From Valuation Myth to Bankruptcy Liquidation: Fisker, Another Broken Sample of the New Energy Bubble

In the summer of 2025, when the bankruptcy court in Delaware, USA, finally approved Fisker's liquidation plan, this once-promising new energy vehicle company officially put an end to its short lifecycle. From the high-profile launch of the Ocean SUV in 2023, to the application for bankruptcy protection in 2024, and then to the abandonment of its headquarters in 2025, Fisker's downward trajectory is not only a history of a company's failure but also reflects the cruel truth behind the wild growth of the new energy industry.

2023: Cracks Beneath the Halo, from the "Production Myth" to "Running Out of Funds"

Henrik Fisker once lent an aura to the car company named after him with his reputation in the design industry. In 2023, the Ocean SUV, which carried the ambition to "disrupt the traditional SUV market," was officially delivered. The outside world once regarded it as the "third pole" after Tesla and Rivian. However, the aura faded much faster than expected.

In July, Fisker first exposed its production capacity shortfall. In Q2, it only produced 1,022 Ocean SUVs, hundreds short of the target of 1,400 - 1,700 vehicles. The failure to meet the production target directly triggered an early warning for the capital chain. Three days later, the company urgently announced the issuance of $340 million in convertible bonds, netting $296.7 million in funds, claiming that the money would be used to "support growth in 2024 and beyond," including adding a new battery production line, capital expenditures, and future product R & D. At that time, the outside world didn't realize that this was just the beginning of Fisker's attempt to "rob Peter to pay Paul."

By December, Fisker's situation further deteriorated. To free up $300 million in working capital, the company cut its annual production target for 2023 to 10,000 vehicles, which was only a quarter of the "optimistic expectation" a year ago. Behind the halving of production capacity was the chaos in supply chain management and potential problems in product quality control. However, at that time, the market's attention was more focused on the "heat of the new energy track," and these cracks were not taken seriously in time.

2024: The Full-blown Crisis, a Death Spiral of Safety Scandals and Exhausted Funds

If 2023 was a year of "underlying turmoil," 2024 was Fisker's "year of disaster." From the concentrated outbreak of safety issues to the complete rupture of the capital chain, this car company slid step by step into the abyss of bankruptcy.

Full Safety Alarms: Four Investigations + One Recall, Total Collapse of Trust

On January 15, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in the United States took the lead. Due to 19 owner complaints (including brake failure, shifting malfunctions, inability to open the door from the inside, and even the sudden opening of the hood while driving at high speed), it launched the first safety investigation into the Ocean SUV. However, Fisker only prevaricated by saying that the problems were "rare" and tried to cover up the hardware defects with software updates.

In February, the safety crisis further escalated. On the 9th, it was reported that since the delivery of the Ocean SUV, owners had reported over 100 cases of "sudden power outages," accompanied by problems such as loss of braking power, key fob malfunctions that trapped owners inside or outside the vehicle, and seat sensor failures. On the 16th, NHTSA launched a second investigation due to 4 complaints of "unexpected vehicle rolling" (which had caused 1 injury).

Before the safety hazards were resolved, Fisker's financial situation was on the verge of collapse. On February 29, the company announced a 15% lay - off and admitted that "the existing cash was not enough to support operations for the next 12 months." At the same time, it planned to shift from the "direct sales model" to the "dealer model" in an attempt to save itself through a model adjustment. However, by this time, the market's confidence in Fisker had begun to crumble.

In March, the crisis entered the "final countdown." On the 18th, Fisker announced a 6 - week suspension of Ocean SUV production, citing "urgent fund - raising" as the reason. Financial report data showed that as of March 15, the company's cash and cash equivalents were only $121 million, of which $32 million was restricted and could not be used immediately, while accounts payable had reached as high as $182 million. A big question mark was put on "whether it could continue to operate."

To make matters worse, on March 25, Fisker's investment negotiation with Nissan (the potential partner mentioned in the report) broke down, which directly put its $150 million convertible bond financing plan at risk. On the same day, the New York Stock Exchange suspended Fisker's stock trading and initiated the delisting process due to the "abnormally low stock price," completely closing the door of the capital market.

Even more absurdly, on March 27, an insider revealed that due to "loose internal processes," Fisker had long lost records of millions of dollars in customer payments (including down payments and even full payments), and some vehicles were even delivered without receiving payment. This news completely exposed the chaos in the company's internal management and shredded the last bit of "trust."

