With zero delivery of a 5.5 billion yuan large order, Delixi Co., Ltd. fails in the photovoltaic glass business. Behind the "friendly negotiation" to terminate the contract with LONGi, there is another shadow over the photovoltaic industry.
Yujian Energy has learned that recently, Anhui Delixi Daily-use Glass Co., Ltd. (002571.SZ, hereinafter referred to as "Delixi Co., Ltd.") issued an announcement stating that after reaching a consensus through consultation with LONGi Green Energy Technology Co., Ltd. (601012.SH), the "Long-term Procurement Agreement for Photovoltaic Glass" and its supplementary agreement signed by the two parties in April 2021 have been officially terminated.
When a long - term contract worth 5.5 billion yuan has never been actually fulfilled within five years and finally ends with a "no - fault termination", what it reflects is no longer the advance or retreat of a single enterprise, but a real mirror image of the entire photovoltaic glass industry being deeply trapped in a supply - demand imbalance. Similar scenarios have not been uncommon in recent years: The 14 billion yuan long - term silicon material contract signed between Aiko Solar Energy and Jiangsu Zhongneng was completely sunk due to the bankruptcy reorganization of its subsidiary; the long - term silicon wafer contract signed between Huamin Co., Ltd. and Pengzhan New Energy was terminated due to price inversion after only two rounds of price quotations.
From silicon materials to glass, from billion - yuan large orders to ten - million - yuan contracts, "a grand start at the time of signing the contract, but a mess at the time of performance" is becoming the norm in the photovoltaic industry chain. Yujian Energy believes that this termination agreement between Delixi Co., Ltd. and LONGi Green Energy is just a newly emerged buoy in the wave of industry clearance.
01
A Long - Term Contract, Idling for Five Years
Capacity Mismatch Behind Zero Delivery
In April 2021, Delixi Co., Ltd.'s ambition to diversify was ignited by a contract. Its wholly - owned subsidiary, Bengbu Guangneng, signed a long - term procurement agreement for photovoltaic glass with 10 subsidiaries of LONGi Green Energy, agreeing to supply no less than 250 million square meters of photovoltaic glass from 2022 to 2026. Based on the market price at that time, the estimated total amount was 5.531 billion yuan. At that time, Delixi Co., Ltd.'s revenue in 2020 was only 783 million yuan, and the contract amount was equivalent to 706% of its main business revenue. The market immediately responded with a daily limit increase.
However, Bengbu Guangneng was still under construction when the contract was signed, and the actual production line did not start operation until April 2024, more than two years after the contract's agreed start date. Delixi Co., Ltd.'s official website still describes the company as a "strategic partner of well - known Chinese photovoltaic module leading enterprises such as LONGi and Trina Solar", but the reality is that the contract has never had any substantial delivery.
On May 12, 2026, the two parties officially signed the termination agreement. The reason for the termination is that the structural contradiction between supply and demand in the photovoltaic industry has led to the inversion of product selling price and cost, resulting in large losses. From signing the contract to terminating it, five years have passed with zero delivery. This large order has left Delixi Co., Ltd. with cumulative losses of more than 600 million yuan - from 2022 to 2025, the company lost 110 million yuan, 86 million yuan, 173 million yuan, and 260 million yuan respectively, with the loss amount increasing year by year.
Bengbu Guangneng lost 105 million yuan in the year of its production in 2024, with a gross profit margin of - 24.44%. After the production suspension in January 2025, the remaining inventory only brought in 14.5 million yuan in revenue, but the annual loss further expanded to 152 million yuan. By the first quarter of 2026, the photovoltaic glass segment only achieved an income of 4,300 yuan from sporadic inventory, and the business has essentially zeroed out.
It can be said that this is not an event of "order cancellation", but a standard sample of an era of capacity mismatch. Delixi Co., Ltd.'s diversification is one of the epitomes of the restlessness in the photovoltaic industry - from 2020 to 2023, a large number of enterprises flocked to various links of the photovoltaic industry, competing to sign long - term contracts to lock in the future market. The total amount of contracts signed in the silicon material link alone in three years exceeded 6 million tons. These contracts were based on collective optimism about future prosperity. Once the industry inflection point arrives, the moat instantly turns into a risk amplifier.
