Li Jian's Glory Bet: Betting on Robot Phone and IPO Challenge, the Tough Times Are Far from Over
In the smartphone market in 2025, two clear consensuses have emerged in the technological competition: AI functions have evolved from concepts to practical applications, and imaging systems have delved deeper into professionalization.
The latest data from IDC shows that the global shipment of AI phones accounts for over 40%. In the Chinese market, the penetration rate of the new - generation AI phones has reached 40.7%, with the annual shipment expected to reach 118 million units, a year - on - year surge of 59.8%.
The strategic layouts of leading manufacturers have made the competition more tangible.
End - side large models with over 7 billion parameters, such as OPPO's Andes Large Model and Xiaomi's Xiaomi AISP Imaging Large Model, have become standard features in high - end phones. AI agents have penetrated all aspects of daily life, including clothing, food, accommodation, transportation, and shopping:
The A2A agent in Huawei's Mate X7 can automatically complete check - in and seat selection. The AI pedestrian removal and customized beauty features in vivo's X300 series have significantly lowered the threshold for professional photography. Honor's YOYO agent can also automate over 3000 scenarios.
The imaging field is also witnessing intense competition in gimbal technology. Professional camera technologies are being rapidly adopted in lower - end models. The vivo S50 Pro mini supports Hitchcock zoom, and Huawei pioneered the one - lens dual - binocular telephoto structure. Even phones priced below 1000 yuan are commonly equipped with OIS optical image stabilization and electronic gimbal combinations.
A survey by Counterpoint shows that the imaging system and AI functions are the top two drivers for users to upgrade their phones, accounting for 32% and 28% respectively.
The underlying logic of these two fields is highly consistent: upgrading the user experience based on existing demands, and technological investment can be quickly translated into market recognition. However, Honor has chosen a differentiated path against the market trend - the Robot Phone.
Potential Risks of the Robot Phone
According to Li Jian's disclosure at the Wuzhen Summit, Honor plans to launch the Robot Phone in 2026. Its core positioning is to "break the two - dimensional world where AI phones are confined to the screen" and achieve a "mobile terminal that can think and act."
Its technological core lies in the robotic skeleton + AI brain: it can achieve autonomous movement and posture adjustment through a foldable mechanical structure and interact with the physical world with the help of the Magic Large Model, such as automatic follow - up shooting and obstacle - avoiding mobile charging.
Honor's substantial investment undoubtedly demonstrates its technological ambition to break the boundaries of consumer electronics.
In the Alpha Strategy, which involves an investment of tens of billions of dollars over five years, over 30% of the resources are allocated to embodied intelligence. The global R & D team accounts for over 70%, and more than 2100 AI - related patents have built a solid technological barrier. This cost - insensitive investment is not only a prediction of the industry's future but also a bold challenge to the ceiling of phone form factors.
However, there is often a gap between technological ambition and market reality, which needs to be bridged by demand.
Before the official launch, the product that bears Honor's hope for transformation has already shown core concerns in terms of demand matching.
The current industry consensus is to make AI better understand users - by optimizing algorithms to improve interaction efficiency and fit daily usage scenarios. However, Honor has chosen a more radical path: turning the phone into a robot.
This divergence in technological direction has directly led to a disconnect between the product and user needs. The core scenarios of embodied intelligence, such as autonomous shooting and mobile charging, are not essential market demands.
Professional creators already rely on dedicated gimbals and charging devices to build a mature workflow, while ordinary users value the portability and grip of the phone more. More importantly, to achieve the functions of a robot, a complex mechanical structure is required. Industry predictions suggest that its weight may exceed 300g, which goes against the current trend of thinner and lighter smartphones.
The final product may end up in a dilemma where professional users find it not sophisticated enough and ordinary users find it too bulky and inconvenient, making it difficult to translate technological investment into actual purchasing power.
Moreover, the R & D of the mechanical structure for embodied intelligence and sensor fusion technology are at the forefront of the industry, with extremely high R & D costs. According to the rules of the consumer electronics industry, the unit cost of new - form products is usually 30% - 50% higher than that of regular models with the same configuration, but the room for price increase is limited (the pricing of high - end phones is influenced by Apple and Huawei).
If the Honor Robot Phone is priced above 8000 yuan, its target user group will account for less than 5% of the high - end market. If the price is lowered, it may face the profit dilemma of not being able to cover R & D costs.
Furthermore, Honor's Alpha Strategy emphasizes the interconnection of the AI ecosystem and has achieved full - brand smart connection across HarmonyOS, Android, iOS, and Windows. However, there is a lack of natural synergy between the embodied intelligence of the Robot Phone and the existing YOYO agent.
The former focuses on physical world interaction, while the latter focuses on digital service scenarios. It is difficult to achieve an ecological effect of 1 + 1>2 in the short term. In contrast, Huawei's HarmonyOS 5.1 has achieved seamless collaboration of AI capabilities among phones, tablets, and cars, with significantly higher user stickiness than single - device innovation.
