With monthly sales of 40,000 units, outperforming "NIO, XPENG, and Li Auto", why is Leapmotor so successful?

If data could speak, the very existence of LEAPMOTOR would be a real paradox of the industrial era.

Between spring and summer in 2025, thanks to the dual - line success of its C - series SUVs and the entry - level B10, it has continuously topped the sales list among new car - making forces since March. Its sales soared from 37,000 to 48,000 in June, a nearly 30% increase in four months, showing a growth curve more than three times that of the industry average. It left NIO, XPENG, Li Auto, ZEEKR, and Xiaomi behind.

However, in the social world, it's like an invisible man: there are no fan frenzies, no brand loyalty, and few people even recognize the "LEAPMOTOR" logo on the streets. The car owners' forums are filled with complaints about "plastic rattles" and "lost contact with after - sales service", while Xiaohongshu is full of cautious inquiries like "Is it worth it?" and "Dare I buy it?"

The paradox doesn't end there. It has incorporated features like lidar, triple - screen displays, and power - operated doors, which were originally found in mid - to high - end models, into products starting at 120,000 yuan. However, car owners generally report cheap - looking interiors, frequent rattles, and inadequate service. It advocates "full - scale self - research", but widely uses second - and third - tier brands for battery cells, trading longer payment terms for lower prices, and mainly relies on third - party solutions for its intelligent driving systems. It seems to have a high technical threshold, but in fact, it has gracefully absorbed the supply chains of failed companies like Zotye.

This is not a story of a sudden hit car, nor does it seem like a marketing miracle. LEAPMOTOR has no emotional narratives and doesn't rely on flashy intelligent driving technologies. Its ability to break through in the "death price range" is more like the sudden realization of a long - suppressed cost - performance logic.

It doesn't create dreams or make grand claims. It simply asks: Is this enough to sell?

The question is: How long can this logic hold up in the second half?

When "high - end configurations" become standard across all brands, when the "price range" is no longer a moat, and when Li Auto, XPENG, and BYD successively enter the same price segment, how much room is left for LEAPMOTOR?

It can replicate hit models, but can it surpass them?

Selling like Li Auto, Living like Redmi

In the battle among new car - making forces, LEAPMOTOR was once an unremarkable player: with mediocre models, a vague positioning, and a weak market presence. It wasn't until 2024, when the C10 and C16 saw increasing sales, that this "mini Li Auto" moved from the middle to the top. By 2025, LEAPMOTOR was no longer the one "living in Li Auto's shadow"; it became the one redefining what Li Auto could be.

In the first half of 2025, LEAPMOTOR delivered a cumulative total of 221,700 vehicles, a year - on - year increase of 156%, and topped the half - year sales list among new car - making forces for the first time. In June alone, it delivered 48,000 vehicles, leading Li Auto by 36,300 vehicles and ranking first for four consecutive months. If 2024 was the year when LEAPMOTOR started to gain momentum, 2025 was the turning point for its complete turnaround - not only did it reach a high - sales position, but it also forced the original leading players to retreat. It seems to be getting rid of the "mini Li Auto" label and becoming the real deal.

This is not a surprise attack by a single model, but the realization of a comprehensive systematic strategy. Different from its peers who are keen on talking about technology, brand, and intelligence, LEAPMOTOR's rise has no mystery; it's all about practical and down - to - earth methods.

First, it firmly chose the extended - range route between the anxiety of pure - electric vehicles and price sensitivity. When other new car - making forces were competing in 800V fast - charging and lidar technologies, LEAPMOTOR started promoting extended - range models from the C11, avoiding the cost traps of high - voltage systems and charging anxiety. This year, the C10, C16, and B10 are all dominated by extended - range models, selling particularly well in second - and third - tier cities, becoming the "affordable Li Auto" - it can run on gasoline and be charged occasionally, focusing on convenience rather than brand loyalty.

It has to be said that the extended - range route is indeed practical and effective. Currently, the relatively successful new car - making forces, such as Li Auto, LEAPMOTOR, and AITO, are jokingly called the "mature version of Li Auto", the "youth version of Li Auto", and the "evolved version of Li Auto" respectively. The extended - range technology itself doesn't have a high technical threshold and can attract some gasoline - car owners. As for whether it can successfully transform to pure - electric vehicles in the future, the upcoming Li Auto i8 will provide the answer.

Second, it created a configuration template of "half - price Li Auto" and went head - to - head with Li Auto. The C10 competes with the L6, and the C16 competes with the L8. It offers all the configurations like "refrigerators, color TVs, and big sofas" at only half the price. The top - end version of the C16 costs less than 190,000 yuan, and the base version is just over 150,000 yuan. The B10 has entered the market below 100,000 yuan, with the whole series following the principle of "perceived value far exceeding the selling price". The product lineup is simplified into large, medium, and extra - large sizes, making it easy for users to choose and for the factory to produce. It can even put pressure on BYD in some product segments.

