Hebei has disposed of 85 energy storage projects in a single move, and a total of 240 energy storage projects have been scrapped across the country in the past year, bringing an end to the game of "snatching project quotas to occupy spots".
Many regions are clearing idle energy storage projects, pushing the industry toward practical implementation and operation.
Foresee Energy learned that on August 20, the Development and Reform Commission of Hebei Province issued the "Public Notice on Independent Energy Storage Projects Proposed to Postpone Construction and Cancel Construction Plans in Hebei Province", with 85 projects being disposed of in a centralized manner. Among them, 69 projects are postponed and 16 directly cancel their construction plans, involving a total scale of 11.655 million kilowatts. Among the 100 sampled independent energy storage projects, only 4 have been connected to the grid.
Hebei is not the only province taking action. In Shanxi, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Jilin, more than 240 energy storage projects have been abolished in total over the past year, with a total scale exceeding 86GWh.
Previously, obtaining the record-filing was equivalent to locking in profits, but now this path has been completely blocked. The industry is shifting from the logic of "whoever gets the indicators wins the market" to "whoever gets grid-connected wins the market".
Commencement within 9 months and grid connection within 15 months: time has become a rigid requirement
Hebei's move this time is well-founded.
In April this year, the Development and Reform Commission of Hebei Province issued a notice setting two red lines: projects included in the provincial construction plan must start substantial construction within 9 months and complete grid connection and put into operation within 15 months. Only one extension application is allowed, with a maximum period of no more than 6 months. If construction still cannot start after the extension, the qualification will be directly cancelled.
Before the project is connected to the grid and put into operation, except for internal transfer within the group, any change of investment subject and shareholder equity is strictly prohibited.
"Substantial construction" is no longer something that can be fooled by holding a ceremony. It requires the simultaneous implementation of land pre-examination and grid access opinions, the completion of the first concrete pouring in the energy storage area and the step-up station, as well as on-site verification by the competent authority.
The disposed projects are concentrated in three categories.
The first category: the registered capital is not in place, and the financing has not been closed.
The second category: the grid access conditions are not met, and the section power flow does not meet the grid connection requirements.
The third category: the enterprise itself has no energy storage operation capacity, and the original declaration was only aimed at policy indicators.
Hebei is not an isolated case. Major new energy provinces across the country are doing the same thing, only with different rhythms and priorities.
Shanxi follows the route of "high-frequency adjustment". In January 2026, 72 projects were removed from the project library; in the first quarter of 2026, another 31 projects were removed from the library. Shanxi is characterized by high frequency and normalization, with dynamic adjustments every quarter.
Ningxia is the representative of "batch abolition". In February 2026, Litong District of Wuzhong City abolished 9 projects at one time, with a total investment of over 5.4 billion yuan. Since 2025, Ningxia has abolished seven batches of 35 energy storage projects, with a total scale of 5.8GW/15.5GWh. The problem in Ningxia is the most typical: a large number of project record-filing certificates have expired, and the projects are occupied without any promotion.
Inner Mongolia adopts the strategy of "penetrating supervision". Two projects with a total capacity of 500MW/3GWh were terminated on suspicion of reselling indicators, and the construction indicators were recovered by the official. During the construction period of the project and within two years after it is put into operation, the equity shall not be changed at will. Inner Mongolia is characterized by directly investigating equity changes, targeting the gray chain of "reselling project approvals".
Xinjiang uses the method of "forcing commencement through commitment". A typical case in Jiashi County: after obtaining the record-filing, the enterprise made a written commitment to "fully start construction within three months", but failed to act for a long time, and was finally cleared out.
The common point of these five provinces is to clear "paper projects". The differences are that Shanxi implements high-frequency adjustment, Ningxia carries out batch abolition, Inner Mongolia implements penetrating supervision, and Xinjiang forces progress through commitments. With different means, they share the same goal — to clear out the projects that occupy indicators but do not carry out construction.
The energy storage bidding market also frequently "hits the brakes". In May this year, a total of 12 energy storage EPC projects across China issued announcements of bid abandonment or bidding termination, with a total scale of more than 5GWh, about one third of which are concentrated in Shanxi. The EPC of the 100MW/200MWh project in Xigang Town, Tengzhou City, Shandong Province issued a termination announcement only one day after the bidding announcement was released. The EPC of the 200MW/800MWh project in Wusu City, Xinjiang, terminated the bidding for the third time.
Easy record-filing but difficult grid connection: there is a huge gap between the "letter of intent" and the "official approval"
The apparent reason for this cleaning storm is the tightening of policies, but the real bottleneck lies on the grid side.
For an energy storage project, the most critical step from record-filing to grid connection is to obtain the "access system design review opinion" from the power grid enterprise. Without this opinion, the project will always stay on paper.
But it is precisely this step that has stuck most projects.
The common practice in the industry is to apply to the power grid company for a "letter of intent for access" at the project declaration stage. Considering factors such as matching new energy consumption indicators and local project reserve, power grid companies usually cooperate to issue this letter of intent. Many developers, after obtaining this letter of intent, think that the access is guaranteed, and use it to go through record-filing, obtain indicators and seek investment.
The real threshold comes later.
When the project enters the stage of substantial promotion, the power grid enterprise will start the detailed access system design review. At this time, problems are exposed. The output capacity of a substation bay and a transmission section is a physical upper limit, which cannot be connected without restriction. A dozen energy storage projects often apply for registration in the same grid section, but the actual acceptable capacity may only be enough for one or two projects to connect to the grid.
