Buying More Despite Mounting Losses? The "Gamble" of Zhangjiajie's Cableways

Zhangjiajie (000430) has proposed a new acquisition plan less than a month after being removed from the delisting risk warning. Recently, the company announced that it plans to acquire a 51% stake in Hunan Wulingyuan Cableway Co., Ltd. for 355 million yuan in cash. The core asset of the company is the franchise of Tianzishan Cableway. It is worth noting that Zhangjiajie actually injected 1.5863 billion yuan of funds after the restructuring last year. This acquisition is equivalent to using about a quarter of the restructuring funds to bet on the cableway business. The cableway was already an important source of income for Zhangjiajie before the restructuring. Now, doubling down on it, is it to deepen resource integration or still trapped in the path - dependence on a single business?

Acquire Tianzishan Cableway for 355 million yuan

Through equity penetration, the actual controller behind this cableway is the Finance Bureau of Wulingyuan District. The Zhangjiajie Industrial Investment Company, which holds a 49% stake, has the same actual controller as Zhangjiajie's major shareholder - Zhangjiajie Economic Development Investment Group Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Jingtou Group"), both being the State - owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Zhangjiajie City (hereinafter referred to as "Zhangjiajie SASAC").

In essence, this cableway belongs to the controlling shareholder system. Acquiring this Tianzishan Cableway is not a supplement of new external assets, but a resource optimization and integration within the same large - scale state - owned asset system.

Looking back to the establishment of this cableway, it was actually invested and established by Hong Kong Anda International Co., Ltd. in 1993. In 1996, the total project investment was more than 80 million RMB, using the single - line circulating detachable grip passenger cableway technology of the Austrian Doppelmayr Company. Its operation right was agreed upon in a contract signed between the Wuling District Government and Anda International, with an operation period from April 1, 1997, to March 31, 2057.

Since then, the cableway has been in operation and development. According to the data arranged by the Zhangjiajie government in 2017, Tianzishan Cableway received about 2.33 million tourists that year. Calculated at about 70 yuan per one - way ticket, its annual operating income was about 150 million yuan. It is a high - quality cash - flow asset with low operating costs and high gross profit.

Until April 2022, the company completed the integration of state - owned assets. The shareholder was changed from "Anda International Resort Paradise Zhangjiajie Co., Ltd." to "Zhangjiajie Wulingyuan Tourism Industry Development Co., Ltd.", and the enterprise type was changed from a wholly - foreign - owned enterprise to a wholly state - owned enterprise.

At that time, Zhangjiajie only held the operation right of Yangjiajie Cableway. One year later, Zhangjiajie found that its subsidiary, Yangjiajie Cableway, and Hunan Wulingyuan Cableway Co., Ltd. (Tianzishan Cableway) under the controlling shareholder Jingtou Group were both engaged in the passenger cableway business in the core scenic area of Wulingyuan, which was the same type of business and constituted horizontal competition.

In order to eliminate horizontal competition and protect the interests of minority shareholders, Zhangjiajie Wulingyuan Tourism Industry Development Co., Ltd. (a subsidiary of Jingtou Group) issued a "Letter of Commitment to Solve Horizontal Competition", promising to transfer and divest 100% of the equity of Wulingyuan Cableway Company to the outside before May 31, 2024. On May 30, 2025, the 100% equity of Wulingyuan Cableway Company completed the industrial and commercial change and was transferred to Zhangjiajie Wulingyuan District All - for - One Tourism Culture Co., Ltd. (the Finance Bureau of Wulingyuan District holds 51% and Zhangjiajie Industrial Investment Company holds 49%), and the horizontal competition was formally resolved.

Now, the Tianzishan Cableway developed in the 20th century has been included in the state - owned assets after going through many twists and turns and is now in the hands of the newly - restructured listed company Zhangjiajie, completing the transition from foreign - funded to state - owned and then to a financing tool.

But it is worth asking why Zhangjiajie is so eager to acquire this cableway less than a month after being removed from the delisting risk warning. It should be noted that in 2025, Zhangjiajie's annual operating income was 459 million yuan, but its net profit attributable to the parent company still had a loss of 549 million yuan. In the first quarter of 2026, the net profit attributable to the parent company was 306 million yuan, a year - on - year increase of 1079.33%, mainly due to the restructuring income of about 327 million yuan recognized from the judicial restructuring. After deducting non - recurring gains and losses, the net profit still had a loss of 2.14234 million yuan, and the cash flow from operating activities was still negative.

It can be said that although Zhangjiajie was "removed from the delisting risk warning" last month, this is only a "clean - up" at the statement level, and its self - hematopoietic ability is still recovering. This eager acquisition of the cableway may be an important part of quickly filling the bleeding hole. After all, from 2020 to 2025, Zhangjiajie has suffered losses for six consecutive years, with a cumulative loss of about 1.331 billion yuan. If the loss continues to expand after the restructuring, market confidence will be further frustrated.

Not Just a "Complementary" Cableway

It is obvious to the market that Zhangjiajie is eager to restore its self - hematopoietic ability, but why did it choose Tianzishan Cableway?

