Thousand-yuan ticket prices and zero airworthiness certificates: Capital doubts in the "first year" of low-altitude aviation
The low-altitude economy has been rapidly pushed to the forefront of policy in the past year.
From the central to local governments, numerous documents have been issued. At the local two sessions in 2025, the low-altitude economy was frequently mentioned and became the focus of emerging industries promoted by the government. According to statistics, 30 provincial-level administrative regions have included the "low-altitude economy" in the key tasks of their government work reports for the year. In many coastal and central and western cities, local governments have established demonstration zones, allocated special funds, and set up industrial funds, attempting to leverage market capital with fiscal resources. However, the reality is that the enthusiasm of capital falls far short of the popularity of the concept. Even in the capital market, the stock prices of relevant listed companies often surge briefly due to news and then quickly decline.
For investors, the low-altitude economy and new energy represent different stories. The demand for new energy is strongly supported by factors such as energy security, cost reduction, and environmental protection. In contrast, the main application scenarios of the low-altitude economy - cross-sea logistics, aerial inspections, and short-distance passenger transportation - have limited practicality, and the demand is not urgent. More importantly, the manufacturing segment of the industrial chain highly overlaps with that of drones, auto parts, and new energy batteries. In essence, it is a peculiar situation of "production capacity first, demand later."
On the production side, enterprises can quickly enter the market by relying on existing production lines. On the market side, it is still uncertain who will be the continuous payers. The main customers of traditional general aviation are local governments with tightening fiscal budgets year by year. The emerging eVTOL (electric vertical takeoff and landing aircraft) is still in the stage of airworthiness certification, and there are 3 - 5 years of technological and regulatory barriers before large-scale operation.
In the pattern of "supply leading," market capital tends to wait and see rather than make bets. This adds a layer of real - world doubts to the "Year of the Low - Altitude Economy" beyond the bustling policy scenarios - is this highly - touted trillion - level track a genuine starting point for an industry or just a concept bubble hyped up by policies?
Government Boosts, Capital Hesitates
In the past year, the "low - altitude economy" has rapidly transformed from an industry term in the professional field to a high - frequency buzzword at investment promotion conferences of governments at all levels. Local governments have listed it as a strategic emerging industry in their development plans. Supporting measures include establishing state - owned platform companies, setting up industrial funds, promoting the layout of general airports and takeoff and landing points, building information management platforms, and announcing special investment quotas around the eVTOL industrial chain. In 2024, there were about 43 financings related to eVTOL in China, and from January to July 2025, the number exceeded 50. The main investors are local government - guided funds. The role of fiscal funds is straightforward and classic - they first "pave the way" and then drive social capital through industrial - guiding fund investments.
Compared with industries such as new energy and semiconductors that were previously strongly promoted by policies, the capitalization path of the low - altitude economy has not been smoothly opened. In demonstration projects in Shenzhen, Hefei, Chengdu and other places, local state - owned funds are often the first or even the only signed investors. A 30% gap in social funds is not uncommon, and most market - oriented PE/VCs are still in the research stage. Many investors said that it is currently difficult to establish a clear profit model. eVTOL is still in the airworthiness certification stage, and there are no verified cases of commercial operation. Infrastructure such as general airports lacks independent cash flow, and investment returns rely on long - term government subsidies or subsequent industrial development.
The reality on the demand side has also dampened the enthusiasm of capital. The largest customers of traditional general aviation operations (helicopters, fixed - wing aircraft, etc.) are still government departments, and the market growth rate has been slow in the past decade. After a brief growth period from 2010 to 2016, the industry entered a plateau. Although the drone industry is active, the consumer - grade market is almost monopolized by DJI, and the industrial - grade market is highly competitive with limited profits. It is especially highly dependent on the development of battery technology, and the upper limit set by the endurance capacity has left the industry in a waiting state. As for the highly anticipated eVTOL, even if the technology matures, the price of a single in - city flight may still be over a thousand yuan, and it will cost several thousand yuan for inter - city flights. There are doubts about whether a sufficient paying user group can be formed.
In the measurement of market space, the "trillion - level" forecasts by institutions mainly reflect differences in statistical caliber. In the "Research Report on the Development of the Low - Altitude Economy" released by CCID Consulting in 2024, it was estimated that the market scale of China's low - altitude economy could reach 2 trillion yuan by 2030. However, its statistical caliber not only includes direct - related sectors such as low - altitude aircraft manufacturing and operation but also covers indirectly - related industries such as aviation materials and new energy power systems. This "full - industrial - chain" caliber is not illegal in itself, but it includes the existing output value of some other industries, making the market scale seem larger. From the perspective of the supply chain, 70% - 80% of eVTOL components overlap with those of new energy vehicles. Many investors admitted that such measurements are of reference value for the government to formulate development plans but are of limited help for investment decisions because they do not directly reflect the effective demand that can be converted into cash flow.
