From 600 pairs of Jinjiang shoes to 12.28 billion yuan: Anta's Unfinished Globalization
In April 1964, 300 pairs of Japanese running shoes arrived in Portland, Oregon, the United States. 26-year-old Phil Knight carried the shoe boxes into the underground laundry room of his parents' house. Nike did not exist at that time. He and track and field coach Bill Bowerman had just founded Blue Ribbon Sports, operating running shoes of the Japanese brand Onitsuka Tiger. [01]
Two years earlier, Knight wrote a course paper at Stanford Graduate School of Business. The title raised a bold question: Could Japanese sports shoes challenge German sports shoes in the same way that Japanese cameras challenged German cameras? In that era, this was first and foremost an issue about manufacturing costs, product quality and international competition. [02]
In 1987, 17-year-old Ding Shizhong came to Beijing with 600 pairs of Jinjiang-made shoes, searching for markets in every shopping mall one by one. This is not a number fabricated in later memoirs; Anta's own overseas brand history page also records this experience. Of course, corporate history is still the enterprise's narration of its own experience and cannot replace independent archives. [03]
39 years later, the story returns to Germany. On October 7, 2026, Anta announced the completion of the acquisition of 29.06% equity stake in PUMA SE, becoming its largest shareholder. According to the transaction circular previously published by Anta, it purchased 43,014,760 shares at 35 euros per share, with a total price of 1,505,516,600 euros, equivalent to about 12.278 billion RMB at the exchange rate used in the circular. [04][05]
300 Pairs of Japanese Shoes · 600 Pairs of Jinjiang Shoes
29.06% Stake in Puma
300 pairs of Japanese shoes, 600 pairs of Jinjiang shoes, 29.06% stake in Puma. If we only frame them as a story of two young people who finally achieved success, it would be a waste of this piece of history. Putting the more than 100-year history of the German, Japanese, American and Chinese sports shoe industries together, what is really worth asking is: How is the most valuable part of a pair of shoes formed, and why are they mastered by different people and enterprises?
01
In the Beginning, Knowledge, Factories and Brands Were Closely Integrated
One of the important origins of the modern sports shoe industry is Herzogenaurach, a small town in Bavaria, Germany. Around 1919, Adolf Dassler and his elder brother Rudolf Dassler made shoes at their parents' home, and officially registered their brothers' shoe factory in 1924. Product improvements came from the craftsmen's repeated tests on shoe lasts, weight and spikes, as well as the actual feedback from athletes in training and competitions. At the 1936 Berlin Olympics, Jesse Owens won four gold medals wearing the Dassler brothers' running shoes. In 1948, the two brothers split up and embarked on the paths of PUMA and adidas respectively. [06]
At that time, professional knowledge, production equipment, product development, athlete relations and corporate reputation were mostly accumulated in the same shoe factory. A brand had to prove first that its products could meet the needs of athletes before more people could gradually remember its name.
The FORMSTRIP side stripe that PUMA launched in 1958 provides a thought-provoking detail. According to PUMA's official history, the stripe was originally used to help stabilize the foot inside the shoe, and later became a brand recognition element that runs through almost all its footwear products. The functionality of the design is not the same as the commercial recognition value it formed later; nor can the statement of "being protected" in the brand archives be directly equated with a certain definite patent right in today's law. [07]
An enterprise first made shoes better through technology, and later accumulated value beyond products through continuous use, trademarks and consumer trust. What Anta is buying through purchasing PUMA shares today is exactly such a set of brand, sports culture, design, market and organizational assets that have been formed over decades, not several production lines.
02
Nike Did Not Build the Largest Shoe Factory, But Changed Who Organizes Production
When Knight started his business, he was not the owner of a shoe manufacturing factory, but the American distributor of Japanese running shoes. Nike later established its own brand, product R&D and athlete cooperation system, but did not grow along the direction of owning more and more shoe factories.
According to Nike's 2026 fiscal year annual report submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, about 52% of Nike brand footwear is manufactured in Vietnam, 27% in Indonesia, and 16% in China; large-scale production is completed by independent contract manufacturers. Nike undertakes functions such as product definition, design and development, sports science, brand communication and global supply chain coordination. [08]
The material development, manufacturing, testing, marketing and retail of a pair of shoes can gradually take place in different companies and different countries. The activities originally concentrated inside one shoe factory are split apart, and reconnected through contracts, technical standards and long-term cooperation.
Therefore, Nike's leap is not a story of a manufacturer "escaping from manufacturing". It entered the market originally from trade and distribution, and later gradually learned to make scattered knowledge, manufacturing and market resources operate around its own products and brands.