Third, LEAPMOTOR almost replicated the organizational and supply - chain logic of "Redmi" - packing in configurations and keeping the prices low. In terms of hardware, it abandoned well - known battery cell brands and used second - and third - tier brands to gain price and payment - term advantages. At the channel level, it absorbed a large amount of sales and service resources overflowing from other brands, achieving rapid expansion from first - tier cities to county - level markets. In terms of organizational strategy, it highly emphasizes standardization and resource reuse, reducing costs through modularization while ensuring the production rhythm.

This system may not sound glamorous, but it is extremely practical. Against the backdrop of the industry's widespread practice of burning money for subsidies, LEAPMOTOR became the second new car - making force after Li Auto to achieve quarterly profitability. Although its profit structure is still fragile, when most new car - making forces are still struggling to find a healthy financial path, it has established a positive - cash - flow cycle through scale, product selection, and strategy.

More importantly, this strategy precisely targets the psychological gap of current mainstream users: they don't want to buy expensive or hard - to - repair high - tech cars. They don't blindly believe in technology but want to feel that they are getting value for money, such as having lidar at the 100,000 - yuan price range. They don't pursue the ultimate but want a one - stop solution. Its success doesn't rely on grand brand narratives but on practical calculations in the real world.

LEAPMOTOR hasn't disrupted the industry, nor does it want to reshape the consumption concept. However, it has proven one thing in its own way: in an era of product oversupply and increasingly difficult - to - convince users, the most effective strategy is often the simplest one: selling products based on product strength.

Becoming the Sales Champion but Remaining an "Unknown"

If we only look at the data, LEAPMOTOR is a winner in this era. However, if we look at social media, it seems to be an invisible presence.

On Zhihu, there are very few questions about LEAPMOTOR, and its level of attention is far lower than what its sales volume should have brought. On Weibo and Xiaohongshu, most discussions revolve around "Is it worth it?" and "Can I buy it?", and there are even a lot of complaints about materials, service, rattles, and plastic feel. Rarely do we see LEAPMOTOR owners actively sharing photos and promoting the brand, let alone the kind of "owner - initiated brand protection" shows like those of Li Auto. For a car with monthly sales exceeding 10,000, hardly anyone recognizes its logo, and no one gives it a second look on the street.

This extreme disconnection between brand and sales is rare in the Chinese auto market. NIO has its supporters, XPENG has its fans, and even Xiaomi, a new entrant, can stir up public opinion. In contrast, LEAPMOTOR quietly distributes, sells, and delivers its cars. It has never been at the center of topics and doesn't try to be a topic - maker. This is not a social - currency feast but more like an extremely efficient "low - key business".

The reason behind this is not hard to understand. LEAPMOTOR's target users are practical consumers with limited budgets, uneven information access, and short decision - making cycles. They don't browse car - modification posts on Autohome, don't shout that Li Auto is a belief on Weibo, and don't compare chassis vibration filtering with "sisters" on Xiaohongshu. They care more about what they can get at a fixed price, whether they can pick up the car on the same day, if the battery will explode, and how far the service center is from home. They do have comparisons and anxieties, but due to limited energy and resources, they can't afford the additional cognitive cost for the car.

From LEAPMOTOR's perspective, it doesn't have an obsession with "building brand assets". It doesn't want users to pay for the logo but hopes that users will remember "what kind of configuration and space they can get at this price". It has almost channeled all its promotion efforts to the grassroots level, from subway exits, shopping mall squares, and pop - up test - drive points in third - tier cities to ground - level promotion and community operation in the sinking market. In today's new - energy vehicle marketing context, this approach may seem crude but is practical - it precisely targets the consumer segments ignored by high - profile strategies.

Of course, this "invisible explosion" also brings real challenges. The fuzzy user perception makes it difficult to build brand influence; the shortcomings in materials and service are constantly exposed as the scale expands; the pressure on after - sales system improvement, rights - protection disputes, and the spread of complaints may all become the ceiling for future growth. However, LEAPMOTOR has temporarily suppressed these issues because its cars are cheap, the configurations are eye - catching, and the delivery is fast.

It's not that there are no problems, but the problems are masked by the stronger price signal. In a market with scattered attention and soaring brand - building costs, the role of an "unknown" may actually become an alternative moat in the era of scarce traffic.