Zhangjiajie announced that this acquisition aims to carry out industrial integration around the main tourism business, improve the transportation layout of the core scenic area of Wulingyuan, and enhance the level of operational integration. More importantly, the target company has high - quality assets and stable profitability, which is expected to bring continuous returns and enhance the overall profitability and risk - resistance ability.

Indeed, in 2025, Hunan Wulingyuan Cableway Co., Ltd., the operating entity of Tianzishan Cableway, achieved an operating income of 112 million yuan. In the first quarter of 2026, the operating income was 16.4714 million yuan, showing a stable source of passenger flow and income. Moreover, in the first half of last year, Tianzishan Cableway received more than 1.5054 million tourists, far exceeding the data of Yangjiajie Cableway under Zhangjiajie in the same period.

Actually, compared with Yangjiajie Cableway, Tianzishan Cableway has advantages in geographical location, recognition, and operating costs. Tianzishan Cableway is located in the northwest of the core scenic area of Wulingyuan, with a closer connection to other major scenic spots in the scenic area (such as Yuanjiajie and Jinbianxi). It is easier for tourists to include it in their itineraries. In contrast, the area where Yangjiajie Cableway is located is relatively marginal, and some tourists may choose other transportation methods due to route planning or time constraints.

In addition, as a representative peak in the Wulingyuan Scenic Area, Tianzishan has a high brand recognition, and tourists have a stronger recognition and willingness to use its cableway. Most tourists regard taking the Tianzishan Cableway as a "must - do item" to experience the Wuling scenery. Although Yangjiajie Cableway also has unique landscapes, its overall recognition is low.

What is more related to cost is that Tianzishan Cableway has undergone several upgrades and renovations, with a stronger carrying capacity (the one - way hourly traffic can reach 2,100 people), higher operating efficiency, and lower unit cost allocation. While Yangjiajie Cableway has relatively high operating costs and a compressed profit margin under the condition of low passenger flow.

At the same time, on the assessment benchmark date (December 31, 2025), the assessed value of the total equity value of the company's shareholders was 695 million yuan. Compared with the book value of 212 million yuan, the assessment increased by 484 million yuan, with an appreciation rate of 228.67%, which further reflects the scarcity and irreplaceability of Tianzishan Cableway as a transportation node in the core scenic area of Wulingyuan.

Not only is it highly competitive within the scenic area, but as the core transportation support, the strong self - hematopoietic ability of the cableway is a common feature of mountain - type scenic areas. The gross profit margin of the cableway business of most listed mountain - type scenic areas is between 70% and 80%, and some scenic areas even exceed 80%. For example, the gross profit margin of the passenger cableway of Emei Mountain A is 79.45%, and the gross profit margin of the cableway and cable car business of Huangshan Tourism is 74.21%. Referring to the data in 2024, the annual gross profit margin of Yangjiajie Cableway was 58.23%. Although it is lower than the industry average, in Zhangjiajie's total operating income of 459 million yuan in 2025, this cableway contributed 75.6194 million yuan, accounting for about 16.5%, still being one of the company's important profit points.

It can be seen that both Yangjiajie and Tianzishan Cableways have a certain profitability, and Tianzishan Cableway has stronger cash flow. Zhangjiajie's eagerness to buy this cableway also reveals the consistent business rule of mountain - type scenic areas: the cableway is not only the core transportation hub but also a stable source of income that such scenic areas prefer to hold.

The Self - Hematopoietic Ability of One Cableway Is Far from Enough

This acquisition is undoubtedly a capital injection into Zhangjiajie's core assets, but problems also emerge after the injection: Can a "complementary" cableway stop Zhangjiajie's continuous bleeding after the restructuring?

Dayong Ancient City is the most loss - making project of Zhangjiajie. Since its trial operation in 2021, due to reasons such as pre - project decision - making mistakes, emphasis on construction over operation, single business format, and scarce passenger flow, it has continued to suffer serious losses and has become the "hard - hit area" dragging down Zhangjiajie's performance. As of 2025, Dayong Ancient City has been in continuous loss for 5 years since its opening, with a cumulative loss of more than 1.1 billion yuan. Last year, Dayong Ancient City entered the judicial restructuring process. At the end of 2025, it was taken over by Hunan Radio and Television (including DianGuang Media and Mango Excellent Media) for restructuring and is planned to reopen in July this year (renamed "Fantasy Dayong City").

Different from the former Dayong Ancient City, Fantasy Dayong City addresses the pain points of single local cultural experience, lack of night - time content, and short tourist stay. It abandons the traditional ancient - city imitation model and emphasizes the integration of "culture and tourism + content + technology", introducing Mango IPs (such as the "Good 6 Street" trendy experience area) and immersive experience areas, and transforming the business format towards youthfulness and trendiness.

This is only the effort on the Mango system level. Other investors include Jifu Qingyuan, which has the mature operation experience of the "Qingming Shanghe Garden" theme park; Caesar Tourism, which provides channel expansion, supply - chain optimization, and membership system sharing; and Zhangjiajie Industrial Investment, which provides capital injection and integration.

