Wang Sicong, who used 500 million yuan for a trial run, has registered a new company at the village committee.

If someone tells you that Wang Sicong, who once rented an entire floor of office space in the Shanghai Tower office building and used 500 million yuan as trial capital, has registered his new company on the first floor of a village committee, you would probably think it is a joke.

But this is indeed a fact clearly recorded on Tianyancha: On July 24, 2026, Jiangxi Banana Culture Entertainment Co., Ltd. was officially established with a registered capital of 10 million yuan, and its registered address is clearly written as: 1st Floor, Meiyuan Village Committee, Nanyi Town, Ruichang City, Jiujiang City, Jiangxi Province.

Source: Tianyancha

It is not Lujiazui, not China World Trade Center, not Shenzhen Bay, but a village committee. The "sense of disparity" of this address has more dramatic tension than any public relations release.

Almost at the same time as this company was registered, thousands of kilometers away in Beijing, 72-year-old Wang Jianlin was signing another asset sale agreement — This is already the 86th Wanda Plaza he has sold in three years. From a net worth of 220 billion yuan in 2015 to 10 billion yuan on the Hurun Global Rich List in 2026, 210 billion yuan has vanished. Wanda's total debt is about 600 billion yuan, with daily interest approaching 20 million yuan.

The father is selling properties to survive, while the son is registering a new company at the village committee. These two events took place almost in the same period — the most dramatic "father and son divergence" in China's business history in 2026 has unfolded quietly.

The "Banana" on the first floor of the village committee: What is the origin of the new company?

Let's first sort out the details of this new company. Jiangxi Banana Culture Entertainment Co., Ltd. has Wang Jiahui as its legal representative, with a registered capital of 10 million yuan, established on July 24, 2026. The equity structure is held by three parties: People's Weibo (Wuxi) Culture Media Co., Ltd. holds 80% of the shares, with a subscribed capital contribution of 8 million yuan; Shanghai Banana Plan Film and Culture Co., Ltd. under Wang Sicong's name holds 10% of the shares, with a subscribed capital contribution of 1 million yuan; natural person Li Li holds 10% of the shares.

The name "Banana" easily reminds people of the Banana Plan ten years ago. In 2015, Wang Sicong established Shanghai Banana Plan Culture Development Co., Ltd. with a registered capital of 100 million yuan, holding 68.5% of the shares himself. He set up Banana Sports, Banana Performance Brokerage, Banana Games, Banana Music, and Banana Pictures in one go, and even publicly signed the South Korean girl group T-ara, building a "pan-entertainment empire" covering esports, entertainment, sports, film and television, and music.

But the new company is completely different from the starting strategy back then. Wang Sicong does not serve as the legal representative, nor is he the controlling shareholder, and the associated company only subscribes for a capital contribution of 1 million yuan. Its business scope mainly covers investment activities with self-owned funds, enterprise management, enterprise management consulting, brand management and marketing planning, and there are no heavy asset businesses that require licenses such as performance brokerage and online cultural operation for the time being.

Source: Canned Gallery

Liu Youhua, financial commentator and deputy director of the Research Department of Private Equity PaiPai.com, said: "Judging from the equity structure and business scope, Jiangxi Banana Culture is more like an investment and brand operation platform, rather than an entertainment company that plans to sign artists, hold performances and pour resources into content. Wang Sicong has changed from a controlling shareholder ten years ago to a minority shareholder holding only 10% of the shares, which is a very obvious signal of declining risk appetite."

As for the choice of the registered address on the first floor of the village committee, the registered address is not equal to the actual office location. Based on this information alone, it is impossible to judge whether the company actually operates locally, nor can it be inferred whether it has obtained tax or investment attraction preferences. But this site selection at least sends a signal: Wang Sicong is no longer obsessed with luxury offices in CBDs, but is deliberately minimizing his cost structure.

2 Billion Yuan in Tuition Fees: What Did Panda Live Stream Teach Wang Sicong?

To understand why Wang Sicong is "holding back" now, we have to look back at the most expensive tuition fee seven years ago.