Compared with the cautious market capital, the government is promoting the low - altitude economy at a very fast pace. Since the end of 2023, many places have successively issued documents to establish "leading groups for the development of the low - altitude economy," and the establishment of demonstration zones, investment promotion plans, and supporting land use have been advanced simultaneously. Some regions have even directly linked the low - altitude economy with their existing industrial chains such as the automobile, drone, and lithium - battery industries, hoping to digest some production capacity through the "new scenarios."
The concept of the "low - altitude economy" itself combines the mature and income - generating drone industry with eVTOL projects that are still in the speculative stage and have no income. However, in the view of investment institutions, this logic of "building production capacity first and creating demand later" means that the commercialization cycle will be lengthened, and the risk of capital precipitation is significant. As a result, on one hand, fiscal funds continue to be invested in infrastructure construction, and on the other hand, social capital keeps its distance. This divergence is not only reflected in the number of investment agreements but also in the valuation expectations. Local state - owned capital is willing to accept low valuations and hold shares for the long term, aiming at industrial development. In contrast, PE/VCs require clear exit paths and visibility of cash flow in three to five years.
In the absence of strong demand, the "Year of the Low - Altitude Economy" seems more like an early bet by the policy - making side rather than a consensus start in the capital market.
Mismatch between Technological Maturity and Implementation Cycle
The wait - and - see attitude of capital largely stems from the fact that the gap between technology and commercialization in the low - altitude economy is much larger than the external publicity. In fact, all optimistic forecasts are based on a series of key assumptions, and none of these assumptions has become a reality. These assumptions include a revolutionary breakthrough in battery technology, a significant simplification of regulatory approval processes, the rapid construction of large - scale infrastructure, and wide public acceptance. However, these are precisely the bottleneck problems that need to be solved.
Take the highly anticipated eVTOL as an example. According to data from the Civil Aviation Administration, as of July 2025, no aircraft model in the country has obtained an airworthiness certificate, and only a few enterprises have entered the type certification stage. Although EHang's EH216 - S obtained a special flight permit at the end of 2023, its operation range is limited, which does not mean full - scale commercialization. The prototype aircraft of enterprises such as AutoFlight and Times Technology are still in the test - flight and submission - for - review stage. Even if they pass the review smoothly, a large amount of time and funds will need to be invested in mass production, maintenance systems, and pilot training.
The lack of infrastructure further lengthens the implementation cycle. The general airports and takeoff and landing points required for the low - altitude economy must not only meet the technical specifications of the Civil Aviation Administration but also be incorporated into local planning and airspace management systems. As of the end of 2024, there were only 451 general airports in the country, most of which are concentrated in the western or remote areas, mainly serving agricultural and forestry operations and emergency rescue, which do not match the urban operation needs of eVTOL. The "takeoff and landing point networks" proposed by local governments mostly remain at the demonstration - zone stage. For example, in 2024, Shenzhen only built 10 takeoff and landing points in the first batch, with a coverage radius of less than 10 kilometers, making it impossible to form a stable urban route network.
Even if the problems of airspace and infrastructure are gradually alleviated, the obstacles on the market side remain severe. The promotion of the low - altitude economy needs to overcome multiple thresholds. First, there is a lack of sufficient pilot projects and safety tests for the unified planning of routes and urban layout. The uncertainty of airspace use makes it difficult for operators to plan stable routes. Second, the payers are unclear. The prices of drones and small general - aviation aircraft range from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of yuan, making it difficult for low - end transportation to form a cost advantage. Third, the operating costs of domestic general aviation have been high for a long time. The procurement, maintenance, and flight costs of small aircraft are much higher than those of ground transportation, and their airspace priority is low, making it difficult to establish a viable business model. It should be remembered that this is the transportation sector, an industry with extremely thin profit margins. Many subways, high - speed railways, and air routes are still operating at a loss, which makes it hard for capital to generate enthusiasm.
A deeper problem lies in the cultural foundation on the consumer side. From 2015 to 2017, the communities of domestic and foreign model - aircraft and drone enthusiasts were active, giving rise to a large number of online and offline activities and small - and - medium - sized manufacturers. However, with the tightening of regulations and the increase in takeoff and ownership thresholds, many enthusiasts withdrew, and the civilian flight culture shrank sharply. Although China is a major drone - producing country, it has a relatively weak drone culture. The lack of public recognition of flight makes it difficult for the low - altitude economy to expand naturally relying on the C - end market like new - energy vehicles. Instead, it is highly dependent on various subsidies.
The gap between operating costs and users' payment ability ultimately makes the commercialization process lack a clear timeline. Based on current technology, for a two - seat eVTOL to complete a 20 - kilometer commercial flight in the city, after calculating the hourly cost, energy consumption, insurance, and maintenance fees, the one - way ticket price may be as high as over 1,500 yuan. For inter - city routes, the price can easily reach several thousand yuan. This price range is much higher than that of high - speed railways and online car - hailing services on the ground, which means it can only operate in niche markets such as high - end business and tourism experiences. Although drone logistics has an advantage in single - trip transportation costs, it is restricted by noise pollution, route approval, and landing safety in high - density urban areas, and its large - scale application can only be limited to remote or specific scenarios.