Honor's forward - looking bet on the Robot Phone is essentially a strategic choice between short - term profit and long - term valuation. From the perspective of IPO logic, this product is more like a carrier of a technological story: by using the cutting - edge concept of embodied intelligence, it demonstrates R & D strength to the capital market to make up for the valuation shortfall in high - end products. However, this choice conflicts sharply with the company's short - term operations.
In the first half of 2025, Honor's R & D expense ratio reached 11.3%, far exceeding the industry average of 6% - 8%. Among them, the investment related to AI and embodied intelligence accounted for over 37%, directly leading to a 17% year - on - year decline in net profit. The IPO review has strict requirements for financial stability, and continuous profit decline may affect the progress of the tutoring and acceptance process.
Honor is simultaneously promoting three technological directions: R & D of end - side large models (in competition with OPPO, VIVO, and Xiaomi), iteration of the Robot Phone's mechanical structure (a unique approach), and regular updates of foldable phones and mid - range phones (to maintain the sales volume). This has led to the dispersion of resources. The self - evolving AI native concept of the Magic 8 series launched in 2025 has a slower scene implementation speed than OPPO and VIVO due to the diversion of R & D resources, and the market feedback has been mediocre.
Therefore, some analysts have pointed out that while the industry is concentrating resources on solving the practicality of AI, Honor is investing a lot of energy in the unproven form of embodied intelligence. This strategic divergence may cause it to miss out on market share during the crucial competition period of current AI phones.
Illusion of Sales Recovery and IPO Constraints
Li Jian's assertion that "the most difficult period is over" is mainly supported by the market share data in Q3 of 2025:
Honor shipped 9.9 million units and regained the fifth position in the industry with a 14.4% market share, ending two consecutive quarters of decline. However, a closer look at the data reveals that this recovery is more like a passive filling of the market gap during the industry downturn rather than active growth.
In the Q3 sales volume, models priced below 2000 yuan (mainly the X70 series and 400 series) accounted for 58%, a 12 - percentage - point increase from the same period last year. Among them, the X70 series, with its high - capacity battery of over 8000 mAh and high cost - performance, was the main driver of the share recovery. In the high - end market above 600 US dollars, Honor's share was only 1.58%, far lower than that of Apple (34%), Huawei (16.4%), and even lower than Xiaomi (4.2%). The high - end development process has almost stagnated.
Honor's market share dropped from 17.1% in Q1 of 2024 to 13.7% in Q1 of 2025 (Canalys data shows that it dropped to the sixth place in Q1) and then rebounded to 14.4% in Q3, with a fluctuation range of 25%, far exceeding the industry average of 5%.
Behind this is the pain of channel reform. In Q3 of 2025, Honor cancelled the national distributor system and switched to provincial distributors or direct supply, resulting in shortages in core regions such as Beijing and Guangdong. The inventory turnover days of some dealers increased from 45 days to 68 days, and channel confidence was dampened.
Honor has performed well in markets such as Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Macau. The activation volume in the Vietnamese market increased by over 300% year - on - year. However, the shipments in these markets only account for 12% of the total, which cannot offset the decline in the domestic market. More seriously, the growth of the European foldable phone market depends on the channel gaps left by Samsung and Apple. As Huawei and Xiaomi accelerate their layout in Europe, Honor's growth space will be rapidly squeezed.
The decline in profitability better reflects the real business situation. In the first half of 2025, Honor's gross profit margin was 13.2%, a 2.8 - percentage - point decrease from the same period last year, lower than the industry average of 15.6%. A channel distributor revealed that "to boost sales, Honor adopted a 'high - configuration, low - price' strategy for the 400 series, with a gross profit margin of less than 10%, which is a loss - making move for the sake of sales volume."
Li Jian's transformation of Honor from a phone company to an AI terminal ecosystem company faces a core paradox. Building an AI ecosystem requires long - term and large - scale investment, but the profit from the phone business cannot support this cycle.
In the first half of 2025, the revenue from Honor's AI - related businesses (including large - model R & D, pre - research on the Robot Phone, and ecosystem devices) only accounted for 4.3% of the total revenue, but consumed 37% of the R & D expenses. The phone business, which is the core of profit, was affected by the reliance on low - end models and price wars, with a 17% year - on - year decline in net profit, creating a vicious cycle of "the main business subsidizes new businesses, and new businesses have not yet generated profits."
Another major obstacle to the transformation is the issue of technological independence, which is directly related to whether the IPO review can be passed.
Although Honor has completed the shareholding reform, it still has a deep patent licensing relationship with Huawei. As of November 2025, 23% of Honor's core patents still come from Huawei's authorization, and the proportion of self - owned patents (68%) is lower than the industry average of 75%. Regulatory authorities clearly require Honor to prove that it does not rely on Huawei for technology. If this issue cannot be properly resolved, the IPO process may be delayed or even aborted.
