An era has come to an end. Konka, the leading enterprise in the color TV industry, has voluntarily announced its delisting.
On October 1, 1999, several television sets were installed on the Tiananmen Gate Tower, and the screens displayed the marching formations along Chang'an Avenue. These were the equipment used for the 50th National Day Parade, provided by Shenzhen Konka Co., Ltd. In the same year, the company had just manufactured China's first high-definition digital TV prototype, with its output value exceeding 10 billion RMB, and became the first enterprise in Shenzhen to record annual sales revenue of over 10 billion yuan.
In the past decades, Konka color TVs were placed on the TV cabinets in the homes of many people. There was a white crocheted dust cover on the top of the cabinet, the four letters "KONKA" were printed on the front of the device, and a plastic bag was wrapped around the remote control to keep dust out. When the TV was delivered home, the whole family would usually carry it together, and neighbors would stand at the door watching for a while. For an ordinary family in the 1990s, this was an event worth keeping in memory.
Seven years earlier, on March 27, 1992, Konka's A-shares and B-shares were listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange at the same time, with the stock code 000016. It was the first spring after Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour Speech, and Konka became the first Sino-foreign joint venture in China to be listed on the A-share market, and has since been known as the "First Color TV Share".
But last night, Konka released a total of 16 announcements. Tucked among them was a "Notice on Voluntarily Terminating the Company's Stock Listing by Way of Shareholders' Meeting Resolution". Despite its long title, the content is very simple: the company has decided to delist itself from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
The plan is written in detail: both A-shares and B-shares will be withdrawn from listing for trading, and after the termination of listing, the shares will be transferred to the delisting board under the management of the National Equities Exchange and Quotations for custody. The controlling shareholder Panshi Runchuang will offer a cash option to all A-share shareholders except itself, with an exercise price of 2.48 yuan per share; Hemao Company will offer B-share shareholders a price of HKD 0.73 per share. The equity registration dates are September 22 and September 28 respectively. At the close of the day, Shenzhen Konka A closed at 2.33 yuan, with a total market value of 5.611 billion yuan.
The half-year report released on the same day showed that the operating revenue in the first half of the year was 3.852 billion yuan, down 26.60% year on year, the net profit attributable to the parent company was a loss of 173 million yuan, 54.93% lower than that of the previous year; the owner's equity attributable to shareholders of the parent company was -6.227 billion yuan, and the asset-liability ratio was 133.01%.
Thirty-four years ago on March 27, the gong of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange rang for this company. In 1992, Konka's A-shares and B-shares were listed simultaneously with the code 000016, making it the first listed Sino-foreign joint venture in China's capital market, and it had a widely spread title - the "First Color TV Share".
In accordance with current regulations, the company has been put under delisting risk warning if its net assets were negative at the end of 2025. If there is no improvement by the end of 2026, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange will directly cancel the company's listing qualification. That is to say, there is very little room left for Konka regarding the delisting matter. Instead of waiting for that day to come, it took the initiative to grasp the choice by itself, and left small and medium shareholders an exit opportunity with a price more than 6% higher than the market price.
This is not a hasty exit, but a choice made after careful consideration.
Thirty-four Years Ago, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Gong Rang for It
The story took place in Shenzhen in May 1980. That year, Guangdong Guangming Overseas Chinese Electronic Industry Company officially opened for business. Ganghua Electronics made the investment, and the Shenzhen side provided land and labor. This was the first Sino-foreign joint venture electronics enterprise in China after the reform and opening-up.
It started producing tape recorders instead of televisions.
At that time, China's home appliance market was almost blank. The most decent items in ordinary people's homes were bicycles, sewing machines and watches. A 14-inch black and white TV cost an ordinary worker several months' salary to afford, which was a luxury among luxuries. In 1984, the first complete color TV assembly production line of the factory was completed and put into operation. Three years later, the Ministry of Electronics Industry issued the domestic sales production license for Konka brand color TVs, allowing Konka color TVs to be sold in China - before that, every TV it produced could only be loaded onto ships for export.
Three years passed from the launch of the first production line to obtaining the domestic sales license. These three years are usually briefly mentioned in later accounts, but for an enterprise, it was a watershed between working for others and starting its own business.
In the spring of 1992, after Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour Speech, the air was filled with an uplifting atmosphere. On March 27, Konka's A-shares and B-shares were officially listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, becoming one of the first batches of enterprises to land on the Shenzhen market. The company's total assets that year were 549 million yuan.
In the following ten years or so, the enterprise ushered in its best period.