Although the signals from the policy - making side are positive, they cannot cover the uncertainties in implementation. In July 2025, the statement of the Southern Theater Air Force at the Conference on High - Quality Development of the Low - Altitude Economy in Guangdong Province was regarded as a positive signal for airspace reform. However, in the view of investment institutions, it also means that the construction of regulatory and safety systems will be tightened simultaneously, and the timelines for certification and operation will not be shortened in the short term. For this reason, the low - altitude economy is still a track with a "visible ceiling but an invisible timeline" in the eyes of capital - the technical parameters and investment amounts can be calculated, but the actual starting point of marketization remains unknown.
Demand Not Yet Arrived, Capital Has Made Three - Tiered Bets
The demonstration projects in the past two years have brought the low - altitude economy from concept to reality. However, with the future still unclear, the layout of capital in this track is no longer a single - point "bet on the winner" but more inclined to be tiered and diversified. The construction pace of airspace management, airworthiness certification, and ground facilities determines the maturity time difference in different application fields. For institutional investors, the core is not simply to judge the rise and fall of the industry but to match the return period, risk tolerance, and the development rhythm of the track to form an executable allocation path.
Looking at the segmented markets, the recent real - return opportunities are concentrated in drone services with proven business models and some low - dependency B2B applications, such as agricultural plant protection, inspections, and medical logistics in specific scenarios. These fields have high technological maturity, relatively clear regulations, verifiable unit economics, and predictable cash flows. In contrast, medium - dependency businesses such as retail delivery and aerial tourism are still in the market - education stage and are suitable for mid - term growth layout. The most imaginative urban air transportation faces multiple constraints such as insufficient battery energy density, lack of air traffic control systems, high infrastructure investment, and low public acceptance, and it remains a long - term, high - risk speculative investment.
This difference in the maturity curve has also given rise to three parallel capital paths. The first tier is to invest in the enabling technologies and infrastructure of the "shovel - sellers" - battery technology, unmanned aircraft traffic management (UTM) software, advanced sensors, composite materials, etc. These enterprises not only serve the low - altitude economy but also cover broader markets such as national defense and the automotive industry. They have a dispersed customer base and strong anti - risk ability. The second tier is to bet on operators, especially logistics, inspection, medical transportation, and other service providers with proven business models. These companies have a lighter investment compared to the manufacturing end. They can flexibly purchase aircraft models and systems and quickly adjust their operation strategies according to market demand. In the early stage of the industry, manufacturers often also engage in operations to share the high initial costs. As the market matures, the entry of third - party professional operators will provide more light - asset investment targets for capital. The third tier is manned eVTOL manufacturers with strong capital, clear certification paths, and the support of industrial alliances. This tier is more like a high - stakes bet, requiring investors to have long - term funds and high tolerance.
In the next three to five years, several key trigger signals will directly affect capital decisions. First, the mass production of batteries with an energy density exceeding 400Wh/kg, fast - charging ability, and high cycle life. Second, regulatory agencies such as the FAA and EASA issuing type certificates to mainstream manufacturers, and a stable cross - city UTM system in operation. Third, operators achieving continuous one - year passenger - carrying profitability without subsidies. Fourth, the establishment of a multi - operator - shared urban vertical takeoff and landing network through the PPP model. Once these milestones are achieved, the industry risks will significantly decrease, and the capitalization channel will be truly opened.
For investors, the attractiveness of the low - altitude economy lies in its combination of long - term prospects and immediate opportunities. It has the long - term vision of air taxis and the realized cash flows from agricultural inspections, medical logistics, etc. However, the high initial investment and operation costs often deter investors. In a sense, operators have more opportunities than manufacturers. Companies like SF Express and Meituan are more flexible in exploring application scenarios. In the future, the industry leaders are likely to be those integrating operation and manufacturing, similar to the model of Western industry benchmarks such as Joby.
Conclusion
The policy promotion and capital intervention in the low - altitude economy are at a delicate stage. The enthusiasm of local governments and the early investment of fiscal funds have solved the startup capital for early demonstration projects, but they cannot replace the market's verification of commercial viability. Whether it is eVTOL, general airports, or air traffic control information platforms, they all face the same reality: before the demand side is opened up, capital can only make trade - offs between policy opportunities and long - term technological expectations.
For investors, this is a long - term bet. It is neither like the high - certainty expansion of the new - energy industry nor the low - cost replication of the Internet industry. Instead, it is more like a combination of infrastructure and high - end manufacturing - heavy assets, long - term certification processes, and slow returns. In such a structure, time becomes the biggest cost, and the sustainability of cash flow determines whether one can wait until the market truly matures.
Therefore, the current low - altitude economy is more like a "warm - up" guided by fiscal policies. Its greatest value lies in opening up the underlying conditions for policies, airspace, and infrastructure. The real influx of capital may not occur until the first commercial routes are established and a stable paying customer group emerges. For investors who value capital efficiency, maintaining attention and making a cautious tiered layout may be the most practical approach in this emerging - industry competition.