What exactly do China's science and technology innovation services aim to deliver?
For a scientific research achievement to step out of the laboratory, the hardest moment is often not "failing to find the right technology", but the next party dare not take over the project.
Enterprises have reviewed the papers and seen the samples, but they cannot tell whether the achievement can be integrated into their own process, cost and quality systems; investors recognize the technical direction, but do not know which verifiable progress the next round of funding can bring; scientific research teams are willing to promote the transformation of the achievement, but there may be no one in charge of production, sales, compliance and continuous financing. As a result, the projects that have been signed, stored in the database and participated in roadshows still remain stagnant. The real deliverable of China's science and innovation services is the "handoverability" of scientific and technological achievements: to enable the personnel at the next stage to take over the project based on evidence, with resources and clear responsibilities. This definition is stricter than "facilitating transactions". A transaction can be signed in one afternoon; handoverability must answer four questions: whether the industrial problem has been clearly stated, whether the technical evidence can be rechecked, who will bear the funds and risks of the next stage, and which organization will continue to operate the project after the handover. Missing any of the four, the so-called transformation may only pass the uncertainty to the next party.
I. Quite a number of bridges have been built, why is the handover still difficult?
A few years ago, in the article "What Kind of Industry-University-Research System Does China Need?" published by "Focus and Peripheral Vision", we discussed the applied research organizations that connect "academia" and "industry". Looking back today, this judgment still holds value, but the problem has moved forward: we have more bridges, but has the handover mechanism on the bridges really taken shape?
According to the report of the State Council on the promotion of the commercialization of scientific and technological achievements, by the end of 2024, universities and research institutes have built a total of 2364 technology transfer institutions; more than 200 concept verification centers are under accelerated construction, and more than 2400 pilot test verification platforms have been included in the gradient cultivation reserve pool. "Being included in the reserve pool" here does not mean that all platforms have been completed and put into operation. The scale of institutions and projects shows that the main contradiction today can no longer be simply summarized as "the lack of intermediaries".
What is more worth paying attention to is what happens after the platforms are completed. The 2026 deliberation opinion of the Standing Committee of Jiangsu Provincial People's Congress points out that some concept verification centers and pilot test platforms have problems such as repeated layout, low marketization degree, insufficient professional talents, and poor connection between front and rear links. Some platforms add a new sign to the original institution, but do not establish an operation mechanism covering achievement screening, technical verification, risk assessment and commercial feasibility analysis. In the survey, some platforms also reflected that the pressure of audit and accountability after failure makes institutions tend to avoid high-risk projects. This is the survey conclusion of Jiangsu province, which cannot be directly taken as the national proportion; but it reveals a structural problem worthy of inquiry across the country: the sign, equipment and project entrance of the platform can be obtained through construction; to make the entity at the next stage willing to sign for the handover, it relies on continuous judgment and responsibility arrangement.
In the past, when we talked about the "Valley of Death", we often imagined it as a blank gap between the scientific research end and the industrial end. In fact, many projects fall into the blank of the next link from a completed link: there are no enterprise-applicable indicators after the paper, no pilot test budget after the sample, no procurement decision after the pilot test, and no operation team after the contract is signed. What is missing here is not a single docking activity, but a set of handover systems that can make risks gradually verifiable and sharable.
II. Jianxin Optoelectronics: Why are funds willing to enter before the products mature?
The process in which Jiangsu Industrial Technology Research Institute supports Jianxin Optoelectronics provides a window for observing early-stage hard technology projects. According to the interview of the China Intellectual Property News with the founding team, the Industrial Technology Research Institute and the park investors, when the team started its business with optical communication chip technology, social capital worried about the long return cycle, while early investment from industrial capital might limit its access to more customers. The project did not get a large sum of investment at the beginning, but 300,000 yuan of preparation funds; the founder Li Kun continued to carry out commercial verification and team building as a project manager.
In the next 3 to 6 months, the staff of the Industrial Technology Research Institute accompanied the project team to visit customers, find partners, and invite investment and legal personnel to participate in the evaluation. The significance of this link is not just to add "market opinions" to expert reviews, but to put three issues on the table in advance: who may use this technology? What indicators need to be met to be eligible to enter the customer's system? Once the company is established, how to arrange intellectual property rights, equity and R&D objectives?
After passing this stage, the team invested 3 million yuan, Jiangsu Industrial Technology Research Institute provided 9 million yuan of R&D funds, and Suzhou Industrial Park provided 9 million yuan of R&D funds and added 9 million yuan of investment. The total funds of all parties listed in the report are about 30 million yuan, and the founding team holds nearly 80% of the shares. The support funds are not paid in one lump sum, most of which are allocated according to the scientific research project contract and phased objectives; the "combination of allocation and investment" designed by the Industrial Technology Research Institute also takes the subsequent market financing as an important node for the conversion of financial R&D support into equity. The Regulations of Jiangsu Province on the Promotion of the Development of Industrial Technology Research Institute provides an institutional basis for mechanisms such as project managers, stage management and fault tolerance.