In 1993, Konka moved north to Heilongjiang, merged Mudanjiang TV Factory, and established "Mukang". This model of revitalizing old local factories with funds from listed companies was later called the "Mukang Model". After that, five major bases in Northeast China, Northwest China, South China, East China and Southwest China were built one after another, with an annual output of more than 10 million units. In 1996, Changhong launched a price war, and Konka quickly published the famous "Konka Manifesto" in newspapers, stating that "Whoever rises will be the sun", and took up the fight against all odds. Three years later, Changhong failed due to excessive accumulation of color picture tubes. Konka seized the opportunity to overtake it and took the first position in the entire industry.
1999 was the peak year. In this year, Konka developed China's first high-definition digital TV prototype, its output value reached more than 10 billion RMB, and it became the first enterprise in Shenzhen with annual sales exceeding 10 billion yuan. In the 50th National Day Parade, the live broadcast equipment on the Tiananmen Gate Tower was the TV sets produced by Konka.
By 2000, the company's total assets reached 8.913 billion yuan, growing 16 times in eight years.
There is also such a history in the color TV industry. Chen Weirong from Konka, Huang Hongsheng from Skyworth, and Li Dongsheng from TCL were all classmates in the Radio Department of South China Institute of Technology, and started their businesses in the same period, known as the "Three Swordsmen". Together with Hisense, which rose later, the four major brands in China's color TV market in the 1990s were formed.
In the following years, from 2003 to 2007, Konka won the annual sales championship in China's color TV market every year.
The time when the enterprise scale reached its peak was later than the time when the industry scale reached its peak. In 2019, Konka Group achieved an operating revenue of 55.119 billion yuan, setting a historical record.
From Color TV to Chips,
The Path Konka Has Tried to Take Over the Years
After the 55.1 billion yuan mark, the revenue curve began to decline. By 2025, this figure had dropped to 9.835 billion yuan.
Konka is not an enterprise that is content with the status quo. However, the number of transformations it has carried out, the funds it has invested, and the new battlefields it has opened up in the past ten years are the largest among its peers. The problem lies in what kind of relationship exists between these different business segments.
The color TV business has become increasingly difficult. Panel prices follow their own cycles. From CRT to LCD, and now to Mini/Micro LED, two generations of technology have been replaced. The screen in the living room is taking up an increasingly smaller share of users' time as mobile phones and tablets grab more attention, and the TV power-on rate has been declining all the way. This is a problem that all manufacturers have to face.
Peers have come up with different answers. TCL expanded upstream, invested heavily in the panel industry, and continuously expanded along the directions of semiconductors, photovoltaics and other fields; Hisense independently developed image processing chips and mastered the entire industrial chain of ultra-high-definition display; Skyworth set up R&D centers around the world and focused on OLED technology. Although their directions of cross-sector expansion are different, their roots are the same - they all grow on the tree of the display industry.
Konka chose to expand outward.
The biggest expectation was placed on the semiconductor sector. Chongqing Konka Optoelectronics invested 2 billion yuan to connect the entire MLED industrial chain from epitaxial wafers, chips to mass transfer and small-pitch modules, covering epitaxial chips, mass transfer, packaging, modules to display screens. It also established a complete process mass transfer pilot line, and once launched the world's first Micro LED watch. In the storage segment, Konka built an industrial chain of "design + packaging and testing + channels", and its first storage main control chip has achieved mass production.
The way to expand its white home appliance business was through acquisitions. It obtained the Xinfei brand through acquisition, merged Beko China's factory to make up for the shortcomings in drum washing machines, built an air-conditioning production base in Ningbo, and built a smart home appliance industrial park in Xi'an to test dishwasher products. In addition, it also has PCB business, environmental protection technology business, as well as industrial parks and supporting facilities distributed across different regions.
What it has laid out is a huge network.
The trouble is that semiconductors, industrial parks and other businesses are all capital-intensive, long-cycle and slow-return businesses. Where does the capital to support these businesses come from? By mid-2025, Konka's consumer electronics business revenue was 4.713 billion yuan, accounting for more than 90% of the total revenue, with a gross profit margin of 3.23%. The color TV business was the largest segment, accounting for 42% of the total revenue, but its gross profit margin was only 0.39%.
At a gross profit margin of 0.39%, in front of the 2 billion yuan-level investment in optoelectronics, many things do not need further explanation.
In the same period, Konka's R&D expenditure in 2024 decreased by 16.38% year on year. The front-end investment was reduced, while the back-end long-cycle projects were still waiting for output, both ends restricting the company's development.
