HomeArticle

All 47,000 fund investors have suffered losses across the board, and the top-tier star aura of Liu Yanchun has been completely shattered.

达摩财经2026-09-11 09:23
Fund managers whose funds have plunged over the past year, leaving all their investors in the red.

Liu Yanchun spent decades growing from a researcher to a top-tier fund manager managing hundreds of billions of assets, only to fall in just one year to become a fund manager whose all investors suffered losses.

On May 1 this year, the new regulations on public offering fund information disclosure system came into formal implementation. Active equity products that have been established for more than one year are required to disclose the proportion of profitable investors in the past year in their semi-annual reports and annual reports, which means the public will be informed of how many investors have made money from this product in the past year.

Now the 2026 semi-annual reports of public offering funds have been fully released, and the profitability situation of fund investors of active equity funds has also been announced. Data shows that among more than 5,600 funds that have disclosed this indicator so far, 120 products have achieved full profitability for all investors in the past year (the unified statistical interval is from July 1, 2025 to June 30, 2026), more than 50% of the funds have a proportion of profitable investors reaching 90%, and the average proportion of profitable investors is about 79.15%.

However, in this round of statistics, 8 products performed unsatisfactorily, with the proportion of profitable investors being 0%, which means all investors suffered losses.

Among the fund managers managing these products with zero profitable investors, there are many well-known fund managers in the market such as Liu Yanchun, the top star fund manager of Invesco Great Wall, and Li Bo, the Tsinghua top student fund manager of AXA SPDB Investment.

Among them, Invesco Great Wall Jiying Growth Two-Year Closed Open-end Fund managed by Liu Yanchun had about 47,000 holders at the end of the first half of the year, with individual investors accounting for more than 99%, making retail investors the biggest losers in this round of losses.

This product has always been dominated by the consumption style before. In the past year, the heavy positions in the first three quarters were highly stable, almost all of which were leading stocks in the consumer and pharmaceutical sectors. By the second quarter of 2026, most of the top ten heavy positions have been occupied by individual stocks in the AI industrial chain, and Kweichow Moutai has dropped from the largest heavy position to the tenth place.

This large position adjustment stems from the adjustment of the product's investment research team. Meng Qi, the newly added co-managing fund manager of Invesco Great Wall Jiying Growth Two-Year Closed Open-end Fund in early June this year, is an investment research professional focusing on the technology track. However, Meng Qi took over the fund at an unfavorable time, when the surging market of the technology sector was coming to an end. Even though the product added a large number of technology stocks to its heavy positions in the second quarter, it obviously failed to catch up with the rising trend of the technology sector in terms of performance.

Invesco Great Wall Occupies Two Spots

In the past year, some investors of Invesco Great Wall have had a tough time. Among the 8 products with zero profitability for all investors, Invesco Great Wall takes up two spots.

In addition to Invesco Great Wall Jiying Growth Two-Year Closed Open-end Fund managed by Liu Yanchun, the other one is Invesco Great Wall Value Steady Progress Three-Year Closed Open-end Fund managed by Liu Su. The two above-mentioned products have accumulated declines of 5.01% and 4.16% respectively in the past year, trapping a total of about 75,000 holders.

Both Liu Yanchun and Liu Su are experienced veterans in the industry, but Liu Su's steady and balanced investment style makes the performance and reputation of his products not as "brilliant" as Liu Yanchun's.

In fact, Liu Yanchun's performance in the past two years has been far worse than before. Due to his long-term focus on the consumer track, many of his funds have heavily bet on stocks in the liquor and pharmaceutical sectors, and still stick to the liquor and other industries when the consumer sector is in a slump, leading to a sharp decline in the performance of all his managed products.

As of June 30 this year, among the 6 products under his management, 5 have recorded negative cumulative net value growth rates in the past year, among which Invesco Great Wall Emerging Growth Mixed Fund, Excellent Performance Growth Mixed Fund, and Domestic Demand Growth No.2 Fund have all fallen by more than 10%. The only product that achieved performance growth, Invesco Great Wall Dingyi LOF, also underperformed its performance benchmark by 2.6 percentage points.

Although only Invesco Great Wall Jiying Growth Two-Year Closed Open-end Fund under Liu Yanchun's management has suffered losses for all investors, it does not mean that other products have made money for most of their holders.

According to the fund's semi-annual report, the proportion of profitable investors of Invesco Great Wall Emerging Growth Mixed Fund, Domestic Demand Growth No.2 Fund, Excellent Performance Growth Mixed Fund, and Domestic Demand Growth Fund managed by Liu Yanchun in the past year is 19.01%, 17.03%, 22.55% and 23.3% respectively. These figures are far lower than the average proportion of 79.15% for profitable investors, and Invesco Great Wall Emerging Growth Mixed Fund is also one of the products with the largest number of loss-making investors in the whole market.

However, not all products performed poorly, Invesco Great Wall Dingyi LOF under his management performed very well, with a remarkable 91.6% of profitable investors.

But this achievement cannot be entirely attributed to Liu Yanchun. Since the beginning of this year, many products under Liu Yanchun's management have successively added co-managing fund managers, and Invesco Great Wall Dingyi LOF is one of them.

