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Five giants including Samsung and SK Hynix have drained the entire South Korea?

东针商略2026-06-18 20:23
On one hand, the AI boom has driven a staggering surge in semiconductor exports; on the other, traditional manufacturing is mired in a harsh winter, presenting South Korea's economy with a stark "fire and ice" dichotomy.

On one hand, the AI boom has driven semiconductor exports to soar. On the other hand, traditional manufacturing industries are deeply stuck in a cold winter. The South Korean economy presents a distinct phenomenon of "extreme disparity."

In the first quarter of this year, the export volume of the top five leading enterprises such as Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix accounted for more than 40% of South Korea's total exports for the first time, and the contribution rate to the incremental growth was as high as 82.8%.

Semiconductor exports soared by 139% year - on - year, directly pushing the KOSPI index to a record high. The market value of SK Hynix even exceeded the $1 trillion mark.

However, beneath this prosperity, traditional industries such as steel, automobiles, and petrochemicals have generally declined. Retail consumption and equipment investment have seen a "triple decline" again after eight months.

Moreover, the wealth effect of the semiconductor industry is extremely concentrated, exacerbating social polarization. For every 1 billion won of output value created by the semiconductor industry, only 2.1 jobs are generated, which is only one - third of the average level in the manufacturing industry.

The salary gap between employees of large enterprises and small and medium - sized enterprises has widened to more than twice.

In order to allow ordinary people to share the dividends of AI, South Korea recently even approved the listing of leveraged ETFs for single stocks, which was ridiculed by public opinion as a "national casino."

Some experts have warned that the semiconductor industry is highly cyclical. Over - reliance on a single engine may repeat the mistake of Finland, whose economy collapsed due to the decline of Nokia. South Korea urgently needs to use the current prosperous period to cultivate diversified growth engines; otherwise, the "imbalance between ice and fire" will ultimately damage the foundation.

The Birth of the "Neuron Economy," but Why South Korea?

On one hand, large enterprises such as Samsung, Hyundai, and SK Hynix are making huge profits, and their exports are constantly setting new records. On the other hand, young people can't find decent jobs, small shop owners are struggling to make ends meet, and some people even choose to end their lives because they can't pay off their debts. Why does this "extreme disparity" coexist in the South Korean economy?

There is a concept that I think is very vivid - the neuron economy.

In biology, neurons are the only cells capable of transmitting information. When the brain processes complex tasks, only a very small number of neurons are activated, while the vast majority remain silent. They consume a small portion of the overall energy but complete the core work of cognitive functions.

The "neuron economy" I proposed describes an extreme economic form. A few leading enterprises form the "central nervous system" of the economy. They absorb most of the capital, talents, and policy attention, create most of the incremental export volume and stock - market wealth. Tens of thousands of small and medium - sized enterprises and traditional industrial sectors are like the silent background tissue, maintaining basic metabolic functions but hardly participating in the transmission of growth signals.

South Korea is the first country in the world to fully present the characteristics of the "neuron economy."

The prototype of this economic form was laid as early as half a century ago.

In the 1960s, the Park Chung - hee regime chose the "unbalanced development strategy," concentrating limited resources to support a few large enterprises, creating the so - called "Miracle on the Han River." This model, which economic historians call "compressed industrialization," is essentially using the power of the state to open a green channel for capital concentration.

The chaebols obtained low - interest loans, foreign exchange quotas, and protection of access thresholds at the cost of fulfilling the export targets designated by the state.

This is a kind of transaction. Capital gets privileges, and the state gets growth.

But even Park Chung - hee back then probably wouldn't have expected that half a century later, this concentration would develop to such an extreme degree. In the first quarter of 2026, the top five export enterprises such as Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix accounted for 43.5% of South Korea's total export volume of $219.9 billion.

Currently, the incremental export volume of the top five enterprises is as high as $50 billion, accounting for 82.8% of South Korea's overall incremental export volume during the same period. This means that the growth engine of the South Korean economy has been completely concentrated in five enterprises.

This leap in concentration has no precedent in the history of South Korea's economic development.

Even in the 1990s, when the chaebol economy was at its peak, the export share of the top five enterprises remained stable at around 30%. It only took less than two years to exceed 40% today.

What has driven this change is the semiconductor "super - cycle" spawned by the global AI investment boom.

In the first quarter of 2026, South Korea's semiconductor exports soared by 139% year - on - year, while the export growth rate of all categories other than semiconductors was only 11.6%.

This set of data highlights a cruel economic fact. What South Korea is experiencing now is "technical growth," that is, the GDP figures are eye - catching, the export data is brilliant, and the stock market is constantly setting new records. However, the dividends of growth are almost completely captured by a few enterprises in the semiconductor industry chain.

Other industrial sectors, from automobiles to steel, from chemicals to home appliances, are being squeezed by rising raw material costs due to the depreciation of the won, intensified competition in overseas markets, and the slowdown of global demand.