However, being able to organize the global supply chain does not mean permanent market advantages. Nike's revenue in the Greater China region in fiscal year 2026 decreased by 13% at constant exchange rates; its financial performance for the first quarter of fiscal year 2027 still shows that the company is facing pressure from product structure and regional market adjustments. Organizational capabilities must also constantly undergo re-examination by consumers. [08][09]
Two different but interconnected changes have thus emerged in the global sports shoe industry: manufacturing activities are reconfigured between different countries; the organization of products, technologies, brands and markets has also become more complex. The two are not the same national relay race.
03
What Jinjiang Shoe Factories Need to Get Rid of Is Not Manufacturing, But Substitutability
China's footwear industry grew rapidly through overseas orders and OEM processing after the reform and opening up. OEM allowed enterprises to obtain income, and also enabled them to learn quality control, large-scale production and international supply chain rules. Without the accumulation of manufacturing capabilities, it would be difficult for enterprises like Anta to emerge later.
However, between the processing fee and the final price paid by consumers, there is value created by brands, R&D, channels and market relations. Ding Shizhong's experience of selling Jinjiang shoes in Beijing allowed him to access the market side at a relatively early stage. Around 1999, Anta invited Kong Linghui as its brand spokesperson and put advertisements on the sports channel of China Central Television; according to Ding Shizhong's public recollection, the relevant investment was close to the enterprise's profit of that year. The enterprise began to actively invest manufacturing profits in an intangible asset that takes many years to form: consumers' awareness and trust in Anta. [10]
However, shifting from manufacturing to own-brand operation is not the only path for enterprise upgrading.
Shenzhou International is an important counterexample. It has long produced for global apparel brands, but continues to deepen into materials, testing, product development and process collaboration. Its 2006 annual report disclosed that in 2005, it built a fabric laboratory with an area of more than 6,000 square meters, and subsequently passed the acceptance of customers such as Nike, adidas and UNIQLO, and could directly provide fabric and finished garment testing services for these customers; the design and development center operated jointly with Nike was also put into use. It should be noted that the list of laboratory acceptances in this paragraph does not include PUMA, although PUMA was indeed a customer of Shenzhou during the same period. [11]
Shenzhou did not stay in the low value-added links just because it continued to do manufacturing. It formed its own professional barriers through craftsmanship, R&D and customer collaboration. Therefore, the criterion for judging enterprise upgrading should not only be "whether there is its own consumer brand", but whether the knowledge, capabilities and bargaining position mastered by the enterprise have changed.
Xtep, which also grew up in Jinjiang, reminds people that brand acquisition is not a one-way path to success. Xtep acquired the relevant businesses of K-Swiss and Palladium in 2019, and decided to spin them off from the listed group in 2024, transferring them to the controlling shareholder's family to concentrate resources on developing Xtep, Saucony and Merrell; the spin-off was completed in November 2024. This does not mean that the brands disappeared from the market, but that the listed group re-selected its own business boundaries. [12]
An enterprise can build competitiveness through technology, manufacturing, brands, or reconfiguration of resources. The real common point is not to acquire foreign companies, but to constantly find positions that are harder to be replaced.
04
Anta's Second Transformation: Operating Brands Not Created by Itself
In 2009, Anta obtained the relevant businesses of FILA in Chinese Mainland, Hong Kong and Macao. By 2025, the revenue of the FILA division reached 28.469 billion yuan. This achievement shows that Anta has the ability to apply its experience in channels, retail, supply chain and consumer operation to another brand; but it mainly proves the brand re-operation capability in the Chinese market, and cannot be directly extended to an organizational method effective in any market around the world. [13]
In 2019, the consortium participated by Anta completed the acquisition of Amer Sports, whose portfolio includes brands in different sports fields such as Arc'teryx, Salomon and Wilson. Amer Sports' revenue in 2025 increased by 27% year-on-year. This result is the combined effect of multiple factors including the brand's own product strength, consumption trends, local teams and shareholder support, and all the growth cannot be attributed to Anta. [14]
On October 8, the exclusive interview with Ding Shizhong published by Yicai supplemented the "multi-brand operation" with organizational mechanisms that were hardly visible to the outside world in the past. Ding Shizhong said that the group is mainly responsible for strategic consensus, risk control and middle and back-office support such as supply chain, logistics, IT and talents, while each brand is responsible for specific operations; it reduces intervention when the brand operates well, and increases support when it encounters difficulties. [15]
This is of course first and foremost the manager's narration of his own methods, and cannot be directly regarded as independently verified business facts. But it puts forward a valuable management proposition: The capability of a multi-brand group may not only lie in how many resources it can unify, but in knowing which resources should be shared and which judgments must be left to the brands.
What Nike coordinates is mainly the global product development and supply chain network; what Anta is developing is another higher-level capability — to allow brands with independent histories, technologies and consumer groups to use some common resources without losing their own characteristics. Its actual effect has to be tested by individual brands, markets and specific projects.
