The "new ghost story" of storage: Is the United States going to seize money?

The U.S. demands targeting South Korea's semiconductor industry are evolving from "factory construction" to "profit sharing."

According to a Friday report cited by The Korea Times from informed sources, Rick Switzer, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, explicitly stated during talks last month with South Korea's Trade Minister Ahn Duk-geun that the U.S. side has the right to share the massive profits of SK Hynix and Samsung Electronics, on the grounds that large-scale procurement by U.S. companies has directly driven the profit growth of South Korean chipmakers. This statement has not been officially confirmed by the U.S. authorities, but it has already drawn widespread attention across South Korea's industrial and government sectors.

The backdrop of this development is that South Korea's semiconductor exports to the U.S. surged by more than 90% year-on-year in the first half of this year, and South Korean memory manufacturers continue to capture high profits in the global AI industrial chain.

A research report from CITIC Securities points out that based on historical experience, when overseas companies continue to secure high market share or high profits in critical industries, it often triggers political intervention from the U.S. government, accelerating the redistribution of global industrial benefits — the experiences of Japan's semiconductor industry in the 1980s and Taiwan, China's panel industry in the 2000s serve as clear precedents.

01

The U.S. Rationale: Procurement Drives Profits, So Benefit Sharing Is Justified

According to The Korea Times, citing an industry insider familiar with the matter, Rick Switzer proposed to Ahn Duk-geun during the meeting that large-scale procurement of South Korean semiconductors by U.S. companies has directly boosted the profit growth of South Korean chipmakers, so the U.S. side is equally entitled to share these profits.

"The U.S. logic is that if local South Korean partners are eligible for a share of profits for contributing a portion of the value, U.S. companies should enjoy the same rights," the source said. A senior South Korean government official also confirmed to The Korea Times that the U.S. side did put forward the aforementioned claim, without providing further details.

The Korea Times reached out multiple times to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of the Treasury for comment, but received no response. Officials from South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy stated that they were unaware of the matter, and reaffirmed that South Korea's basic position is that "industry-related matters should be advanced based on the principle of commercial rationality."

02

Historical Precedent: High Profits Often Act as a Trigger for Political Intervention

The CITIC Securities research report outlines two typical cases to reveal the U.S. government's operational logic in similar scenarios.

Japan's Semiconductor Industry (1980s): After Japan's semiconductor industry rose rapidly and continuously eroded the competitive edge of U.S. companies, the U.S. government, driven by the business community and industry associations, pressured Japan through measures including tariffs, Section 301 investigations, the U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement, and 100% punitive tariffs. The combined impact of these policies and the burst of Japan's economic bubble ultimately led to a redistribution of market share and profits in the global semiconductor industry. Notably, the lost market share of Japan did not flow back to the U.S.; instead, South Korea became the ultimate beneficiary with policy support.

Taiwan, China's Panel Industry (2000s): In 2006, Taiwan's shipment share of large-sized LCD panels once ranked first globally. In the same year, the U.S. Department of Justice launched an antitrust investigation on grounds of price-fixing. Major Taiwanese panel companies were ordered to pay a total of more than 800 million U.S. dollars in criminal fines, and multiple executives were sentenced to prison. The combined impact of policy shocks, the global financial crisis, and a downward industrial cycle ultimately drove the market share and profits of the global panel industry to shift to the Chinese mainland.

CITIC Securities points out that the two cases follow a common pattern: once the U.S. government redefines the high profits of overseas companies as harming the competitiveness of its domestic industries, political intervention will follow, often implemented through the coordinated use of multiple tools covering trade, industrial policy, and antitrust regulation.

03

Current Landscape: Supply Priority, Political Pressure Not Yet Formed

CITIC Securities argues that to judge whether South Korea's high memory profits will trigger U.S. government intervention, the key lies in understanding the decision-making mechanism of its technological and economic policies.

At this stage, relevant U.S. policies are still dominated by the core White House team including Donald Trump and Scott Bessent. Meanwhile, as the influence of tech-aligned right-wing figures such as Michael Kratsios and David Sacks grows, major U.S. tech corporations are also gaining more sway over the policy agenda. After the core White House circle defines the nature of an issue, agencies including the Department of Commerce, USTR, the Department of Justice, and the FTC typically implement corresponding measures using trade, industrial, or antitrust tools respectively.

In the current phase, against the backdrop of still strong AI demand, the U.S. business community is more focused on ensuring memory supply rather than suppressing the prices and profits of South Korean companies. The political circle tends to integrate the "MAGA" initiative with tech industrial policies, driving the return of manufacturing, jobs, and supply chains by encouraging South Korean companies to expand production in the U.S. While scattered voices of opposition to South Korean memory price hikes have emerged in U.S. political circles, industry organizations, and among consumers, a systematic political pressure has not yet taken shape.

04

Risk Tipping Point: Cost Pass-Through Capability Is the Key Variable

CITIC Securities warns that as long as memory costs can still be passed downstream, price increases are more likely to be seen as part of the booming AI sector, resulting in relatively limited incentives for political intervention. However, if prices continue to rise and significantly squeeze the profits and return on investment of U.S. companies, South Korea's high memory profits may be redefined by the U.S. government as harming U.S. AI competitiveness.

The research report recommends close monitoring of two signals: first, whether major U.S. tech corporations shift from securing supply to publicly opposing price hikes; second, whether policy decision-makers turn from prioritizing supply assurance and promoting U.S.-based production expansion to intervening on grounds such as "monopoly," "price-fixing," or "supply chain security."

Rick Switzer's aforementioned remarks may well be an early sign that this risk is shifting from a latent state to an explicit one. For SK Hynix and Samsung Electronics, the frontline of the U.S.-South Korea semiconductor game has quietly extended from manufacturing localization to the realm of profit distribution.

This article is from the WeChat Official Account "Wall Street CN", authored by ZHAO Ying, and published with authorization from 36Kr.