In April 2026, among South Korea's 15 major export categories, the exports of 7 categories declined year - on - year. Automobile exports decreased by 5.5%, steel exports decreased by 11.6%, and home appliance exports dropped by 20%.

This is the operating logic of the "neuron economy." It doesn't pursue balanced growth but maximum efficiency.

It concentrates all resources on the sectors that can generate the highest marginal returns, allowing other sectors to shrink slowly until the health of the entire economy depends on the continuous excitement of a few "neurons."

The Financialization Shift: When the State Becomes a Bookmaker from a Planner!

If it were just like this, South Korea would just be another resource - based economy suffering from the "Dutch disease," except that what it exports is not oil but chips.

However, a series of subsequent operations by the South Korean government have pushed it in an unprecedented direction in the history of the global economy.

On May 27, 2026, the South Korean Exchange approved the listing of 18 single - stock leveraged and inverse ETFs for Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix all at once.

This decision came very suddenly.

Not long ago, South Korea's regulatory authorities still prohibited the issuance of leveraged products for single stocks on the grounds of "high risks of derivatives." Behind this 180 - degree policy turn is a well - thought - out strategic choice by the South Korean government.

Why do this? Because in the past few years, South Korean society has been suffering from increasing class anxiety.

High housing prices, fierce competition in the job market, and the lowest fertility rate in the world. The term "Three - Giving - Up Generation" (giving up love, marriage, and having children) is popular among young people.

At the same time, the excessive profits of the semiconductor industry are accumulating in the hands of a few enterprises and major shareholders, and the dividends that ordinary people can share are extremely limited.

For every 1 billion won of output value created by the semiconductor industry, only 2.1 new jobs are generated, which is only one - third of the average level in the South Korean manufacturing industry.

This means that the more prosperous the semiconductor industry is, the greater the employment pressure.

This dilemma where growth is out of touch with people's livelihoods is called "ghost GDP" by economists. Output is growing, but people can't feel it.

The South Korean government's countermeasure is very bold. Since workers can't participate in the AI dividends through employment, then let them directly become the sharers of capital appreciation through the financial market.

The "citizen dividend" concept proposed by Kim Yong - beom, the head of the Policy Office of the Blue House, was to feedback the excessive profits of the AI industry to the people through institutional arrangements. Although it was shelved due to a stock - market crash, the core spirit of this idea was continued in the launch of leveraged ETFs.

This is a kind of disguised "sovereign computing - power dividend."

The logic of the state is that the HBM (High - Bandwidth Memory) chips of Samsung and SK Hynix are the core of AI infrastructure. The global AI giants are paying a kind of "computing - power rent" to them. The two enterprises thus obtain excessive profits, driving up the stock prices. By providing leveraged financial tools to the people, the government enables ordinary South Koreans to participate in this wealth - creation process with a multiplier effect.

In terms of policy effects, this is indeed a precise "pump." On the first day of listing, the trading volume of the 18 products reached 9.8 trillion won. Retail investors' net buying funds flooded in, and the capital that was previously traded in overseas markets also flowed back on a large scale.

The radical part of this financialization shift is that it breaks an implicit boundary that modern states have adhered to in economic governance. The state can create a good market environment and provide social security, but it should not directly give the green light to high - risk speculative behaviors, let alone pin the hope of national wealth accumulation on the unilateral rise of a few stocks.

And the South Korean government has crossed this boundary.

It has packaged the risks of a highly concentrated industrial structure into a national - scale wealth feast through financial derivatives.

From being an industrial planner in the era of the "Miracle on the Han River" to being the institutional designer of a leveraged bull market today, the change in the role of the South Korean government is also a common dilemma in national governance in the so - called era of technological capitalism. When a country's small and medium - sized enterprise sector continues to lose blood, its employment absorption capacity continues to decline, and class mobility continues to dry up, and the only thing that can drive growth is a few technology giants, the country will find that the tools it can use are extremely limited.

Traditional industrial policies can't make traditional manufacturing regain competitiveness in the short term. The growth of social welfare expenditure is limited by the fiscal ceiling. Labor - market reform is extremely sensitive politically.

In contrast, opening the floodgates of financial derivatives and allowing people to "make money with money" seems to be the most economical and efficient way to relieve social contradictions.

This choice has its internal economic logic, but it also opens a Pandora's box.

A Fractured Society and an Uncertain Future

Therefore, the impacts of the "extreme disparity" in the South Korean economy are continuing to ferment in at least three dimensions.

First, the fracture of the social contract.

The operation of a healthy society depends on an implicit consensus, that is, hard work can lead to a decent life, and following the rules will bring corresponding rewards.

This consensus is the cornerstone of the social contract in modern countries.