However, this transformation is not without risks. First of all, the original positioning of the project is biased towards "urban fantasy" and "youthful" transformation, which does not match the tourist structure and core needs of Zhangjiajie's "natural landscape sightseeing". Relying only on variety show IPs for drainage will create a gap with the local Dayong culture, Xiangxi culture, and Tujia culture, making it difficult to truly attract the target population.

Secondly, the investment entities of Fantasy Dayong City have different backgrounds, and there may be differences in operational decision - making in the future. How to achieve efficient synergy is the core problem. Most importantly, scene transformation, IP construction, and content output all require continuous capital investment, and the capital gap is bottomless.

These problems that have not yet been exposed to the market cannot be solved by simply acquiring a cableway with healthy cash flow. Moreover, the profitability of Tianzishan Cableway is restricted by the joint - operation model of "three cableways and one elevator" with a single - ticket system. According to the joint - operation agreement, the Zhangjiajie Wulingyuan Scenic and Historic Interest Area and National Forest Park Administration first collects the ticket fees uniformly and then distributes them according to the agreed weights: Bailong Elevator accounts for 40.8%, Tianzishan Cableway accounts for 19%, Yangjiajie Cableway accounts for 13%, Huangshi Cableway accounts for 16.2%, and 10% is extracted as management fees and 1% as a flexible amount for assessment rewards.

Under the joint - operation model, with unified ticketing and centralized marketing, the cableway has difficulty in independently setting prices or adjusting prices flexibly, and the regulatory role of the price lever on the off - peak and peak - season revenues is limited. In other words, the growth of passenger flow will not directly translate into profit growth. Pricing power and distribution rules are the core variables for profitability.

Although the cableway business has high gross profit and high - quality cash flow, it is greatly affected by the off - peak and peak seasons and operating rules. It is difficult to drive secondary consumption and increase added value, and cannot support the long - term development of the scenic area. Especially for a restructured company like Zhangjiajie, the cableway consumption model at the sightseeing level is far from enough to promote its transformation.

Hotels May Be the Key to the "Second - Round Entrepreneurship" of Mountain - Type Scenic Areas

It can be said that the competitive advantage of mountain - type scenic areas has shifted from resource advantage to operational advantage, and tourists' travel needs have also changed from "hasty sightseeing" to "in - depth immersive" leisure vacations. High - quality accommodation experiences (such as mountain - side vacations and health - care treatments) can greatly increase tourists' stay time and consumption willingness.

However, the reality is that mountain - type scenic areas generally present a pattern of "strong cableway, weak hotel", and the proportion of the hotel business is far lower than that of the cableway business. Taking the data in 2025 as an example: The cableway and cable - car business of Huangshan Tourism accounts for nearly 40%, and although the hotel business accounts for more than 20%, the gap is obvious; the passenger - cableway business of Emei Mountain A accounts for 40%, and the hotel business accounts for less than 20%; the hotel business of Jiuhua Mountain accounts for nearly 30%, still lower than the cableway business; the cable - way transportation business of Lijiang Co., Ltd. accounts for nearly 50%, and the hotel - operation business only accounts for more than 20%.

However, mountain - type scenic areas have increased their investment in the hotel business, conforming to the trend of transformation from "single - sightseeing tourism" to "leisure - vacation tourism". Huangshan Tourism renovated and upgraded old hotels such as Beihai Hotel and Tangquan Hotel to increase high - gross - profit rooms and reception capacity; Lijiang Co., Ltd. introduced brands such as InterContinental and Indigo to operate its hotels in a light - asset model; Emei Mountain A self - operates hotels such as Hongzhushan Hotel and Emei Mountain Hotel, deeply integrating service quality with scenic - area resources; Xiangyuan Cultural Tourism acquired a professional operation company to carry out brand output and light - asset operation for hotels in scenic areas such as Qiyun Mountain, improving overall efficiency.

However, a series of actions still cannot change the "supporting" and "complementary" role of the hotel business. It will still take time for the hotel business to surpass the cableway business, which is the core revenue source. If hotels are regarded as the key to the "second - round entrepreneurship" of mountain - type scenic areas, what problems need to be solved urgently?

On the one hand, there is an extreme differentiation between the off - peak and peak seasons, and it is difficult to revitalize the idle resources in the off - season. Different from market hotels in ordinary city centers and transportation hubs, the location of mountain - type hotels is strongly related to passenger flow and the scenic area. Hotels on the mountain are restricted by the scenic - area ticket policy and transportation conditions. Although they have scarcity and landmark features, their accessibility is poor; hotels at the foot of the mountain are located around the scenic area, with relatively better accessibility, but they face fierce competition from similar hotels in the vicinity.

Moreover, the customer groups of mountain - type hotels are relatively vertical, mainly targeting sightseeing tourists, vacation tourists, and those seeking natural healing. They are greatly affected by seasons, weather, and holidays. In the off - season, the passenger flow drops sharply, and hotels are largely vacant, resulting in a significant fluctuation in annual operating income and making it difficult to achieve stable profit growth.

On the other hand, there