In 2009, Wang Jianlin gave his son 500 million yuan as "trial capital". Wang Sicong founded Pusi Capital with this fund and entered the venture capital circle as a "internet celebrity investor". The early stage was really brilliant: he invested in projects such as Dianping, Cloud Game Holdings, Legend Games, Hero Entertainment, and Xiaoguo Culture, with nearly 80 projects in total, and 6 invested companies went public.

But the turning point came soon. In 2015, Wang Sicong personally ran Panda Live Stream and served as CEO. The start was almost perfect: Series A financing of 650 million yuan, Series B of 1 billion yuan, total financing of nearly 2 billion yuan, peak valuation of about 5 billion yuan, and it once occupied half of the live streaming industry. In order to compete for users and anchors, the platform relied on high-priced contracts for top anchors, sky-high purchases of event copyrights, and production of variety shows to attract traffic for a long time, and the speed of burning money even exceeded its profitability.

After completing the last round of financing in May 2017, Panda Live Stream did not receive any external capital injection in the following 22 months. In March 2019, the platform ceased operations. Pusi Investment later confirmed in a statement that the nearly 2 billion yuan investment loss of Panda Interactive Entertainment was borne by Pusi Investment and its actual controller. Due to the signing of a guaranteed repurchase agreement, Wang Sicong personally also had to assume the debt settlement obligation to investors. The industry estimates that the Panda Live Stream project alone brought him at least 3 billion yuan in potential losses.

Source: Canned Gallery

After that, a wave of bad investments came one after another: 100 million yuan invested in LeTV Sports was completely lost; many companies under the Banana Plan suffered losses all year round; in December 2025, 8% of the equity of Shanghai Maiji Culture held by Pusi was auctioned judicially, and the net asset assessment value was even negative 1.6662 million yuan, with the starting price of only 107,500 yuan — "Negative asset auction" has become a symbol of the complete collapse of Wang Sicong's investment myth. Pusi Capital, which managed more than 3 billion yuan in assets at its peak, has almost all of its core assets divested, and its management scale has shrunk by more than 90%.

The well-known financial commentator Song Qinghui said: "The failure of Panda Live Stream gave Wang Sicong the most profound lesson — public attention can help an enterprise quickly acquire users and resources, but it can never replace cost control, organizational management and stable cash flow. His problem at that time was not just betting on the wrong live streaming track, but tying multiple businesses with high investment and immature profit models together, and placing the most money-burning live streaming platform at the center of the entire system. Once the financing stopped, the whole system stalled."

From 500 Million Yuan to 1 Million Yuan: Wang Sicong's Investment Logic Has Changed

If you sort out Wang Sicong's investment trajectory from the end of 2025 to mid-2026 carefully, you will find a clear "dimension reduction" path.

At the end of 2025, Beijing Ningyue Yueji Medical Beauty Clinic was established, and Wang Sicong participated indirectly through the upper-level partnership to enter the light medical beauty track. At the end of January 2026, Beijing Dadehouxin Investment Management Co., Ltd. under his name invested in Chengdu Putonia Enterprise Management Co., Ltd., with a subscribed capital contribution of only 216,200 yuan, holding 16% of the shares, and its business involves bars and catering. On February 9, Beijing Yuwu Catering Management Co., Ltd. was established with a registered capital of 1 million yuan. On June 23, Shanghai Wanjing Shenghua Culture Technology Co., Ltd. was established with a registered capital of 1 million yuan, and Wang Sicong holds shares indirectly. Coupled with Jiangxi Banana Culture on July 24, he has made at least five consecutive shots in more than half a year.

Source: Canned Gallery

These investments have three common characteristics. First, the amount is small, with the subscribed capital contribution ranging from 216,200 yuan to 1 million yuan, which is in sharp contrast to the angel investments of hundreds of millions of yuan in the early years; second, no controlling stake, Wang Sicong is almost a minority shareholder or holds shares indirectly, and no longer personally acts as the "operator"; third, the tracks are pragmatic, focusing on physical consumption fields that can generate cash flow such as catering, bars, medical beauty, and cultural technology, rather than Internet platforms that require long-term money burning.

