How long can Jishi Auto last?
In 2025, as the new energy vehicle industry undergoes an accelerated reshuffle, Jishi Auto, which has been established for over three years, stands at a crossroads of fate. This new car - making force that has raised over $1.5 billion in cumulative financing and once had a post - investment valuation close to $3 billion has yet to make a breakthrough in the market. Although the sales volume of Jishi 01 reached 1,286 units in August 2025, setting a new historical high, such a result is still a drop in the bucket compared to the huge investment. As the tide of capital gradually recedes, how long can Jishi Auto hold on?
The Carnival and Hidden Worries of the Capital Game
Jishi Auto's financing journey can be regarded as a "capital favorite" among new car - making forces. Since its establishment in 2021, the company has completed seven rounds of financing in just three years. From early - stage investors like Gaorong Capital and Northern Light Venture Capital to later - stage giants such as Tencent Investment and Sequoia China, and then to the $1 billion strategic investment from Weiqiao Pioneering Group in September 2023, the enthusiasm of capital once pushed its valuation to a peak of $3 billion. It is particularly noteworthy that when Jishi Auto completed its Series E financing in February 2023, it didn't even have any mass - produced models. This phenomenon of "valuing a company at billions before any cars are produced" is not uncommon in the new energy vehicle investment boom, but it also planted hidden dangers for its later development.
The intensive injection of capital has masked the fatal flaws in Jishi Auto's business model. Adopting the contract - manufacturing model, Jishi Auto has saved the huge investment in building its own factory and focused its energy on R & D, channels, and brand building. However, this asset - light model has not brought the expected efficiency advantages. Compared with NIO in its early days, which also adopted the contract - manufacturing model, Jishi Auto's sales performance pales in comparison. Data shows that Jishi Auto's monthly average sales volume has long hovered around 400 units. Even in August 2025, the best - selling month, it only achieved a sales volume of 1,286 units. Such a scale is far from being able to support the growth expectations corresponding to its valuation.
What's even more alarming is that the serious deviation between the financing scale and the enterprise value is wearing down investors' patience. The interval between each round of financing for Jishi Auto has been continuously shortening, from once every three months at the beginning to once every six months later, but the financing amount has not been translated into an increase in market share. The $100 million capital increase in April 2024 showed a decline compared with the previous financing scales in the hundreds of millions of dollars, which may imply that investors' confidence in Jishi Auto is wavering. Referring to the example of WM Motor, whose cash flow broke due to a "loss of $12,000 per vehicle", if Jishi Auto cannot achieve economies of scale as soon as possible, the safety cushion built by the $1.5 billion in financing may not last long.
The Dilemma of Misaligned Product Positioning
Jishi Auto's product strategy has always wavered between ideal and reality. Its first mass - produced model, Jishi 01, is positioned as a mid - to high - end extended - range hybrid SUV, with a domestic guide price ranging from 299,900 to 359,900 yuan. This price range is in the "red ocean" area of the new energy vehicle market. There are strong competitors like Tesla Model Y and Li L7 at the high end, and cost - effective options like BYD Tang PLUS at the low end. Jishi 01 lacks sufficient differentiation advantages to break through. Although the company launched a personalized optional package of "in - vehicle kitchen + roof tent" in an attempt to create a niche label of "outdoor travel", the starting price of 359,900 yuan plus a 23,000 - yuan optional fee makes the total price approach 400,000 yuan, far exceeding the psychological expectations of the target user group.
The sales data mercilessly reveals the real feedback from the market. From January to August 2025, the cumulative sales volume of Jishi 01 was only 7,041 units, with a monthly average of less than 900 units. This performance is in sharp contrast to the monthly sales volume of over 10,000 units of Li L7 during the same period. Although there was a several - fold year - on - year increase in some months, a closer look at the data reveals that this is a false prosperity based on an extremely low base in the same period last year. The sales volume of Jishi 01 was only 568 units in October 2024 and even dropped to 502 units in January 2025. Such a large fluctuation indicates that it has not yet established a stable user group and market recognition.
To reverse the decline, Jishi Auto launched an aggressive promotion policy in September 2025: "A limited - time ultra - low annual financial interest rate of 2.5%, zero down payment, and a daily payment as low as 186 yuan." Although this sales strategy similar to "rent - to - own" may boost sales in the short term, it will significantly erode the already meager profit margin and intensify the cash - flow pressure. The cruel reality of the new energy vehicle industry is that without sufficient scale support, any promotion is just a short - sighted solution. WM Motor's lesson of a $12,000 loss per vehicle due to the "price - for - volume" strategy, which ultimately led to a broken capital chain, apparently has not attracted enough attention from Jishi Auto.