The improvement of the financial situation every year was gradual. The net profit attributable to the parent company from 2022 to 2024 was -1.47 billion yuan, -2.164 billion yuan and -3.726 billion yuan respectively, with the loss expanding year by year; while the net profit attributable to the parent company after deducting non-recurring gains and losses has been negative for 15 consecutive years from 2011 to 2025.
It was not until 2025 that the centralized clearance was completed. The total amount of asset impairment provisions accrued by the company this year was 7.697 billion yuan, with an impact of -7.697 billion yuan on the total profit. The net profit attributable to the parent company for the whole year was -12.582 billion yuan, and the net assets attributable to the parent company at the end of the year were only -6.083 billion yuan.
The projects spread out in recent years, financial subsidies, fund investments and acquisition balance payments were all concentrated in this year's financial statements.
After the net assets turned from positive to negative, the direction of the problem changed. It is no longer about how Konka got to where it is today, but what to do next.
Voluntary Delisting Is a Well-Arranged Exit
Part of the solution has been put into practice since the spring of 2025.
In April of that year, Overseas Chinese Town Group and its persons acting in concert transferred their Konka shares for free to Panshi Runchuang and Hemao Company under China Resources. In July, the transfer procedures for A-shares and B-shares were completed. China Resources held nearly 30% of Konka's total shares, becoming the new actual controller. After the professional integration press conference of Konka was held in August, this old electronics enterprise officially became a member of China Resources' technology and emerging industry sector. The board of directors was re-elected in the same month, with the China Resources faction occupying four non-independent director seats, and Wu Jianjun, former chairman of China Resources Pharmaceutical Commercial Group, served as the chairman.
The subsequent actions were very intensive. Panshi Runchuang lent 2.17 billion yuan to Overseas Chinese Town, which was specially used to repay the principal and interest of Overseas Chinese Town's loans; the related party China Resources Co., Ltd. provided a total of no more than 1.8 billion yuan in short-term revolving loans for the redemption of external interest-bearing liabilities and capital turnover; at the end of the year, Panshi Runchuang invested another 5 billion yuan to help Konka issue perpetual bonds.
On the business side, the company made a backward adjustment. Semiconductor, environmental protection businesses and underperforming industrial parks were gradually divested, and the business focus was gradually concentrated on the core consumer electronics business.
These funds and corresponding business adjustments have played a role. In the first half of 2026, the net profit attributable to the parent company was a loss of 173 million yuan, with the loss reduced by 54.93% year on year, which is a rare degree of improvement in recent years. However, the net asset gap of 6.227 billion yuan cannot be filled by just one half-year report.
Therefore, the announcement was released on August 27.
The meaning of "voluntary" is that the company has sorted out the rules clearly. When the net assets are negative at the end of 2025, the delisting risk warning will be triggered; if the audited net assets are still negative at the end of 2026, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange will terminate the company's listing. The problem left for Konka is not "whether to delist" but "how to delist".
The difference between the two paths lies in the treatment of small and medium shareholders. If the company passively waits for forced delisting, investors will face an unlimited downward trend in the delisting arrangement period. Voluntary delisting is different. After the 2024 delisting system reform, the relevant provisions of both the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange clearly stipulate that the company should provide protection measures such as cash option to dissenting shareholders before the general meeting of shareholders. In practice, this measure is usually implemented by the controlling shareholder, who provides the option to all small and medium shareholders except itself, with a certain premium on the price.
The price offered by Konka is 2.48 yuan per share, about 6% higher than the 2.33 yuan price before the suspension, and the B-share price is HKD 0.73 per share. The cash is paid by Panshi Runchuang and Hemao Company, which are under China Resources.
This channel is nothing new. Companies such as Erzhong Heavy Machinery, Jingwei Textile Machinery, Shanghai Potevio and Yaxing Coach have already gone through this process. In 2025, more companies including Yulong Co., Ltd. and AVIC Capital also voluntarily withdrew from listing. As the number of cases increases, this measure has changed from a rarely used clause to a common practice.
The procedure has not been completed yet. The current plan has been approved at the 12th meeting of the 11th board of directors, and still needs to be submitted to the general meeting of shareholders for voting. It can take effect only after the separate counting of votes by small and medium shareholders reaches a certain proportion.
As for where the shares will be transferred after delisting, the announcement clearly states that after the termination of listing, the company will apply for the shares to be transferred for trading on the delisting board under the custody of the National Equities Exchange and Quotations, and the shares can still be traded. The company also stated that it will maintain stable operations after the termination of listing, and there are no plans for major asset restructuring for the time being, nor a specific timetable for relisting.
The stock code disappears, but the company does not cease to exist. The factories are still in operation, the production sites in Zhangzhou, Dongguan, Xinxiang and Chongqing are