The newly hired fund manager Ke Haidong is also a veteran in investment research, whose investment style tends to be a balanced allocation that takes the consumer sector as the base position and adds technology positions to capture more growth opportunities.

Since Ke Haidong began to manage Invesco Great Wall Dingyi LOF on May 9, the net value of this fund has risen significantly. In the first four months of 2026, the cumulative net value growth rate of Invesco Great Wall Dingyi within the year was still negative; by the end of June, the cumulative net value growth rate within the year had reached 6.22%. At that time, Ke Haidong had been in office for less than two months, and his return on employment had reached 26%.

It is not difficult to see from the fund positions that the reason why Invesco Great Wall Dingyi LOF turned positive in the first half of the year is mainly the change of its positions. In the second quarter, all the top ten heavy positions of this product were replaced, switching from the previous heavy bets on the consumer sectors such as liquor and medical care to the AI technology growth track.

Closed-open Funds Have Become the "Hardest Hit Area" of Zero Profit

In addition to the two funds of Invesco Great Wall, the remaining six funds with losses for all investors are ABC-CA Hongye Three-Year Closed Open-end Fund, UBS SDIC Hong Kong Stock Connect 6-Month Closed Open-end Stock Fund, Founder Fubon Xinyi One-Year Closed Open-end Mixed Fund, CSC Beijing Stock Exchange Select Two-Year Closed Open-end Fund, AXA SPDB Bojian Growth One-Year Closed Open-end Fund, and Fullgoal Vision Select Three-Year Closed Open-end Fund.

According to the product information, the scale of these 8 products ranges from 50 million yuan to 1.1 billion yuan; the heavily invested industries are not completely the same, covering industries such as automobile, communication, non-bank finance, and food, and their interval declines are also quite differentiated.

iFinD data shows that as of June 30 this year, the top three funds with the largest declines in the past year are AXA SPDB Bojian Growth One-Year Closed Open-end Fund, UBS SDIC Hong Kong Stock Connect 6-Month Closed Open-end Stock Fund, and CSC Beijing Stock Exchange Select Two-Year Closed Open-end Fund, with cumulative declines of 34.98%, 16.72% and 13.08% respectively, which are also the funds with the most serious net value declines in the first half of this year. The remaining 5 funds all have declines of less than 6% in the past year.

The fund with the largest performance contrast is undoubtedly CSC Beijing Stock Exchange Select Two-Year Closed Open-end Fund. At the end of 2025, this fund ranked 65th among 4329 similar products with a cumulative net value growth rate of 105.33%. But in the first half of this year, the fund fell by 22.77% in half a year.

On the whole, the similarity of these 8 products is not very high, and the only common point is that they all belong to regular closed-open funds. In general, investors can choose to buy or sell funds on their own, but the biggest feature of regular closed-open funds is that they cannot be subscribed or redeemed during the closed period.

Among these 8 products, the closed operation period of 6 products completely covers the statistical interval of the proportion of profitable investors in the past year (July 1, 2025 - June 30, 2026). The remaining two products, Founder Fubon Xinyi One-Year Closed Open-end Fund A and UBS SDIC Hong Kong Stock Connect 6-Month Closed Open-end Stock Fund, were open for subscription and redemption during the statistical interval, but the open period was very short.

That is to say, even if the holders of these products know that the net value of the fund is in a continuous declining stage, they cannot sell it halfway. This is one of the factors that make closed-open funds the hardest hit area of zero profitability.

However, the mechanism of closed-open funds is not the root cause of this phenomenon. More than 170 closed-open funds have disclosed the proportion of profitable investors this year, with the median of this indicator reaching 99.88%, and 56 products that have achieved positive returns in the past year have a 100% proportion of profitable investors.

The real reason for the zero profitability of these products, in addition to the rotation of market styles, is also related to the position adjustment strategy of fund managers.

In the second quarter, the top ten positions of AXA SPDB Bojian Growth One-Year Closed Open-end Fund A managed by Li Bo were concentrated in the Hong Kong stock technology and intelligent electric vehicle tracks, but the performance of the automobile market was mediocre, dragging down the overall performance; CSC Beijing Stock Exchange Select Two-Year Closed Open-end Fund heavily invested in small and medium-sized specialized and new stocks on the Beijing Stock Exchange, and the shrinking liquidity of the Beijing Stock Exchange had a certain impact on its performance.

However, a close look at the fund semi-annual reports shows that many fund managers attribute the loss to AI. Leng Wenpeng, the fund manager managing CSC Beijing Stock Exchange Select Two-Year Closed Open-end Fund, said that he had insufficient expectation for the continuous downturn of the small-cap stock style and limited layout in artificial intelligence. Li Bo also said that the domestic demand of the two industries of consumer electronics and automobiles was squeezed by both rising costs and delayed demand, but the physical commodities that are most likely to be empowered by AI first are also consumer electronics and automobiles, and he will continue to wait patiently for the operating inflection point in the future.

This article is from the WeChat official account "Damo Finance" (ID: damofinance), the author is Damo Finance, and 36Kr is authorized to release it.