After facing difficulties in the domestic market, Jishi Auto set its sights on overseas markets and launched the Saudi - version of Jishi 01 priced at 560,000 yuan. This version has been specially optimized for the Middle - East market, including an Arabic voice system, a sand - mode, and a special paint for the Sahara sand. In 2025, it occupied a 6% share in the luxury SUV market above 500,000 yuan in the UAE.
However, the seemingly good overseas performance actually hides risks. On the one hand, the price of 560,000 yuan has a premium of nearly 70% compared with the domestic version, and this price - discrimination strategy may damage the brand consistency. On the other hand, the 6% market share mainly relies on the local curiosity about emerging brands and lacks a sustainable growth foundation. More importantly, the specific sales volume in the Middle - East market has not been publicly disclosed, and its contribution to the overall revenue may be negligible.
The Survival Countdown in the Industry Reshuffle
In 2025, the new energy vehicle industry is no longer a "blue ocean" that can be easily influenced by capital. Instead, it has entered an elimination stage of "hard - power competition". According to a report by Dongchedi at the beginning of the year, the global automotive industry is undergoing a cruel reshuffle. From the collective collapse of Chinese new forces to the shutdown of German century - old factories, the prediction that "90% of car companies will not survive 2025" is becoming a reality. Byton burned through 8.4 billion yuan but failed to produce mass - produced cars, HiPhi suffered a broken capital chain due to misaligned competition, and Hengchi's after - sales service was paralyzed due to the debt crisis of its parent company. These cases reveal a common pattern: enterprises lacking core technologies, making mistakes in product positioning, and relying on capital infusion will eventually be eliminated by the market.
Jishi Auto is treading on the failed paths of its predecessors. Its core problem lies in the failure to establish a sustainable business model. Insufficient R & D investment has led to a lack of product competitiveness, and the low sales volume cannot form economies of scale. The model of relying on financing to maintain operations will be unsustainable after the capital tide recedes. Although the contract - manufacturing model has reduced the initial investment, it has also lost the ability to control the supply chain and the initiative in cost control, which is in sharp contrast to BYD's successful path of achieving cost dominance through vertical integration. Under the double squeeze of raw - material price fluctuations and the normalization of price wars, Jishi Auto's survival space is being continuously compressed.
The cash - flow situation is the key variable determining Jishi Auto's survival time. Based on the cumulative financing of $1.5 billion, if the company's annual operating cost remains at around $300 million (including R & D, marketing, personnel, and other expenses), the existing funds can theoretically support it for about five years. However, the actual situation may be more severe. On the one hand, the low sales volume results in revenues far from covering the costs, and each car sold may consume the previous financing. On the other hand, investors have shown signs of hesitation. The capital increase of only $100 million in April 2024 indicates that the difficulty of subsequent financing will increase significantly. Referring to the example of HiPhi, which went bankrupt in 2024 after raising over $1.7 billion in financing, Jishi Auto's capital reserve is not sufficient to be care - free.
What's even more fatal is that Jishi Auto has not yet established a differentiated technological barrier. In core fields such as autonomous driving and the three - electric system, the company lacks breakthrough innovation. The product competitiveness mainly relies on the stacking of configurations rather than technological strength. The "copy - cat" development model may have been feasible in the early stage of the industry, but it is no longer sustainable in the technological competition stage of 2025. Obviously, enterprises relying on subsidies should be eliminated. The new energy vehicle industry is no longer a paradise for disruptors but a battlefield of hard - power in the manufacturing industry. The R & D investment of Jishi Auto is seriously mismatched with its valuation, which makes it lack the ability to resist risks in the industry reshuffle.
The Gradual Loss of Market Trust
As a high - value consumer product, user trust is the cornerstone of a car brand's survival, but Jishi Auto has obvious shortcomings in this regard. Although there has been no direct exposure of Jishi Auto's quality problems by state - owned media, the frequent trust crises in the new energy vehicle industry have affected consumers' psychology. China National Radio once exposed a car company that, after discovering safety hazards, did not inform consumers but simply dealt with them with nylon cable ties. Such incidents have seriously damaged consumers' trust in emerging brands. In such an industry environment, Jishi Auto neither has the brand heritage of traditional car companies nor the quality - control reputation of benchmark enterprises, making it difficult to gain long - term trust from consumers.