The review conclusion finally given by the power grid enterprise is often "the section power flow does not meet the requirements", "no access conditions are available" or "large-scale capacity expansion and transformation is required". This written conclusion directly sentences the project to death.
Many projects obtained the letter of intent at the time of declaration and thought everything was fine. When they were about to start construction, they found that the official approval could not be obtained. All the pre-investment in land pre-examination, survey and design, and equipment procurement were in vain.
This is not a technical problem, but a rhythm mismatch between power grid planning and power source construction.
The record-filing of energy storage projects is the responsibility of the local energy competent department, but the grid access is independently reviewed by power grid enterprises. There is no effective connection between the two. In order to boost investment, local governments issue a large number of record-filings and give out indicators. However, the capacity expansion and transformation of the power grid requires a planning cycle of 3 to 5 years. The two sides go their own way, and finally the projects cannot be implemented, with developers taking the blame.
The signal released by Document No. 114 is very clear: capacity price does not support idle projects. But even if the policy is not tightened, these projects cannot be connected to the grid.
In January 2026, the National Development and Reform Commission and the National Energy Administration issued the "Notice on Improving the Generation-side Capacity Price Mechanism" (Fa Gai Jia Ge [2026] No. 114), which established the grid-side independent new energy storage capacity price mechanism for the first time at the national level. However, the capacity price is no longer a universal benefit. The document clearly implements list-based management: only projects included in the provincial dynamic list and actually connected to the grid after implementation are eligible to enjoy the policy. Projects outside the list will no longer be given capacity price.
The logic of Document No. 114 is very clear. The capacity price will eventually be "included in the local system operation cost". In order to prevent the increase of user electricity prices, local governments need to control not only the capacity price level, but also the scale of capacity price. Energy storage can be filed without restriction, but substation bays and section regulation capabilities have physical upper limits. When formulating the list, local governments will inevitably give priority to projects that actually have the conditions for implementation.
Even if the qualification for capacity price is obtained, the assessment is becoming stricter. Every month, the energy storage power station shall declare the maximum discharge power and continuous discharge duration of the next month to the power grid enterprise. If the declared capacity cannot be provided according to the dispatching instruction during operation, 50% of the monthly capacity electricity fee will be deducted for two occurrences within the month, and 100% will be deducted for three occurrences. If the monthly full deduction of capacity electricity fee occurs three times in a natural year, the qualification will be directly cancelled.
After the mandatory energy storage allocation is cancelled, the leasing demand drops sharply, and energy storage must learn to make profits on its own
By the end of June 2026, the cumulative installed capacity of new energy storage across China reached 153GW/396GWh. However, the newly added installed capacity in the first half of 2026 was only 17GW, with a year-on-year decrease of 20% in power, which is the first year-on-year decline in half-year newly added installed capacity in recent years.
The industry is shifting from the "volume expansion" cycle to the "gear shifting" cycle.
At present, the revenue of most independent energy storage projects consists of three parts: capacity price, capacity leasing, and peak-valley arbitrage. But the reality in 2026 is that after the cancellation of mandatory energy storage allocation, the leasing demand drops sharply, and some regions face the awkward situation of "available capacity but no tenants".
Take a 100MW/200MWh project in North China as an example. If the capacity leasing rate is lower than 60%, even if the full capacity electricity fee is obtained, the internal rate of return of total investment is still less than 4%. The five-year bank loan interest rate is 3.5% — such a low return cannot beat inflation, let alone cover the previous investment.
The real way out lies in the refined trading in the spot electricity market. Some projects in Shanxi earn an extra 0.2 yuan per kWh of electricity in the spot market through the strategy of "declaring volume and price". But this is the work of professional traders, not something that speculators reselling indicators can do.
This large-scale project cleaning has released three clear policy signals.
First, obtaining indicators does not mean obtaining profits. The capacity price is no longer a universal benefit, and only projects that are actually implemented can enjoy the policy dividends.
Second, grid access is an insurmountable rigid constraint. There is a real threshold between the letter of intent and the official approval. Without the access system design review opinion, no matter how many record-filings you have, they are just waste paper.
Third, operation capacity has become the core threshold. The assessment of capacity price is getting stricter and stricter. Those who cannot provide the declared capacity according to the dispatching instruction will have their capacity electricity fee deducted or even be disqualified. Enterprises that only have assets but no operation capacity cannot obtain full profits even if the projects are completed.
For energy storage development enterprises, the development logic has been completely rewritten.
The due diligence of grid access feasibility must be put in advance. Before obtaining the grid access system design review opinion, do not blindly obtain indicators.
The registered capital and financing plan must be closed in advance. Do not count on exiting through equity transfer in the later stage. Before the project is connected to the grid and put into operation, except for internal transfer within the group, any change of investment subject and shareholder equity is strictly prohibited.
It is necessary to calculate the profit clearly. The capacity price is not a "iron rice bowl", and the demand for capacity leasing is also weakening. Energy storage must find an independent profit path that does not depend on others' survival.
The light asset arbitrage path of "obtaining indicators, waiting for price rise, and selling projects" has been completely blocked.
This public notice in Hebei is only a slice of the national stock project cleaning. The high-frequency adjustment in Shanxi, batch abolition in Ningxia, penetrating supervision in Inner Mongolia, and commitment-driven promotion in Xinjiang — all regions are doing the same thing in different ways.
For enterprises that are truly willing to invest and have the ability to build projects, this is a good thing instead. Scarce resources such as land and grid nodes can finally be released to projects that can be implemented.
This article is from the WeChat Official Account "Foresee Energy", and is authorized for release by 36Kr.