The key of this case does not lie in the number of "30 million yuan", but in the risk arrangement: the team shows its commitment with cash and intellectual property rights, public funds provide phased support for high-risk R&D, and market financing participates in price discovery. The founder retains the operating motivation, and public funds do not have to pretend to have mastered the definite equity valuation when the technology is not yet mature.
As of the report, Jianxin Optoelectronics stated that it completed the R&D objectives within the project cycle in 2023, and started formal production at the end of that year. This is enough to prove that the project has crossed a threshold of R&D organization and product manufacturing, but not enough to prove stable orders, profitability or long-term competitive advantages. Public materials do not provide independently verifiable data on customer procurement, revenue and repurchase; describing it as a successful industrialization will once again confuse "someone takes over the baton" and "has finished the whole journey".
A truly effective science and innovation service institution precisely needs to know which stop it has delivered to. At this stop of Jianxin Optoelectronics, what it delivers is an operating entity with intellectual property rights, team, segmented funds and R&D objectives, enabling the products to move forward to customer verification and market financing.
III. YJ2301: What the technology manager changed is not the introduction list, but the fate of the project
Another path takes place in the field of innovative drugs. The drug candidate developed by the team of Li Fei from Nanjing Medical University was originally targeted at the recovery stage of stroke. According to the interview of Xinhua Daily with the participants, the team of Xia Zheng from Suzhou Science and Technology Enterprise Equity Service Co., Ltd. believed that the clinical verification and market access of the original indication were difficult, so they suggested prioritizing the verification of its potential in the field of analgesia, and participated in supplementing experimental data, patent layout, transaction structure design and industrial docking, which took more than a year to promote the cooperation. This is the project process described by the participants, and public materials cannot independently prove the specific contribution proportion of each step. But the terms of the agreement can be checked against the announcements of listed companies. In December 2025, Jiudian Pharmaceutical signed the YJ2301 patent and technology transfer agreement with Suzhou Yuanju Pharmaceutical founded by Li Fei's team. According to the agreement, after paying the first milestone payment, Jiudian obtains the relevant global rights and interests of the project, and is responsible for the subsequent R&D, production and commercialization. At that time, the project only completed part of the preclinical research. According to the announcement of Jiudian Pharmaceutical, the total transfer fee shall not exceed 400 million yuan, of which the milestone fee shall not exceed 11 million yuan, and the rest is mainly the sales share after the product is approved for listing in the future, with a maximum share of 389 million yuan. Jiudian also stated that the transaction will not have a significant impact on its recent operating results.
The relationship between these figures explains the achievement transformation better than the "400 million yuan transfer": 400 million yuan is the upper limit of payment in the agreement, not the current transaction income; the sales share depends on whether the project can go through clinical trials, approval and listing sales. The agreement arranges the subsequent development for enterprises with stronger drug R&D and commercialization capabilities, and the scientific research team retains part of the future income; the early payment of the transferee enterprise is constrained by milestones, and the larger consideration is bound to the subsequent results. This is a cross-organizational and cross-stage risk allocation.
From this perspective, the work of technology managers has a clearer boundary. His work does not end after introducing the professor to the pharmaceutical company and collecting a matchmaking fee. The really valuable action is to find that the original application path is difficult to be taken over, organize the verification of new uses, supplement the evidence and right arrangements that can enter the transaction, and then find the industrial entity willing to bear the next stage of risks.
Of course, the fact that a pharmaceutical enterprise takes over a preclinical project does not mean that the drug has been launched on the market. The 2025 annual report abstract of Jiudian Pharmaceutical still describes YJ2301 as a preclinical project. The phased achievement here is that the R&D rights and subsequent responsibilities have been handed over; clinical success and commercial returns still need to be tested by future facts.
IV. What on earth to deliver? Not a report, but four consecutive results
The two projects are in completely different industries, one follows the path of entrepreneurship and "combination of allocation and investment", the other follows the path of technology transfer and milestone payment; but their underlying work is similar.
First, rewrite "good technology" into "whose problem it solves". Scientific research achievements are usually described by principles, performance, papers and patents; while enterprise decision-making starts from customer pain points, alternative solutions, process compatibility, regulatory requirements and procurement budget. Jianxin Optoelectronics needs to find out whether the chip can enter the real customer system, and YJ2301 needs to find indications with clearer clinical paths. If it is not even clear who will pay to solve the problem, any valuation is premature.
Second, rewrite technical commitments into evidence that can be rechecked by the next party. Concept verification is not to "prove that it is very advanced", but to answer whether it is worthy of entering the next round under the agreed scenarios, indicators, controls and failure conditions. The manufacturing industry may focus on yield rate, stability, unit cost and continuous operation; pharmaceutical projects focus on preclinical data, patent boundaries and the next stage of development plan. The report should state what has not been passed, not just what has been achieved.