From April to June, Fisker entered the "bankruptcy countdown." On April 29, a new round of lay - offs began. The company admitted in an SEC filing that "if it couldn't raise funds within 30 days, it would apply for bankruptcy." In May, due to its inability to pay R & D fees, the cooperative engineering company stopped the Pear (affordable electric vehicle) and Alaska (pickup truck) projects and accused Fisker of "illegal occupation of intellectual property." On May 10, NHTSA launched a fourth investigation due to "false triggering of the automatic emergency braking system." On June 12, the Ocean SUV had its first official recall due to "the font/color of the warning lights not meeting federal standards."

On June 18, this one - year struggle finally came to an end. Fisker officially applied for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The financial report showed that its assets were about $500 million - $1 billion, while its liabilities reached $100 million - $500 million. In the bankruptcy statement, the company casually stated that it "would maintain a lean operation and wait for asset buyers," but by this time, no one cared.

Aftermath of Liquidation, from "Zero Salary" to "Abandoned Headquarters"

Bankruptcy was not the end but the beginning of Fisker's "total loss of dignity." In 2025, the liquidation process of this car company was full of absurdity and helplessness.

In July, to maintain the funds for the bankruptcy process, founder Henrik Fisker and his wife, co - founder Geeta Gupta - Fisker, announced that they would cut their annual salaries to $1, and postponed employee severance pay, medical insurance benefits, and sales bonuses. However, this "pathetic move" did not win sympathy. The U.S. Trustee, a bankruptcy regulatory agency under the U.S. Department of Justice, directly opposed Fisker's asset sale plan, believing that it "harmed the interests of creditors."

On July 16, the bankruptcy court finally approved Fisker to sell 3,231 Ocean SUVs for $46.25 million, with an average price of about $14,000 per vehicle. This price was less than one - third of the original price, equivalent to a "fire sale." However, even so, the transaction was full of twists and turns. In October, the buyer, American Lease, suddenly made trouble, saying that Fisker could not complete the "migration of vehicle data to non - Fisker servers" and threatened to terminate the transaction, almost shattering the creditors' "last hope."

Meanwhile, Fisker's "mess" continued to ferment. On October 4, the SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) launched an investigation, accusing Fisker of "possibly violating federal securities laws" and questioning its "lack of a record - keeping plan." On October 5, the landlord of Fisker's headquarters in La Palma, California, revealed that when Fisker left, it left the headquarters in a "mess," with hazardous waste and full - scale clay models of vehicles, looking like it was "fleeing." On October 7, the Department of Justice, on behalf of NHTSA, clearly stated that Fisker's plan to "let owners bear the labor cost of the recall" was "illegal," forcing the company to finally compromise.

On October 16, after resolving a series of issues such as data migration and recall costs, the bankruptcy court finally confirmed Fisker's liquidation plan. In addition to the vehicles, about $1 billion worth of equipment left in its Austrian factory would also be sold by the trustee. Moreover, the "charity foundation" established by Henrik Fisker in 2021 was exposed to have never donated more than $100,000 and had quietly closed in 2025, becoming the final footnote to this failure.

From Fisker's downward trajectory, it's not difficult to find the core of its failure: using the "design halo" to cover up the "manufacturing shortfall" and using the "capital story" to fill the "operational loopholes." As a car company, it neither solved the basic problem of "stable production capacity" nor adhered to the bottom line of "safety and reliability." Instead, it tried to "bypass the problems" through frequent financing and model switching, and finally collapsed under the triple crisis of product, funds, and trust.

For the new energy industry, Fisker is not the first "bubble example," nor is it necessarily the last. In the wave of "electrification transformation," the heat of capital can easily make people ignore the essence that "building cars is a slow - paced business." Without a solid supply chain management, a strict quality control system, and a healthy cash flow, even the most beautiful "disruptive vision" will eventually turn into a bubble.

When Fisker's headquarters was abandoned, when the Ocean SUV was sold at a "heavily discounted price," and when the founder couple's annual salary was cut to $1, this three - year new energy farce finally ended in the most embarrassing way. What it left behind is not only a pile of assets that no one cares about but also a wake - up call: on the new energy track, only by "keeping one's feet on the ground" can one avoid being a "flash in the pan."

This article is from the WeChat official account "Shan Zi." Author: Rayking629. Republished by 36Kr with permission.