02
Losing 100 Yuan per Ton of Glass, Who Is Still Holding On?
Delixi Co., Ltd.'s report card of a 95.42% plunge in photovoltaic glass revenue to 12.1053 million yuan and a gross profit margin of - 2.88% is just a tiny speck of dust in the industry's cold winter. Kyson New Energy lost approximately 900 million yuan in net profit in 2025, with its revenue decreasing by approximately 29% year - on - year; Hainan Development lost 472 million yuan, hitting a new low in more than a decade; both Jinjing Technology and TuoRiXinNeng turned from profit to loss. Even leading enterprises were not spared - the net profit of Follett in the first half of 2025 declined by more than 81% year - on - year.
Based on the price data at the time of signing the contract in 2021, the average price of 3.2mm photovoltaic glass was 28 yuan per square meter, and the average price of 2.0mm was 22 yuan per square meter. By May 22, 2026, the transaction price of 2.0mm coated glass was only 8.0 - 8.5 yuan per square meter, and the transaction price of 3.2mm was only 15.0 - 15.5 yuan per square meter, almost halved compared to five years ago. A report from Deutsche Bank pointed out that the inventory days of photovoltaic glass have reached 45 days, far exceeding the usual level of 2 to 3 weeks.
At this price level, almost all small and medium - sized enterprises' kilns are losing cash costs. According to the analysis and calculation of Yujian Energy, kilns below 600 tons have the most serious losses, 800 - ton kilns can barely maintain, and only large kilns of 1000 tons and above have a glimmer of hope. Although the two kilns of Bengbu Guangneng are of the 1000 - ton level, they were put into production when the price hit rock bottom, and the scale advantage was completely offset by the general trend of the industry.
At the end of June 2025, the top ten domestic photovoltaic glass manufacturers reached a consensus to collectively reduce production by 30% starting from July, mainly by cold repairing and shutting down kilns, blocking kiln openings to limit production, etc. to shrink production capacity. However, the operating rate of downstream component enterprises has remained at a low level, and the pattern of oversupply is difficult to reverse in the short term.
03
A Five - Year Long - Term Contract
Why Did LONGi Also "Let Go"?
The fact that a long - term contract with zero delivery can be maintained for five years is not a choice made by one party alone. LONGi's cooperation is also a key dimension to understand this phenomenon.
For LONGi, this contract had a strong strategic positioning color from the very beginning. The photovoltaic market in 2021 was in an upward cycle, and locking in upstream resources was a standard move for leading enterprises. At that time, there was also a short - term supply shortage in the photovoltaic glass field. Signing a large order in advance was not only an effective guarantee for future production capacity but also a restraint on competitors.
However, the industry's fundamentals changed fundamentally in 2023. According to Solarzoom data, the production capacity of photovoltaic glass began to shrink after reaching a peak of 115,000 tons per day in June 2024, but the demand growth rate was far lower than the capacity release rate. In 2025, component enterprises continued to push down prices, and the bargaining power of glass manufacturers was constantly weakened. As a buyer, LONGi had no motivation to execute a long - term contract signed five years ago based on a high - price framework when faced with low - price spot goods in the market. Zheng Tianhong, a photovoltaic analyst at SMM, pointed out that the overall price of photovoltaic glass was still in a downward channel in 2025. Even though there were two rapid price increases, it was difficult to change the overall loss situation of the industry.
Yujian Energy's analysis believes that the deeper reason is that this long - term agreement stipulates that "the specific order price will be negotiated monthly". In essence, it is a framework agreement that locks the quantity but not the price. When the industry price is falling unilaterally, the buyer can completely choose not to issue specific orders without bearing the liability for breach of contract. This highly flexible clause design allows both parties to maintain the legal form of the contract for five years while avoiding any substantial transactions until it was completely terminated through "friendly consultation" in 2026.