Liu Youhua analyzed: "Shifting from 'large shareholding plus heavy assets' to 'small shareholding plus light assets', from 'betting on tracks to scale up' to 'doing small business in the red sea', this is a very typical risk aversion behavior after experiencing large losses. He no longer bets big, no longer bets on a single track, no longer spends hundreds of millions of yuan on a single point. The projects are also isolated from each other — exiting one project does not affect other businesses, and losing in one track will not lead to concentrated exposure again."

What is more noteworthy is that Wang Sicong has withdrawn from the position of director of Wanda's subsidiary companies as early as August 2022, and then successively cleared all shares related to Wanda, completing the legal debt separation from the giant Wanda Group. In June 2025, he transferred the Huanju Commercial, which he previously claimed managed 6 billion yuan in assets, to Mario Ho, the son of the gambling king, and withdrew less than two years later, which also confirmed his mentality of no longer clinging to "large platforms".

The father sells properties, the son sinks down: Two second halves of a richest man family

To understand Wang Sicong's "down-to-earth" attitude, we cannot ignore Wang Jianlin's "darkest hour".

Since 2023, Wanda has sold more than 80 Wanda Plazas. In May 2025, Wang Jianlin packaged and sold 48 Wanda Plazas in core cities in one go, with the asset package valued at about 50 billion yuan. In March 2026, Shanghai Zhuanqiao Wanda Plaza was transferred for 2.048 billion yuan; in June, Shanghai Songjiang Wanda Plaza and Quanzhou Puxi Wanda Plaza completed industrial and commercial changes. Wanda Film was renamed "Ruyi Pictures", and its actual controller was changed; the hotel management business was sold to Tongcheng Travel for about 2.5 billion yuan; the equity transfer of Kuaiqian Finance was completed.

As of the beginning of 2026, Wanda Group's total debt is about 600 billion yuan, and the interest-bearing debt of its core platform Wanda Commercial Management exceeds 140 billion yuan, with annual interest fluctuating between 7 billion and 13 billion yuan, approaching 20 million yuan per day on average.

Source: Canned Gallery

The 72-year-old Wang Jianlin is thin with prominent cheekbones, and netizens described him as "as thin as a piece of paper". Suning lost the first instance lawsuit of 1.747 billion yuan, Yonghui was enforced for 3.86 billion yuan, and Sunac's 9.5 billion yuan arbitration is waiting — multiple debt collection clues are queuing up in front of Wanda's door.

Song Qinghui pointed out: "What Wang Jianlin chose is to carry it hard — sell assets, pay off debts, and maintain credit. And Wang Sicong chose to start a new business — lighter, more dispersed, and more cautious. Behind these two choices are the completely different situations of the two generations: The father is burning 20 million yuan in interest every day, and he no longer has the spare capacity to give his son hundreds of millions of yuan to test casually. The 200,000 yuan and 1 million yuan subscribed capital contributions of Wang Sicong's new companies look inconspicuous, but they are numbers that really need to be calculated by himself."

A thought-provoking detail is that the small-scale bars, catering, medical beauty and cultural entertainment projects that Wang Sicong has recently selected are all concentrated in the physical consumption fields that can generate cash flow quickly. In the general environment of cooling financing, capital begins to prefer "small but beautiful" cash flow projects, rather than super large platforms that burn money for a long time without seeing profits. The choice of the new company's registered address in a town in Jiangxi also reflects the trend of the business territory extending to second- and third-tier cities and county markets — this is the real "sinking market".

Established at the Age of 40

In 2016, someone asked Wang Sicong what the biggest challenge in his life was. He replied: He hopes to surpass his father's success in his lifetime. At that time, Panda Live Stream was expanding, and the Banana Plan's territory was continuously extending. He believed that Internet traffic and entertainment content could support a business path different from Wanda's.

Ten years later, this path did not develop as expected. But Wang Sicong did not leave the table, he just changed his playing style.

Liu Youhua commented: "From a positive perspective, Wang Sicong is indeed growing. He began to respect risks, began to pursue risk isolation between projects, and began to focus on cash flow rather than valuation stories. These changes are not easy for a rich second generation who once took 500 million yuan to test casually. He is no longer in a hurry to prove how big he can do, but to avoid losing too heavily first —