Third, rewrite financial support into phased risk arrangements. Who will pay for this round of verification fee? What nodes need to be reached before investing the next sum? Who has the right to stop the project in case of failure? Public funds, enterprise R&D budgets and venture capital bear different risks, and cannot be measured by the same set of "contract amount". The segmented funds of Jianxin Optoelectronics and the milestone plus sales share of YJ2301 both leave the uncertainty to the person who is most capable of judging and most motivated to deal with it.
Fourth, rewrite project implementation into an operating organization with clear rights and responsibilities. Who the patent is transferred to, which company the team joins, who is responsible for subsequent financing, mass production, registration or sales, must be clarified at the time of handover. Scientists can continue to serve as technical leaders, and they do not have to be required to complete enterprise operation alone; entrepreneurs cannot just take an authorization and expect the original laboratory to complete productization automatically. For the project to move forward, there must be an entity that can make continuous decisions, bear profits and losses, and sign contracts with external parties.
Therefore, the product of science and innovation services can be a set of "handover notes" instead of just roadshow PPT: a list of industrial problems, which clarifies customers, scenarios, alternative solutions and the willingness to pay; a list of verification results, which clarifies indicators, samples, costs, unqualified items and the next round of tests; a list of handover responsibilities, which clarifies ownership of rights, next sum of funds, milestones, exit conditions and operating person in charge. The three lists do not necessarily exist in the form of tables, but these information must be available for the next decision-maker to review independently.
V. Who is the "insider"? See if he can promote the next party to sign
In this ecosystem, scientists, entrepreneurs, technology managers, investors, parks and platforms have different positions. No title naturally represents "understanding of achievement transformation". Scientists know the mechanism and boundary of technology best, but may not know which customer will make the purchase; entrepreneurs understand the needs and operational constraints, but may not have the ability to judge the failure probability of cutting-edge technology; investors can allocate capital, but are usually not responsible for the long-term engineering of a certain technology; the government and platforms can build public capabilities, but cannot replace the market to complete every product selection. The value of technology managers is to organize continuous actions between these judgments, and know when to hand over the project to a more appropriate person.
To judge whether a technology manager is really experienced, we can ask very specific questions: can he name the purchasers and vetoes in the target industrial chain? Can he rewrite the scientific research indicators into customer acceptance indicators? Does he know the cost and failure conditions of the next round of verification? Can he handle patent ownership, income distribution and conflict of interest? The most critical point is whether he has found the next party who is willing to continue to bear the risks with his own budget, equipment, team or credit.
The public role of Xia Zheng's team in YJ2301 at least shows that "redefining application scenarios, organizing evidence and arranging transactions" is closer to the core of this profession than simply introducing two parties to each other. The project manager and the Industrial Technology Research Institute team in the Jianxin Optoelectronics case show another practice of "visiting customers, forming teams, and allocating funds in stages". But a single project cannot prove the long-term winning rate of an individual or institution. To call someone an "insider" in the industry, we still need to look at his continuous project records, including the performance after unsuccessful transactions, failed exits and handover.
The transition from a scientist to an entrepreneur is not a one-time identity conversion ceremony. A more common path is that scientists hold on to technical judgment, while operators take charge of market and organizational responsibilities, and the two form a division of labor in the same company or transaction structure. Requiring scientists to invent, finance, build factories and sell products at the same time seems to respect talents, but in fact it makes the most scarce people bear all the uncertainties alone.
VI. How science and innovation services survive also determines what they deliver
If we only assess how many projects the platform has received and how many activities it has held, we will get more and more project entrances; if we pay commissions only according to the amount of technology contracts, we will easily reward "large order announcements" and ignore whether the subsequent implementation is feasible; if we require institutions to be fully responsible for their own profits and losses, they may only approach low-risk projects in the market, leaving the early-stage technologies most in need of public support in place.
Therefore, science and innovation services cannot assume that there is only one payer and one charging method. Enterprises pay for clear testing, trial production, entrusted R&D and technical problems; public funds pay for verification capabilities with external benefits that enterprises are temporarily unwilling to bear alone; project companies compensate for long-term accompanying support and early risks through equity or subsequent income distribution. The three types of income correspond to three different responsibilities: service income is responsible for the agreed results, public funds are responsible for the process and resource use, and equity income needs to undergo long-term market tests.
This is not limited to institutional design. The above-mentioned Jiangsu Provincial People's Congress research report disclosed that Jiangsu Weikail Biomedical Pilot Test Platform achieved a service income of more than 180 million yuan in 2024, and the CRRC Qishuyan Institute Rail Transit Pilot Test Platform achieved a service income of 85.06 million yuan in the past two years. These figures show that platforms with professional equipment, engineering capabilities and external customers can generate service income;