Li Auto can afford to "take it slow".
On the last day of October, Li Auto dropped a bombshell: the company announced a recall of 11,411 MEGA models. The reason for the recall is that the anti - corrosion performance of the coolant is insufficient. Under specific conditions, it may cause corrosion and leakage of the cooling aluminum plates of the power battery and the front motor controller. In extreme cases, there is a risk of thermal runaway of the power battery.
Just one week before the recall announcement was issued (on the evening of October 23rd), a fire incident involving a 2024 Li Auto MEGA occurred in Shanghai, which became the direct cause of this recall.
After the recall notice was released, Li Xiang himself responded on his Weibo account immediately.
In recent years, in addition to this Li Auto MEGA recall, recall events have also occurred frequently among other automakers. Amid the rapid development of domestic new - energy vehicles, it has truly sounded an alarm for the entire industry.
From the perspective of industry data, the number of new - energy vehicle recall events showed an obvious upward trend from 2024 to 2025. According to data from the State Administration for Market Regulation, a total of 89 new - energy vehicle recalls were carried out in 2024, involving 4.491 million vehicles, a year - on - year increase of 180.1%, accounting for 40.0% of the total number of recalls for the whole year. In 2025, the recall events continued.
The continuous quality problems have vaguely made people aware that the MEGA incident is not just an isolated accident, but a concentrated manifestation of the systematic problems in the entire industry.
01
To understand the deeper meaning of this recall, we first need to return to the strategic background of the MEGA itself.
From 2023 to 2025, the industry generally regarded it as the "vacuum period for high - end pure - electric MPVs": traditional luxury brands such as Mercedes - Benz's EQT have not been launched on a large scale for a long time. Although Volvo's EM90 has been released, its price of 818,000 yuan makes it more like a "placeholder" product. Among domestic new - force automakers, XPeng X9 has just completed market pre - heating, and the sales volume of the pure - electric version of Denza D9 is limited. There is a lack of a real benchmark product in the market segment above 600,000 yuan.
It was precisely during this market gap that Li Auto saw an opportunity. As a company that started with range - extended hybrid technology, Li Auto urgently needed to prove its technical strength and strategic foresight in the pure - electric field to the capital market. In 2024, Li Auto's revenue reached 144.5 billion yuan. The L - series models have accumulated abundant cash flow for the company - a cash reserve of 112.8 billion yuan provides sufficient financial support for Li Auto's pure - electric transformation.
Against this background, the success or failure of the MEGA does not only represent the fate of a single product, but also the strategic expectation of Li Auto's "second growth curve".
Therefore, when the MEGA project was initiated, Li Auto faced a typical game between "first - mover advantage" and "product perfection". If it chose to spend an additional six months on more comprehensive material compatibility tests, it might miss the crucial market window period and allow competitors to take the lead. However, if it launched the product according to the established time node, it had to bear the risk of insufficient verification. Li Auto ultimately chose the latter - this is not due to a lack of technical ability, but a strategic compromise in the face of business reality.
However, it was precisely this strategic pressure that gave the MEGA project a certain color of "time anxiety" from the very beginning.
From a technical perspective, the MEGA uses the Kirin 5C ternary lithium battery, with a maximum cruising range of 738 kilometers, which is also at the mainstream level among products in the same category. Compared with lithium iron phosphate batteries, ternary lithium batteries perform better in terms of energy density, low - temperature performance, and charging speed. However, a high energy density also means a higher degree of instability to some extent, and relatively lower safety. The main reason is that ternary lithium batteries have inherent chemical property hidden dangers: poor thermal stability, and they are prone to thermal runaway under high temperature, physical damage, or management failure.
The cathode materials (lithium nickel cobalt manganate or lithium nickel cobalt aluminate) of ternary lithium batteries are prone to decompose and release oxygen at about 200°C, increasing the risk of combustion. In contrast, the thermal runaway temperature of lithium iron phosphate batteries is as high as 500 - 600°C. Especially when encountering mechanical damage (such as collisions), punctures, squeezes, or short - circuits, the probability of a ternary lithium battery catching fire is significantly higher than that of a lithium iron phosphate battery. Third - party data shows that its thermal runaway risk is about three times that of the latter.
