The more prices rise, the more losses mount. What's wrong with shared power banks?
In April 2026, Monster Charging was delisted from the NASDAQ.
When this company went public five years ago, its market value was $2.1 billion, with Hillhouse Capital, Alibaba, and Xiaomi standing behind it. At the time of delisting, the stock price dropped back to $1.195, a decline of 85% from the issue price, and all three institutions were trapped. Hillhouse Capital continuously bet on six rounds starting from the angel round, but ultimately did not wait for the day of a turnaround.
Consumers' reactions to this vary. The reason is not hard to understand: the price of shared power banks has increased significantly in recent years. In 2017, it was still 50 cents per hour, rising to one or two dollars in 2019, and in 2024, it had reached four or six dollars in some shopping malls, and even exceeded ten dollars in some scenic spots. Users have been scolding for years about "fleece - cutting", and now finally "retribution has come".
But there is one thing that doesn't add up: if shared power banks are really fleecing consumers, how did they end up losing money themselves? In 2024, Monster Charging's revenue was 1.894 billion yuan, a year - on - year plunge of 36%, and the net loss was 13.53 million yuan.
This is the most core paradox of the shared power bank business - it didn't make money because of the price increase. On the contrary, it had to keep raising prices because it couldn't make money.
01 Users Pay $1, and the Company Keeps 40 Cents
It's actually not difficult to figure out where the money went.
The core logic of shared power banks is to lay out points: place the machines in shopping malls, restaurants, and bars. Users scan the code to borrow, return to the cabinet for charging, and the platform takes a cut. It sounds like a light - asset and easy - money business, but in fact, the bottleneck lies in the "entry fee".
Good locations - high - speed railway stations, shopping mall atriums, and popular restaurants - are not easy to enter. Merchants control the traffic, and the platform controls the equipment. It's obvious who needs whom more. In the early days of the industry's melee, in order to grab locations, power bank companies began to pay entry fees to merchants, which later evolved into revenue sharing.
Monster Charging's financial reports record this ever - lengthening chain: in 2019, the fees paid to location partners accounted for 48% of the revenue; in 2020, it rose to 58%; in 2021, it reached 61%. That is to say, for every dollar users pay, more than 60 cents have to be distributed to merchants first, and the company actually keeps less than 40 cents in hand - before deducting equipment depreciation, operation and maintenance labor, and platform promotion.
This is the situation under the direct - operation model. To solve the cash - flow pressure, the industry later widely promoted the "agency model": the brand sells the equipment to agents, the agents are responsible for laying out points and maintenance, the brand only collects the equipment payment, and the subsequent operating income is shared among the three parties.
The agency model was originally intended to reduce the burden, but in the end, the pressure was just transferred, and the problem didn't disappear.
Agents also have to compete for locations. If they can't compete, they exchange with a higher sharing ratio. The general level in the industry is that agents usually get 85% to 93% of the turnover, and the rest is shared between the merchant and the brand. At the most intense time of competition, some brands offered a 100% turnover sharing (the brand only earns the equipment price difference) to attract agents.
Under the direct - operation model, the company is working for the merchants; under the agency model, the company is working for the agents. After taking both paths, the money doesn't end up in the hands of the power bank company. Users see the power bank fees rising year by year, but in fact, very little money reaches the company.
02 The Slower the Charging, the More Money the Company Makes
The problem of the cost structure is visible, but shared power banks also have a more hidden defect, hidden in the product design.
Now, the wired fast - charging of mainstream mobile phones in China has reached 65 watts and 100 watts, and the power benchmark of the entire consumer - level charging market has been rising. But if you scan a shared power bank on the street, it's very likely to be an old one with 10 watts or even 5 watts.
Shared power banks do have fast - charging. In 2025, Monster Charging launched the third - generation 22.5 - watt super fast - charging power bank. Jiedian also released the Color Power Bank 3.0 Pro in April of the same year, with a 10,000 - mAh battery and a 22.5 - watt output; Meituan even achieved 27.5 watts. But the problem is that these are new products, news. The reality of the existing equipment is another matter. When mainstream mobile phones already support dozens or even hundreds of watts of fast - charging, most of the shared power banks rented on the street are still charging at the speed of ten years ago - and a power of less than 30W can hardly be called "fast - charging" in 2026 (except for Apple...).
Why? Because this business charges by time.
The Achilles' heel of shared power banks is not in technology, but in the billing logic: fast - charging means users can fully charge in a short time, return the power bank in advance, and the billing stops; slow - charging means users keep the cable plugged in and waste time. From the very beginning, the interests of shared power bank companies and users are not in the same direction. Users hope to charge quickly, return early, and spend less; the platform hopes to charge slowly, have the power bank returned late, and have a longer billing period. Every optimization of the product experience directly corresponds to a decline in revenue.