The transformation between technology and the mass market is also included in this process. Ding Shizhong mentioned that the group hopes to make the technology accumulated in professional sports products serve a wider range of consumers through re-development suitable for daily scenarios. The most important thing here is not to put a mass label on high-end products, but to re-judge which functions are suitable for new usage environments. There is continuous transformation work between professional technology, design, intellectual property and the commercial market, rather than one-time transfer.
05
29.06% Does Not Mean Control: Capital Has Been Delivered, Synergy Remains to Be Proven
On October 7, both Anta and PUMA announced the completion of the transaction, and PUMA at the same time emphasized that it will continue to maintain independent management and brand autonomy. [05][16]
Anta explicitly estimated in its April transaction circular that this transaction will not give it control over PUMA, but will bring "significant influence", so it plans to account for it as an associate using the equity method. The circular discloses that PUMA's supervisory board has a total of seven members, five elected by shareholders and two employee representatives. Anta intends to strive for a maximum of two representatives to enter the supervisory board, but has no direct appointment right; these representatives must be elected by shareholders, and even if all of them are elected, they do not constitute a majority, and must perform their duties for the overall interests of PUMA in accordance with the law. [04]
These corporate governance facts make it impossible to take "Anta will manage PUMA well" as a natural result after the transaction is completed. The supervisory board is not equivalent to the management team, and the significant influence of shareholders is not equivalent to the direct command right over the supply chain, channels and products.
A more simple alternative explanation is long-term investment: PUMA has nearly 80 years of brand assets, but its sales in 2025 were about 7.296 billion euros, down 8.1% year-on-year after exchange rate adjustment; its sales in the second quarter of 2026 still decreased by 9.4% after exchange rate adjustment, and the company is implementing its own inventory, channel and cost restructuring. Anta may judge that its current price does not fully reflect its long-term value. In the exclusive interview, Ding Shizhong also called this transaction a long-term value investment, saying that he has been paying attention to PUMA for ten years. [15][17]
The investment logic and capability logic may exist at the same time, but they cannot replace each other. The future rise of PUMA's stock price or the improvement of its performance will not automatically prove that Anta has created synergy: the restructuring of the original management, the industry cycle and the brand's own adjustments may all play a role.
We need to see at least three layers of evidence: whether Anta has truly entered the agreed governance and cooperation mechanism; whether there are identifiable retail, supply chain, product or technical cooperation between the two parties; after these actions take place, whether there is operational improvement that exceeds what can be explained by the original plan and market changes. Even with the first two layers, we cannot automatically attribute all the results of the third layer to Anta.
Owning the shares has become a fact; the ability to create added value across the independent governance boundaries of the company is only a judgment to be tested.
06
After Buying Global Brands, Who Will Make Anta's Main Brand Go Global?
Ding Shizhong repeatedly emphasized the importance of Anta's main brand in the exclusive interview, and distinguished between enterprise globalization and brand globalization. The former involves the transnational allocation of capital, governance, R&D, supply chain and talents; the latter requires a brand to form stable recognition, selection and repurchase among overseas consumers. [15]
This division in turn raises another question for the acquisition of PUMA: Can the R&D, talent and channel experience obtained from managing global brands flow back and strengthen the brand created by Anta itself?
In 2025, Anta Group's revenue was 80.219 billion yuan, of which the Anta division was 34.754 billion yuan, the FILA division was 28.469 billion yuan, and other brands were 16.996 billion yuan. These three figures are all segment revenues in the financial statements, and cannot be confused with the retail cash flow of the main brand mentioned in the interview. [13]
If the international brand portfolio continues to expand, the group can become a successful investor; but if the original brand does not gain stronger technology, products and recognition from international consumers as a result, then the other half of brand globalization is still not completed.
The experience of the nearly 100-year sports shoe industry also shows that globalization is not a straight line where Germany, Japan, the United States and China take turns to succeed. German brands still exist, Japanese brands still exist, American brands still exist, and production and R&D are distributed in more countries. New enterprises have entered the global network, but the old organizers have not automatically exited as a result.
The particularity of Anta is that an enterprise that grew up in China's manufacturing ecosystem has been able to participate in the allocation of international brands, capital and knowledge resources. The PUMA transaction took it a step forward, but did not answer for it how to convert these resources into sustainable organizational capabilities, and how to feed back Anta's main brand.
Conclusion
Money Can Complete the Delivery, But Cannot Replace Capability
In 1964, Phil Knight looked for American runners with Japanese shoes. In 1987, Ding Shizhong looked for shopping malls in Beijing with Jinjiang shoes. They later took different paths, but none of them stayed in the initial business link forever.