The lag in channel construction has further restricted market expansion. As of September 2025, Jishi Auto's offline stores are mainly concentrated in first - and second - tier cities, with a much smaller coverage area than competitors like Li Auto and NIO. Although the contract - manufacturing model has saved the cost of factory construction, it also means that Jishi Auto needs to invest more resources in channels and services to build brand recognition. However, the limited sales volume can hardly support the cost of channel expansion. This vicious cycle has kept its market penetration rate at a low level, making it difficult to form a word - of - mouth effect.
User feedback has also exposed many problems in product experience. Although the Saudi - version of Jishi 01 has been praised as a "steel camel" by Middle - East users, domestic users still have many complaints about the smoothness of its extended - range system and the fluency of its in - vehicle system. In the current situation of rapid iteration of new energy vehicle product capabilities, any experience short - board may be infinitely magnified. Jishi Auto overly relies on the concept marketing of "outdoor scenarios" but lacks in polishing the basic performance. This tendency of "emphasizing marketing over R & D" is highly similar to the failed path of Byton, which hyped the concept of a "coffee - bar large screen".
Is There Still a Chance?
Jishi Auto is not unaware of the crisis. The aggressive promotion policy launched in September 2025 is both a helpless move to boost sales and perhaps the last effort to buy time. The company may hope to prove its market potential through short - term sales growth and create conditions for the next round of financing. However, the risks of this strategy are obvious. Excessive promotion will damage the brand image, reduce user loyalty, and may even make potential investors question its profit prospects.
The attempt in the overseas market is another important variable. The initial success of the Saudi - version of Jishi 01 in the Middle - East market provides a possible breakthrough path. However, to transform this regional advantage into an overall victory, it requires continuous local investment and long - term brand building, which is extremely difficult for Jishi Auto with a tight budget. The 6% market share in the Middle - East market is more the result of differentiated competition. As traditional luxury brands accelerate their electrification transformation, Jishi Auto's first - mover advantage may soon disappear.
Changes in industry policies will also affect Jishi Auto's fate. In 2025, the national subsidies for new energy vehicles have completely withdrawn, and local government support policies have also gradually tightened. This means that Jishi Auto must achieve self - sufficiency without policy dividends. For an unprofitable enterprise, this is undoubtedly a huge challenge. BYD's ability to grow against the trend is due to the cost advantage brought by vertical integration. Lacking such core capabilities, Jishi Auto will face greater survival pressure after the policy retreats.
Overall, Jishi Auto's survival period largely depends on the progress of the next round of financing. If it can obtain a large - scale investment before the existing funds are exhausted, it may gain a buffer period of one to two years. However, if the financing is not successful, according to the current capital consumption rate, its cash flow may break between the end of 2026 and the beginning of 2027. Referring to the industry average, new energy vehicle brands with a monthly sales volume of less than 1,000 units can hardly survive for more than three years in the fierce competition. Jishi Auto's countdown has quietly begun.
The development history of the new energy vehicle industry has proved that capital can create bubbles but cannot create a market. Jishi Auto has exchanged $1.5 billion in financing for three years of survival, but has failed to gain a foothold in the market. As the capital carnival ends, time is running out for Jishi Auto. In this era where strength speaks, without the support of core technologies and a sustainable business model, no brand can escape the fate of being eliminated. Whether Jishi Auto can break the "death curse" of new forces may be revealed in the next 12 - 18 months.
Content sources:
Zhengguan News: "Jishi Auto's Monthly Average Sales Volume is Only 407 Units. Are Investors 'Anxious'?", September 27, 2024
Dongchedi: "The Truth of the 'Bankruptcy Tide' in New Energy Vehicles: Can 90% of Car Companies Survive 2025?", February 28, 2025
Chezhuzhijia: Sales Data of Jishi 01, September 14, 2025
Xi'an Jishi Auto: Sales Policy Announcement of Jishi Auto, September 18, 2025
Pacauto: "Jishi Auto's Models Priced Around 560,000 Yuan", September 8, 2025
This article is from the WeChat official account "Cheyun", author: Cheyunjun, published by 36Kr with authorization.