There are no "Friends of Time" in the revival match of new forces.

WM Motor, HiPhi, and Jiyue restarted production capacity in July, but technological gaps and a deficit in consumer trust have become the biggest obstacles to their revival.

As the "revival competition" begins, will these new - force automakers stage a comeback or face a swan song?

While the industry generally believes that "elimination means the end," a group of "disappeared" new - force automakers collectively hit the restart button in 2025. WM Motor announced the resumption of production of the EX5/E5 in September. HiPhi is deeply mired in a restructuring deadlock due to the default of Middle - Eastern capital. Jiyue is accelerating the restructuring negotiations...

This seemingly sudden "revival wave" is actually the last - ditch effort of multiple capitals and automakers on the verge of survival after the new - energy vehicle industry entered the "red - ocean killing stage."

However, the market pattern has shown a "6+3+1" fault - line differentiation (the top players take 60% of the market share, second - tier players compete for 30%, and the bottom - tier players only have 10%). The cracks in consumer trust are difficult to repair, and technological gaps are intertwined with concerns about the capital chain.

The outcome of this "revival competition" may be even more tragic than the first round of eliminations.

I. Dual - wheel drive of capital and policy: The "revival logic" and underlying game of new - force automakers

Analyzed from the perspective of the "resource - dependence theory," the revival of automakers is essentially the re - allocation of capital and policy resources. The "revival wave" in the new - energy vehicle industry is not accidental but the result of a game among capital, policy, and the market.

From the capital side, the entry of cross - border capitals such as Baoneng Group and EV Electra is essentially a search for bottom - fishing opportunities for "distressed assets."

Take WM Motor as an example. Its new investor, Shenzhen Xiangfei, is closely associated with Baoneng Group. Huang Jing, the legal representative, also controls core enterprises such as Kunshan Baoneng Automobile. Although Baoneng itself is deeply in a 50 - billion - yuan debt crisis, it still tries to revitalize its assets through the restructuring of WM Motor.

This "using debt to support the car" model exposes the misjudgment of the new - energy vehicle industry by capital as having "high valuation and low risk." Baoneng may regard WM Motor as a vehicle to tell a "rebirth story" in the financial market, rather than truly optimistic about its technological or market potential.

The policy side provides a buffer space for revival. According to Tianyancha data, the sales volume of new - energy vehicles in China is expected to reach 16.5 million units (including exports) in 2025, with the penetration rate exceeding 50%. Technological iterations (such as solid - state batteries and megawatt - level fast charging) have spawned opportunities in niche markets. Local governments, in order to ensure employment and stabilize the industrial chain, provide resumption - of - work subsidies and technical transformation support to enterprises like WM Motor, and even include them in the public procurement system.

For example, the Wenzhou Municipal Government established a special working group to coordinate local supply - chain cooperation, trying to reduce the risks of resuming production through policy support. However, policy dividends are essentially "blood transfusions" rather than "self - hematopoietic." WM Motor's 20 - billion - yuan debt and HiPhi's 15.7 - billion - yuan book debt cannot be filled by government subsidies alone.

The market presents a "polarized" situation. Leading automakers (BYD, Tesla) have built moats through economies of scale and technological barriers, while bottom - tier automakers are caught in a "low - price involution."

The EX5/E5 platform that WM Motor plans to resume production of is five years behind the mainstream in terms of technology. It lacks an 800V platform, and its intelligent driving system remains at the L2 level, with obvious shortcomings in product strength.

The dual promotion of capital and policy is essentially to buy "a critical 3 - to 6 - month window period" for automakers. If WM Motor cannot prove the feasibility of the goal of selling 10,000 units of the EX5 by the end of the year, or if HiPhi cannot resolve the crisis of default on capital injection, the revival plan will quickly collapse.

II. Trust cracks and technological gaps: The "double death traps" for revived automakers

The competition in the new - energy vehicle industry has long been upgraded from "product competition" to "trust competition." Analyzed from the perspective of the "trust economy theory," consumer trust is the "intangible asset" for an automaker's survival.

The bankruptcy histories of automakers such as WM Motor and HiPhi are essentially the "systematic collapse" of trust assets.

WM Motor seriously damaged its reputation due to issues such as spontaneous combustion accidents, battery - locking disputes, and being on the blacklist of the 3.15 Gala. During the bankruptcy period, car owners faced problems such as the suspension of car - system updates, the lack of after - sales services, and the difficulty in finding spare parts.

For example, a car owner could not find the original spare parts for a damaged door handle and finally had to disassemble the car for repair. This experience of being "abandoned in the era of intelligence" completely destroyed users' trust in the brand.

The consequence of trust collapse is "obstacles in sales conversion."