Previously, the spontaneous combustion cases of Porsche Taycan were related to the fast - charging use of ternary lithium batteries or bottom punctures.
Therefore, when adopting the ternary lithium battery solution, it is necessary to reduce risks through an advanced battery management system (BMS) and engineering design. The MEGA uses liquid - cooling technology in the cooling circuits of the power battery and the front motor controller. This is originally a mature and reliable heat - dissipation solution, but there were omissions in the verification of the material compatibility between the coolant and the cooling aluminum plate.
According to Li Auto's official statement, the coolant in this batch passed a 1,064 - hour anti - corrosion test. This figure seems quite sufficient - equivalent to continuous operation for 44 days. However, the reality is cruel: the accelerated aging test under laboratory conditions often cannot fully simulate the complex working conditions in the long - term and real environment. The industry generally conducts tests for more than 18 months before mass production in order to eliminate most potential defects.
Rushing into production without a complete cycle of experiments left a significant accident hidden danger. Therefore, Li Auto's recall plan is to replace key components such as the power battery and the front motor controller for all affected vehicles free of charge. This "full replacement" approach is also a necessary measure.
However, the problems exposed by this recall event go far beyond the technical - level mistake in material selection. It is more like a mirror, reflecting the structural contradictions in the process of the rapid development of the Chinese new - energy vehicle industry.
02
If we broaden our perspective to the entire industry panorama, we will find that from 2024 to 2025, all participants were involved in an unprecedented "speed race" - not about who can run fast, but about who dares to "jump the gun" in the face of uncertainty.
Since the beginning of 2025, more than 30 automakers have announced price cuts. Behind this figure is the overall pressure on the gross profit margin of the entire industry. Tesla reduced the starting price of the Model Y to 239,900 yuan and offered a five - year zero - interest financial plan. BYD even directly sent a letter to its suppliers asking for a 10% price cut, citing that "the competition in the new - energy vehicle market is entering a white - hot stage". Even NIO and Li Auto, which have always adhered to a high - end positioning, had to join this "price war". Data from the China Passenger Car Association shows that in the first two months of 2025, the average price reduction of new - energy vehicles reached 13%, and the entire price war has truly entered a white - hot stage.
In such a competitive landscape, "being slow" often means "being out".
The product development cycle in the traditional automotive industry is usually 30 - 40 months. This time span was reasonable in the era of fuel - powered vehicles because the market was relatively stable and technological iteration was slow. However, in the new - energy era, this cycle is considered "unacceptable". Volkswagen has publicly announced that it will compress the entire development and production cycle from 50 months to 36 months. Chinese new - force automakers generally control this cycle within 24 months, and some even claim to be able to achieve it in 18 months.
Behind this "time compression" is the excessive reliance of Chinese new - energy vehicle enterprises on the "agile development" model. In the past few years, it was precisely by virtue of this rapid iteration ability that Chinese automakers achieved a "corner overtaking" in the global new - energy vehicle market: BYD surpassed Tesla to become the global champion in new - energy vehicle sales; Li Auto established a technical advantage in the range - extended hybrid field with its L - series products; Wenjie and NIO even led traditional luxury brands in terms of intelligent configuration.
However, the success of the "agile development" model cannot be simply replicated in core systems that involve high safety redundancy and long - life - cycle verification. The thermal management system of the power battery is a typical example: it not only needs to maintain stable performance in different temperature and humidity environments but also withstand the test of continuous operation for several years. Any problems with design or material compatibility may gradually appear in the later stage of use. These technical risks with a long "latency period" are difficult to detect and solve in a timely manner through the rapid iteration method.
The deeper problem is that the current market environment is actually punishing those enterprises that "are willing to slow down".
If an automobile company's sales growth slows down for two consecutive quarters, its stock price often drops significantly, and the difficulty of financing also increases accordingly. Under such pressure, it is difficult for corporate management to explain to investors a decision like "we need to spend an additional six months on material compatibility tests", which seems to "not directly generate value".
