Overtake! Canal Jiuyuan had 388 online property sales contracts signed in a week. The truth about "the No.1 Legendary Property in Tongzhou" has emerged.
In the second half of this year, the real estate market in Tongzhou, Beijing, has been in the spotlight.
On July 20th, the Zhaoshang Chaotang Lanyue project opened for sale. The official poster claimed that it had a strong sales volume of 1.86 billion yuan, winning the sales championship of ordinary residential properties in Beijing in July. On August 30th, the second - phase of the project opened for sale, and the official announcement stated that it was "sold out in the second opening", with a de - stocking rate of over 95%. Therefore, it is hailed as the "Number One Divine Project in Tongzhou".
The Number One Divine Project in Tongzhou
On September 20th, the Zhongjian Yunhe Jiuyuan project opened for sale. In less than a week, 388 units were signed for online contracts. Without accident, it will be the sales champion of the Beijing real estate market in September.
Once the Yunhe Jiuyuan project emerged, the "divine project" myth of Chaotang Lanyue was broken. From the opening of the first - phase until now, more than two months have passed. The first - phase and second - phase of Chaotang Lanyue have obtained a total of three pre - sale permits, with a total of 760 housing units. So far, 380 units have been signed for online contracts.
This sales speed not only lags far behind the "latecomer" Yunhe Jiuyuan but also reveals the "hollow" in its sales data.
The market's doubts mainly come from two aspects:
How much "hollow" is there in the data? Chaotang Lanyue claimed a de - stocking rate of 90% for the first - phase opening and 95% for the second - phase opening.
By checking the official website of the Beijing Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban - Rural Development, it can be seen that the pre - sale permit for the first - phase of Chaotang Lanyue includes 6 buildings with 504 housing units. More than two months have passed since the opening, and the actual online - contract de - stocking rate is 61.1%. The second - phase obtained the permit on August 29th and opened for sale on the 30th. Nearly a month has passed so far, and the actual online - contract de - stocking rate is 28.1%.
The official claim was that 1.86 billion yuan worth of units were sold in the first - phase opening, and the second - phase was sold out. But in fact, as of September 21st, a total of 1.905 billion yuan worth of units in the first - phase and second - phase have been signed for online contracts.
Objectively speaking, Chaotang Lanyue has sold well, but it set the tone too high. The actual data is quite different from the promotional claims. Once the truly hot - selling Yunhe Jiuyuan project opened, it was immediately outshined.
Project location map
If you make exaggerated claims, the truth will eventually come out.
If you make exaggerated claims, you may end up hurting yourself...
Chaotang Lanyue is closer to the main urban area of Beijing, only 1300 meters away from Chaoyang. The developer, Zhaoshang, calls it the "intersection of dual - core CBDs". The specific supporting facilities are also excellent. "Within walking distance of the project, there are comprehensive and excellent supporting facilities such as schools, subways, commercial areas, rivers, and medical institutions." In contrast, the Yunhe Jiuyuan project is located east of the North Canal, farther from the city center.
However, Yunhe Jiuyuan not only sells better than Chaotang Lanyue but also at a higher price.
Statistics of pre - sale contract signings for Yunhe Jiuyuan
Statistics of pre - sale contract signings for the first - phase of Chaotang Lanyue
Moreover, Chaotang Lanyue's online - contract signing data shows an obvious downward trend, indicating a lack of follow - up momentum. In July, 175 units were signed for online contracts; in August, 94 units; and as of now in September, 97 units. Nearly half of the online contracts were signed in a concentrated manner after the first - phase opening, and the number started to decline rapidly in August. So, the project "quickly" launched the second - phase at the end of August to "boost the data".
The second doubt about Chaotang Lanyue from the market is that it "boosts the data" through small - sized units. The project is relatively close to Chaoyang. In terms of positioning, it mainly targets the spill - over customer group from urban areas such as Chaoyang, taking the rigid - demand route.
This positioning actually takes several projects in the Chaoqing and Sanjianfang areas of Chaoyang as a reference, voluntarily placing itself in a lower ecological position. It allows the Chaoyang projects to target the improvement - oriented customer group (the "big fish"), while it targets the rigid - demand customer group (the "small fish").
It's unclear whether the project team really conducted in - depth research on the Tongzhou market before making this positioning. By targeting the rigid - demand spill - over from Chaoyang with mainly small - sized units, it is equivalent to giving up most of the local improvement - oriented demand in Tongzhou.
Perhaps the project team assumed that the purchasing power of people in Chaoyang is stronger than that in Tongzhou. Subsequently, the project's planning and promotional activities were carried out according to this logic, highlighting the selling points of low - total - price and fully - functional small - sized units. Even the name "Chaotang" shows this intention.