A survey by Ping An Securities shows that more than 60% of consumers doubt the long - term service capabilities of "revived brands." You Tianyu, the dean of the Kailian Capital Research Institute, even said bluntly: "There is no such thing as a 'small and beautiful' in the Chinese auto market. The economies of scale of automakers have emerged, and brand awareness is mature, which cannot be rebuilt in the short term."

Even if WM Motor reduces the sales resistance in the C - end market through strategies such as old - customer replacement subsidies and the centralized procurement of taxis, consumers will still worry about "becoming an abandoned product again after purchase."

For example, Nezha Automobile was withheld subsidies by the Thai government and chased for debts by dealers because it could not produce the agreed number of cars locally. This "second - time loss of trust" will further intensify the market's vigilance towards revived brands.

Technological gaps are another fatal blow. The technological iteration speed of the new - energy vehicle industry far exceeds that of traditional automobiles. The penetration rate of L2+ intelligent driving has soared from 39% to 53%, and the 800V platform is gradually becoming the mainstream. WM Motor missed the development period of intelligent driving assistance systems and the 800V platform during its shutdown, and the gap in product strength with leading automakers continues to widen.

For example, the Xiaomi SU7 topped the monthly sales list with its advanced intelligent driving system, while WM Motor has not announced relevant plans. BYD's technology of replenishing 400 kilometers of energy in 5 minutes makes WM Motor's 400V platform seem outdated.

At the supply - chain level, WM Motor needs to rebuild the supplier relationships that were broken due to production suspension. However, some core component enterprises have turned to cooperate with Xiaomi and Huawei, further limiting its ability to catch up technologically.

III. Ways to break the deadlock: From "capital games" to "value reconstruction"

According to the methodology of the "lean startup theory," revived automakers need to verify the market with "minimum viable products" rather than blindly expand.

Facing the dual challenges of trust cracks and technological gaps, the key to breaking the deadlock for revived automakers lies in a three - dimensional strategy of "precise positioning + trust reconstruction + technological catch - up."

The first step is precise positioning, avoiding the edge of leading players and focusing on niche markets.

WM Motor plans to resume production of the mature models EX5/E5, using the existing supply chain to quickly recover. HiPhi continues to focus on high - end electric vehicles, avoiding direct competition with BYD and Xiaomi.

This "conservative strategy" is essentially "trading time for space" - reducing capital pressure through asset - light operations and buying time for technological upgrades.

For example, Jiyue Automobile reduces costs through a three - level channel system of "Store+Station+Spot" (direct - sales stores, cooperation outlets, and community service points) and focuses the negotiation with the restructuring party on the safety review of the intelligent driving assistance system to ensure the technological bottom line.

The second step is trust reconstruction, from "after - sales guarantee" to "ecosystem binding."

Experts suggest implementing "automaker bankruptcy insurance," levying premiums based on sales volume to provide after - sales guarantees for bankrupt brands. WM Motor plans to bind the B - end market through old - customer replacement subsidies and the centralized procurement of taxis to reduce the sales resistance in the C - end market.

Deeper trust reconstruction needs to be achieved through "ecosystem binding." For example, NIO builds user stickiness through its battery - swapping system, and XPeng reshapes its technological image through the urban NOA intelligent driving system.

Revived automakers can learn from this logic and transform users from "one - time buyers" to "long - term service users" through models such as "shared charging networks" and "intelligent driving system subscriptions."

The third step is technological catch - up, from "following strategies" to "differentiated innovation."

The R & D investment intensity of bottom - tier automakers is less than 1/5 of that of leading enterprises, and the loss of talents further slows down the speed of technological catch - up.

The key to breaking the deadlock lies in "differentiated innovation."

For example, Nezha Automobile has set up a knockdown assembly plant in Thailand. Although it is regarded as a low - value model, it can avoid tariff barriers through local production and quickly occupy the Southeast Asian market.

WM Motor can focus on the niche field of "range - extended electric vehicles" to avoid the fierce competition in the pure - electric market. Technological catch - up should avoid being "big and comprehensive" but focus on "single - point breakthroughs." For example, Leapmotor achieved a "high - cost - performance" breakthrough by self - developing the CTC battery - chassis integration technology to reduce costs.

The essence of the revival competition is a "value reconstruction competition."

Conclusion

The "revival wave" in the new - energy vehicle industry is essentially the last - ditch effort of capital, policy, and the market in the red - ocean stage. The fate of WM Motor, HiPhi, Jiyue, etc., depends on whether they can complete "value reconstruction" within the 3 - to 6 - month window period, shifting from relying on capital blood transfusions to self - hematopoietic, from repairing trust cracks to building ecological barriers, and from technological following to differentiated innovation.

As Zhu Jiangming, the founder of Leapmotor, said, "In the future, there will be no more than 10 surviving automakers." Every choice of revived automakers will be an "ultimate game" on the verge of survival.

This article is from the WeChat public account "New Business Review" (ID: xinzhainews), author: Wu Zi. It is published by 36Kr with permission.