In recent years, there have been many cases of automakers whose stock prices have plummeted due to slowed - down sales growth. Take Li Auto for example: in September 2025, it delivered 33,951 new vehicles in a single month, a year - on - year decrease of 36.8%, and its stock price dropped significantly accordingly. In the fourth quarter of 2024, its net profit decreased by 31.9% year - on - year.
Similarly, although NIO's sales volume increased by 40.1% year - on - year in the first quarter of 2025, it decreased by 42.1% quarter - on - quarter, and the sales volume of its main brand was almost halved. In 2024, its stock price dropped by 18.6% in total, and its market value was the lowest among "Wei Xia Li", even only one - fourth of Li Auto's.
These cases show that in the current capital market environment, enterprises are under huge growth pressure. Once the sales growth rate slows down, investors often react immediately, leading to a significant drop in the stock price and an increase in financing costs, thus forming a vicious circle.
In such a general environment, the MEGA incident is not accidental but a structural necessity - if this competitive environment that pursues "speed" remains unchanged, we may see more similar quality problems, especially among brands that are eager to shift from traditional technical routes to pure - electric or try to break through the price range quickly.
However, from an industry perspective, this situation is ultimately unsustainable. After all, in the eyes of consumers, if a car cannot even guarantee its own safe arrival at the destination, then all the additional functions and features behind it are just zero.
03
The Li Auto MEGA recall incident has given the entire new - energy vehicle industry an expensive lesson about "respect for engineering" - calculating according to the commitment of free replacement of power batteries and motor controllers, the cost of this recall may exceed billions of yuan, not including the indirect impact caused by the loss of brand reputation.
The enlightenment significance of this incident far exceeds the quality problem of a single product. It is actually sending a clear signal to the industry: in the future, the real competitive barrier will no longer be the ability of "rapid iteration", but who can still hold the engineering bottom line in the extremely competitive environment.
From the law of technological development, the explosive growth of the Chinese new - energy vehicle industry in the past few years has mainly benefited from the rapid breakthroughs in functional innovation: longer cruising range, more intelligent cockpit systems, and more abundant vehicle - networking functions.
But as the market matures and consumers' awareness improves, the focus of product competition is shifting from "what functions it has" to "whether the functions are reliable".
In terms of batteries, the real "unconquered high - ground" for Chinese new - energy vehicles is a set of engineering capabilities with vertical penetration in key links (such as BMS, electric drive, and thermal management). In contrast, from 2024 to 2025, although Tesla's Model Y was surpassed in monthly sales in China by Wenjie, Li Auto, and BYD, its engineering redundancy, thermal management design, and battery safety record are still among the best in the industry - although there have been accidents, it has not carried out large - scale recalls due to problems such as coolant, sealant, and wiring harness layout.
Among domestic automakers at present, BYD is the only one that simultaneously masters the technologies of battery cells, battery packs, complete vehicles, semiconductors, and thermal management. However, this kind of "systematic" ability cannot be established overnight. It is also the result of continuous summarization and improvement after dealing with a large number of accidents. Even so, on October 17, 2025, BYD still launched two recall plans, involving a total of 115,783 Tang - series and Yuan Pro models, mainly related to problems with the drive motor controller and power battery sealing.
It can be seen that the rule of "ten years to forge a sword" in the automotive industry is still valid. The current "quarterly assessment mechanism" of the capital market for new - energy vehicle enterprises is too short - term. In the past, investors often focused on delivery volume and gross profit margin and were even intolerant of "waiting an extra quarter for safety", which led enterprises to have no choice but to be "early starters". However, more and more recall events are reminding the capital market that it should learn to distinguish between "benign slowness" and "malignant slowness": if an enterprise delays the launch due to insufficient technical verification, this should be regarded as a responsible performance rather than a defect in management ability.
In other words, the market should stop the wrong orientation of "forcing automakers to rush to submit their answers" and instead reward those honest enterprises that "are willing to double - check three times before submitting their answers". Only when the engineering bottom line becomes an industry consensus and the core competitiveness of enterprises can Chinese new - energy vehicles truly transform from "producing in large quantities" and "producing quickly" to "producing strongly" and "producing well".
It is hoped that the recall of the Li Auto MEGA is the beginning of this transformation.