Then why do several leading platforms jointly launch 22.5W products? Because if they don't upgrade, user loss will be more serious. But this 22.5W is still far from the 65W and 100W supported by mainstream mobile phones. The appearance of "providing a little fast - charging but not much" reflects the company's awkward situation. When users scold "sucking my blood", they are actually scolding this: you clearly can let me charge faster, but you just don't.
03 The Incremental Story Is Over
The internal holes can't be filled, and the external growth is almost at an end.
According to data from iResearch in 2024, in 2023, the penetration rate of shared power bank locations in first - and second - tier cities had reached 44.7%. The number of industry - covered locations was 3.8 million in 2021 and 4.04 million in 2023, only increasing by 240,000 locations in two years. In other words, most of the shopping malls, restaurants, and office buildings that can be entered have been entered. After years of fierce competition among the leading companies, the cake is only so big, and the shares they divide have basically stabilized.
It seems that there is still room in third - tier and lower - tier cities, with a penetration rate of 22.2%, less than half of that in first - tier cities. But this market is an unsolvable problem.
The problem in the sinking market is not whether there are enough locations, but whether the revenue is cost - effective. The population density is lower than in big cities, the average daily order volume of a single cabinet is small, and the location revenue is limited. Unfortunately, users in this part are the most price - sensitive - shared power banks are essentially a "consumption - upgrading" product. Spending three or four dollars in an emergency is a small amount in first - and second - tier cities, but it's a consumption that people in small cities will think twice about.
What's more troublesome is that the price increase has already started to affect the orders in first - and second - tier cities. From $1 per hour in 2018 to generally starting at $4 after 2022, and exceeding $10 in some scenic spots, the price has more than quadrupled in six years. The price increase didn't bring about revenue growth, but instead led to users voting with their feet - Monster's revenue plunged 36% year - on - year in 2024, which exactly coincided with the significant price increase.
This shows that the pricing of shared power banks has touched the users' psychological boundary. The price increase is to cover the higher commission cost, but the price increase itself is driving away orders; with fewer orders, the revenue is even worse, so the price has to be increased again. The price increase is to survive, but the price increase itself is accelerating the death - there is no exit from this cycle.
Since there is no new story to tell externally, they have to look for a way out internally. This is what shared power bank companies have been trying to do in the past few years.
The result is that they haven't found a way.
Advertising is the most obvious direction. Logically, it makes sense: the locations have been laid out, and the cabinets are placed in shopping malls and restaurants every day, so it's easy to monetize the traffic. Monster did do this - inserting pop - up ads in the mini - program when users scan the code to borrow and return, and also installing display screens on the cabinets to play ads in rotation. But over the years, these advertising revenues have long only accounted for about 1% of the total revenue.
The reason why advertising can't be expanded is related to the nature of the charging cabinet itself. The users of power banks are "people who come when their battery is running low", the usage scenarios are highly random, and the stay time is short. It's difficult for brand owners to include this kind of scattered and low - frequency exposure in their advertising plans. Power banks solve emergency needs, and users' attention is on their mobile phones, not on the cabinets.
The cross - border attempts are even more distant. In 2021, Monster Charging launched a liquor brand called "Kaihuan", hoping to use its nationwide location resources as a sales channel. As a result, this business had poor sales, and relevant data was never separately disclosed in the financial reports, and then there was no follow - up.
These cases point to the same problem: locations are the most valuable asset in the hands of shared power bank companies, but locations can only support one thing - allowing users to find power banks when their battery is running low. The advertising value can't be supported, and cross - border products can't be transferred, because that "no - choice" emergency scenario is the whole of this business, but it can't be a foundation for further development.
Almost all the income of these companies comes from the same thing. They haven't stopped thinking about change, but the card in their hand can only be played in one place.
04 Conclusion
There is a hidden premise in the sharing economy: the interests of the platform and users should at least be roughly the same. A ride - hailing platform hopes that drivers take more orders, and users hope to get a ride, so the two sides have the same direction. A food - delivery platform hopes for more orders, and users hope to get their food, and the same is true.
Shared power banks are exactly the opposite.
Opposition is not uncommon in the sharing economy, but shared power banks are one of the few categories that take it to such an extreme - because it punishes the very scenario on which it depends: users forget to bring their power banks, their mobile phones are almost out of power, and they have no other choice. It is precisely this "no - choice" that supports the entire price - increase logic and also dooms the continuous collapse of the brand's reputation.
The ceiling of this business was set on the day the first cabinet was placed. Its problem has never been about who is operating it, but about how it was designed.
This article is from the WeChat official account "Manfon Slow - Motion", author: Manfon. Republished by 36Kr with permission.