The dilemma of zero delivery of long - term contracts is not only happening to Delixi Co., Ltd. In the downward cycle of the photovoltaic industry, the defects of the long - term contract model have been exposed intensively - the order quantities of a large number of contracts are not rigidly agreed, and the price mechanism cannot cover the risks brought by the severe market fluctuations. Eventually, they can only end in the form of "shrinking, breach of contract, and litigation", becoming the main driving force for overdrawing the industry's credit.
04
Delixi Stops the Bleeding, Cuts off the Photovoltaic Business
Returns to What It Is Good At
In the first quarter of 2026, Delixi Co., Ltd.'s revenue was 380 million yuan, a slight increase of 2.16% year - on - year, and the loss was narrowed to 18.0674 million yuan. After cutting off the photovoltaic glass business, the company showed signs of stopping the bleeding.
After Delixi failed in the photovoltaic glass business, it returned to the daily - use glass field. According to the annual report, this segment achieved a revenue of 1.552 billion yuan in 2025, with a gross profit margin of 17.38%, an increase of 0.87 percentage points year - on - year. Its overseas subsidiary in Pakistan also achieved its first profitable fiscal year. An enterprise that has been making glassware for nearly 30 years found that after the failure of its new business, it was still the old business that could support the basic market.
Yujian Energy has observed that in addition to returning to the old business, Delixi Co., Ltd. is also "saving itself" at the capital level. Yiyuan Aviation subscribed for the additional shares at 885 million yuan and will become the new controlling shareholder of Delixi Co., Ltd. The actual controller will be changed to Wang Tianchong and Xu Qinghua. Their company, Huatian Aviation, mainly engages in aerospace and deep - sea equipment. The former actual controller, Shi Weidong, gave up all voting rights just to let the company get the funds for survival. As of the end of September 2025, Delixi Co., Ltd.'s debt - to - asset ratio had reached 67.42%, and the total principal and interest of interest - bearing debts exceeded 1 billion yuan. Most of this additional subscription funds will be used to pay off debts.
For 2026, the company's management has set the goal of: increasing the shipment and storage volume of daily - use glass by more than 20% year - on - year, and the production and sales rate should not be less than 100%. This is a development blueprint that no longer involves photovoltaic glass. It is worth noting that the company's business plan for 2026 no longer mentions any business goals related to photovoltaics, and the signal of strategic contraction is very clear.
The reshuffle of the photovoltaic glass industry is still accelerating. A report from CICC in May 2026 judged that to achieve supply - demand balance, the domestic photovoltaic glass production capacity needs to be reduced by 5,000 to 20,000 tons compared with the current level, corresponding to a 23% to 36% decline in demand. Huatai Securities' analysis is more direct: It will take a longer time to achieve supply - demand rebalance. The potential new production capacity will suppress the upward movement of the price center, and small and medium - sized enterprises can only rely on increasing the intensity of cold repair and production suspension to gain survival space.
Leading enterprises such as Follett and Xinyi Solar have maintained relative resilience in this round of reshuffle with their cost advantages and large - kiln technology, but there is still a long way to go before real profit recovery. Since 2026, the price of photovoltaic glass has remained at a low level for 9 consecutive weeks, with an average price of 10.25 yuan per square meter for 2.0mm glass, and the inventory pressure is still accumulating. Deutsche Bank data shows that the current price is 9% lower than the trough in 2025, and the inventory days are as high as 45 days, far exceeding the normal level. The process of eliminating backward production capacity is longer than most people expected.
From chasing the trend in 2021 to a full retreat in 2026, what Delixi Co., Ltd. has written with five years of losses is actually a simple arithmetic problem: The depreciation, financial expenses, and labor costs of a thousand - ton kiln cannot last for a full year in a market with price inversion. For those second - and third - tier enterprises still struggling in the photovoltaic glass industry, the time window to decide whether to stay or leave may be running out.
This article is from the WeChat official account "Yujian Energy", author: Zhao Jianan. Republished by 36Kr with permission.