In fact, Chaotang Lanyue has done a good job in targeting the rigid - demand customer group. The units with an area of less than 89 square meters sell the best, with a total price of less than 5.5 million yuan. It mainly features small - sized three - bedroom units, and even a 69 - square - meter unit is designed as a three - bedroom. Although the living experience may not be excellent, it can indeed attract rigid - demand customers who have a need for functional space.
However, in the planning of the first - phase, Chaotang Lanyue also showed its "wishful - thinking" side. To avoid sacrificing too much profit, Chaotang Lanyue still built a large number of units with an area of over 100 square meters. Among them, the 101 - square - meter units sold relatively well, but perhaps due to the overly distinct positioning, the larger 120 - square - meter units did not sell well.
In Building 3 of the first - phase, there are 108 large - sized units, but only 27 units have been signed for online contracts or reserved. Most of the remaining units will probably become long - term inventory and have to be sold as "special - price units", going against the original intention of increasing the project's profit.
Online - contract signing situation of Building 3 in the first - phase of Chaotang Lanyue (Source: Official website of the Beijing Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban - Rural Development)
This "structural hot - selling" is a phenomenon that real - estate developers dislike. At first glance, the sales performance seems excellent, and the project manager gains fame and fortune. However, as time passes, some units will become unsalable inventory, dragging down the actual profit of the project.
In the case of Chaotang Lanyue, the unsalable units are the large - sized ones intended to increase profit, which indicates that there was a problem with the project's initial positioning.
Therefore, in the second - phase, Chaotang Lanyue urgently adjusted the plan, converting a large number of 120 - square - meter units into small - sized units of 69 and 89 square meters. However, the hot - selling momentum has already started to decline.
On September 25th, the official website of the Beijing Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban - Rural Development showed that only 17 units in 6 buildings of the first - phase of Chaotang Lanyue were reserved and waiting to be signed for online contracts. The de - stocking speed of the second - phase is also slower than that of the first - phase.
It is said that besides the deviation in product positioning, Chaotang Lanyue is also "kidnapped" by the sales channels.
Perhaps because Beihaojia is one of the project's shareholders (the project is jointly developed by Zhaoshang Shekou, Beihaojia, and China Overseas Land & Investment), Chaotang Lanyue uses the exclusive sales channel of Lianjia, offering a commission of up to 4 points - such a high channel cost is rare for hot - selling projects in Beijing.
In contrast, the channel commission rate of Yunhe Jiuyuan is only 2 points, half of that of Chaotang Lanyue, and it only used Douyin and some self - media before the opening.
Currently, channel fees are one of the main cost components in marketing expenses. Excessively high channel fees will greatly dilute the project's profit.
Industry insiders speculate that the series of chaotic situations at Chaotang Lanyue may be related to the frequent personnel changes in the marketing department of Zhaoshang Shekou in Beijing.
Two months ago, Yu Haibo, the former marketing director of Zhaoshang Shekou Beijing Company, suddenly resigned. He had only been with the company for 5 months from joining to leaving. Subsequently, Fu Shenchao, the executive deputy general manager of the Beijing company, took over the marketing director position on an interim basis. The leadership has changed three times in a year.
Previously, some analyses suggested that Yu Haibo's departure may be related to difficulties in team integration, unmet performance expectations, and factors such as strategic layout and resource allocation.
At the beginning of 2025, Zhaoshang Shekou Beijing Company also replaced its general manager. Lü Chuanlai, a former key figure in Zhaoshang Shekou's East China region, left the East China area to become the general manager of the Beijing company. In June, the group carried out an overall organizational structure adjustment, completely abolishing the regional - company level, changing from the original three - level management model of "group - region - city" to a two - level management model of "group - city". This may also have had a certain impact on the personnel arrangement and resource allocation of the Beijing projects.
The competition in the Beijing real estate market has reached a white - hot stage, especially among Zhongjian, China Overseas, and China Resources. In the first half of the year, Zhaoshang Shekou increased its investment in Beijing, spending 8.9 billion yuan on land acquisition, ranking 5th in the market. However, its sales performance still lags far behind that of leading enterprises such as Zhongjian Zhidi, China Overseas, China Resources, and Yuexiu.
Within Zhaoshang Shekou, the development gross profit margin in the northern region where Beijing is located is relatively low. Zhaoshang, which has a good foundation in product strength, still needs to systematically sort out its human resources, resources, and decision - making system to avoid getting trapped in a situation where the claims are loud but the returns are low.
This article is from the WeChat official account "Future Habitat", author: Xiaoshi. It is published by 36Kr with permission.