Management changes have further increased the uncertainty of the transformation. In early 2025, former CEO Zhao Ming left the company, and core executives such as CMO Jiang Hairong and sales department head Zheng Shubao also left one after another. After Li Jian took over, he promoted organizational flattening reform, with 38 key positions open for competition, and 24% of managers born in the 1990s took up their posts.
Although organizational vitality has been enhanced, strategic continuity has been affected. The high - end - oriented strategy during Zhao Ming's tenure has been adjusted to an AI ecosystem + scale expansion strategy, resulting in an extended R & D cycle for some high - end models. The domestic market share of the Magic V5 foldable phone is less than 2%, failing to achieve a significant breakthrough.
Honor's IPO process has entered a critical stage.
It completed the filing for listing tutoring in June 2025, with CITIC Securities as the tutoring institution. The first - stage work (from June to September 2025) has been completed, and it has now entered the second stage of deep - level standardization and strategic planning. It is expected to complete all tutoring and apply for acceptance in March 2026.
However, just before the IPO, Honor is facing three difficult - to - solve constraints.
Valuation shrinkage and performance - based betting pressure: The pre - IPO round valuation is only 200 billion yuan, a shrinkage of 60 billion yuan compared with the rumored 260 billion yuan in 2023, reflecting the capital market's doubts about its growth potential. More seriously, some investors require Honor to sign a performance - based betting agreement, stating that the proportion of AI revenue must reach 30% in 2026; otherwise, Honor must repurchase the shares at an annual interest rate of 8%. Currently, the proportion of AI business is only 4.3%, and it is extremely difficult to achieve nearly a seven - fold increase in one year.
Challenges from stricter regulatory reviews: The A - share market has continuously increased the requirements for the hard - technology attributes of technology companies. In 2025, 81% of the companies queuing for IPO on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange's main board were in the suspension state, and the average review time for the ChiNext board was 847 days.
Honor needs to prove three core points: first, technological independence (separation of patents from Huawei); second, compliance of the equity structure (with 23 shareholders including state - owned assets, operators, distributors, etc., it is necessary to prove that there is no interest transfer); third, transparency of related - party transactions (compliance of transactions with related parties such as Huawei and China Mobile).
Difficulty in balancing shareholder interests: Honor's shareholder lineup has expanded to 23, including local state - owned assets, industrial chain suppliers, central - state - owned operators, distributors, and third - party capital. Their interest demands vary significantly: state - owned shareholders pursue stable development and employment security, distributor shareholders hope to increase channel profits, and capital shareholders focus on IPO valuation and exit returns. This diverse interest pattern has led to low decision - making efficiency. For example, due to the opposition of distributor shareholders, the pilot scope of the 2025 channel reform was reduced from 20 provinces to 10, greatly reducing the reform effect.
The Game Is Not Over, and the Tough Times Are Far from Ending
Li Jian emphasized at the Wuzhen Summit that Honor's transformation is "a long - term practice for the future." However, from the current strategic layout, market performance, and IPO progress, this practice is more like a high - risk strategic bet:
The forward - looking bet on the Robot Phone has not yet verified market demand. The sales recovery is passive filling of the gap rather than active growth. The input - output ratio of the AI ecosystem transformation is imbalanced, and the IPO process is constrained by multiple factors.
The deterioration of the industry environment has further exacerbated Honor's difficulties.
In 2025, the global smartphone market is still in a weak recovery state, and the Chinese market is characterized by stock competition. Apple and Huawei firmly occupy the high - end market. Xiaomi and OPPO are continuously squeezing the mid - range market share through the practical application of AI and imaging innovation. The valuation center of the consumer electronics industry is continuously moving down, and Honor's valuation of 200 billion yuan is being scrutinized by the capital market.
The more core issue is that Honor has not yet found a clear survival logic.
It wants to replicate Huawei's technology - driven path but lacks Huawei's patent accumulation and ecological barriers. It wants to achieve differentiation through radical innovation such as the Robot Phone but is restricted by the profit pressure of the phone business. It wants to rush for IPO to solve the funding problem but is tied down by the diverse interests of shareholders and regulatory requirements.
Li Jian's statement that "the most difficult period is over" may only be a phased judgment based on the recovery of the supply chain and the completion of organizational adjustment. In the long run, for Honor to truly be reborn, it needs to solve three core issues:
First, focus on the technological route (find a balance between the practical application of AI and embodied intelligence to avoid over - dispersion of resources); second, break through in the high - end market (establish brand premium beyond parameters and get rid of the dependence on low - end models); third, balance the interest pattern (find a balance between shareholder demands and long - term development).
There is no shortcut to solving these issues, nor can they be achieved overnight. For Honor, the real test is not the past market fluctuations but how to find its own position in the red - ocean competition of the AI era in the future. From the current signs, the outcome of this bet is far from certain, and Honor's tough times are far from ending.