However, when the wealth effect of leveraged ETFs begins to outpace the growth curve of labor income, this cornerstone shows cracks. Take the South Korean semiconductor industry as an example. The average monthly salary of full - time employees in large enterprises with more than 300 people reaches 9.42 million won, while that in small and medium - sized enterprises with less than 300 people is only 4.5 million won, with a gap of more than twice.

If the generous performance bonuses of large enterprises are taken into account, the actual gap is even more significant.

This polarization is determined by the position of the industry and enterprises in the global supply chain.

When the wealth - distribution mechanism is increasingly divorced from labor contributions and increasingly dependent on luck and timing in the capital market, the most basic narrative in modern society, "getting rich through hard work," will collapse.

What replaces it is a speculative social mentality.

People no longer think about how to improve skills, innovate products, and improve services. Instead, they are red - eyed, studying K - line charts, leverage multiples, and capital flows.

This shift in mentality is fatal to a country's long - term competitiveness.

It erodes the entrepreneurial spirit, craftsmanship, and work ethics. These intangible assets are precisely the fundamental reliance for an economy to weather the cycle.

Second, the systemic fragility of the financial system.

The launch of single - stock leveraged ETFs has created a delicate and dangerous structure at the financial engineering level. In order to hedge the positions of the leveraged ETFs they sell, market - makers have to frequently chase rising prices and sell on dips in the spot market.

When the market rises unilaterally, this hedging behavior will form a positive cycle: the stock price rises → the market - maker buys for hedging → the stock price rises further → the market - maker continues to buy.

But when the market reverses, this mechanism will operate in the opposite direction with the same efficiency, resulting in a stampede - style decline.

Since Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix together account for nearly half of the total market value of the South Korean stock market, once these two stocks experience significant fluctuations, the entire South Korean stock market will be dragged into a violent shock, and there is no other sector that can absorb such a large amount of capital in the short term.

This fragility, combined with the strong cyclical nature of the semiconductor industry itself, forms a dangerous combination.

The semiconductor cycle usually switches between prosperity and depression every two to three years, driven by the mismatch between capacity expansion and demand growth. Although the current HBM is in short supply due to AI demand, several international investment banks have already warned that as the production capacity of major global manufacturers expands on a large scale, the supply - demand pattern may reverse around 2027.

When that day comes, retail investors holding leveraged ETFs will face not only a decline in stock prices but also permanent losses of principal due to leverage losses.

In a volatile market, even if the stock price remains flat in the long term, the internal loss mechanism of leveraged products will continuously erode the net value.

Third, the irreversible damage to the industrial ecosystem.

Countless historical cases have shown that when an economy is overly concentrated in a single industry, even if this industry continues to prosper, the overall economic resilience will continue to decline. This is because a healthy industrial ecosystem requires diverse enterprises, talents, and knowledge systems to stimulate each other.

If the smartest young people in a country all flock to semiconductors and financial engineering, all venture capital only chases AI - related tracks, and even the government's policy attention is completely occupied by a few giants, those industries that seem not "cutting - edge," such as precision machinery, basic chemicals, materials science, food processing, etc., will inevitably wither silently.

This withering is gradual and hard to notice. Once a certain critical point is crossed, the cost of reconstruction will be extremely high.

Finland ignored industrial diversification during the heyday of Nokia. When the mobile - phone business collapsed, the whole country experienced a decade - long economic stagnation.

South Korea's situation is more extreme than Finland's back then because it has bet on a highly concentrated industrial ecosystem and tied the entire nation's wealth to this ecosystem through financial leverage.

These impacts will reinforce each other. The fracture of the social contract will drive more people into the speculative market, exacerbating the fragility of the financial system. The turmoil in the financial system will further deteriorate the development environment of the real economy, driving more resources to short - term profit - seeking. The continuous shrinkage of the industrial ecosystem will fundamentally weaken the economy's hematopoietic ability, making society more dependent on the performance of a few giants.

This is a self - reinforcing cycle, and breaking this cycle requires strong political will and historical opportunities.

South Korea's current dilemma provides us with a sample to think about the core contradictions in the era of technological capitalism. The explosive development of AI technology is reshaping the global industrial pattern and wealth - distribution logic at an astonishing speed.

In this transformation, a few enterprises and economies that master key technologies and control the industrial chain have obtained unprecedented returns, while most individuals, enterprises, and regions lacking such structural advantages are facing the risk of being marginalized.

How to make the fruits of technological progress be shared by a wider range of people is a global problem.

South Korea has chosen to use financialization to bridge the distribution gap. This is an untrodden path. Its boldness is impressive, and its risks are equally terrifying.

The "neuron economy" may create dazzling GDP growth rates and stock - market records, but an economy that only relies on a few neurons to fire ultimately cannot support the common prosperity of 50 million people.

South Korea's choice today may only be the beginning of the adventure in the capitalist world.

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