Zotye Engineers, Stellantis Shareholders, and a "Just Make It Run" Car - Making Logic

To understand how LEAPMOTOR can quickly increase sales at "half the price of Li Auto", we need to look at its underlying genes. This company has never taken the elitist route. It doesn't have the high - profile strategy of NIO, nor does it rely on the traffic - driven model of Xiaomi. Instead, it is a group of engineers who have gained experience in traditional car manufacturers like Zotye, Lifan, and Geely, with a strong focus on delivery and cost control, who "assembled, produced, and sold" the cars.

Zhu Jiangming, the founder of LEAPMOTOR, comes from the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation and is good at electronic control architecture and vehicle system integration. However, the composition of LEAPMOTOR's team is much more diverse. According to public information, LEAPMOTOR has more than 3,000 R & D personnel, many of whom are engineering backbones who have worked in traditional brands like Zotye. They don't emphasize technological paradigm shifts but are more proficient in "using existing modules to build cars with high - perceived configurations, reliable functions, and controllable costs". This is why LEAPMOTOR's models with triple - screen displays, electric tailgates, and large audio systems seem to offer "unbeatable cost - performance", but in fact, it's the result of extremely compressed supply - chain structures and simplified pre - research processes.

This "just make it run" logic requires a stable cash flow as a prerequisite. The real turning point was in 2023 when Stellantis made a strategic investment in LEAPMOTOR. As the world's fourth - largest automotive group, Stellantis invested 1.5 billion euros, acquiring a 20% stake in LEAPMOTOR and becoming its second - largest shareholder. It also established a joint - venture company called "LEAPMOTOR International", with Stellantis holding a 51% stake. This deal not only brought in funds but also channel resources and a credit endorsement. Many domestic battery cell and component manufacturers on the verge of being eliminated were willing to offer more favorable payment terms to LEAPMOTOR, even allowing payment after delivery, mainly because of Stellantis.

This "reverse credit expansion" enhanced LEAPMOTOR's ability to control costs. It didn't tie up with high - premium suppliers like CATL but gathered a group of second - tier partners marginalized by the mainstream market. These manufacturers, who had lost out in the competition with BYD, NIO, and XPENG, found a new way out with LEAPMOTOR. LEAPMOTOR re - integrated these resources and packaged them in modules, not emphasizing self - research or competing on performance, but focusing on the "visible cost - performance" for users.

This is why LEAPMOTOR's models can offer a "full - package" configuration at around 100,000 yuan. It's not because of a technological miracle but because it has built a parallel system outside the main track: eliminated engineers, price - pressured suppliers, and international giants seeking transformation together form a production cycle with extremely low costs and high turnover.

This is not a utopia but the most extreme reflection of the reality of the 2025 automotive market.

The Illusion of Profitability: A Half - Realized Miracle

On the surface, LEAPMOTOR has presented an impressive result: in Q1 2025, it delivered 87,000 vehicles, with revenues exceeding 1 billion yuan, a gross profit margin maintained at 14.9%, and quarterly losses narrowing to 130 million yuan. It became the second new car - making force after Li Auto to approach full - scale profitability. For a company that only started in 2019 and stopped losing money last year, this financial statement is quite a "comeback".

However, the question is: Where is the engine of this comeback?

While the gross profit margins of Li Auto and XPENG have been steadily increasing with the growth of scale, LEAPMOTOR's gross profit margin slightly declined from 15.3% in 2024, and the scale effect has not been realized. More notably, a significant part of the profit improvement comes from the phased recognition of Stellantis' joint - venture orders. Although these exported models have helped increase the production rate, the delivery schedule and profit structure are not transparent and cannot be used as a stable income expectation. In other words, this part of the profit is one - time and not part of LEAPMOTOR's self - developed profit model.

There are also greater concerns on the cost side.

LEAPMOTOR's high - cost - performance myth is based on an "extremely compressed" supply - chain model: it partners with mid - tier battery cell manufacturers to extend payment terms, uses highly standardized components to reduce development and inventory costs, and self - develops triple - voltage systems to streamline intermediate links, with strict control over SKUs. However, by 2025, this model is approaching its limit. The prices of raw materials have stabilized, and further extending payment terms will pose a credit risk. Standardized products are difficult to meet the complex market segmentation requirements. Moreover, LEAPMOTOR is offering a 300,000 - yuan - level experience at a 150,000 - yuan price, which is a short - term advantage achieved by squeezing the efficiency of the manufacturing side. Once the price war eases and subsidies are phased out, this pricing system will face a backlash.

Looking at the most crucial product structure.

Currently, the extended - range models are the absolute mainstay of LEAPMOTOR's sales. The C10, C16, and B10 are almost all extended - range models. The advantage of the extended - range route is that it avoids charging anxiety, has a relatively low technical threshold, and is easily accepted by users. However, the problem is that its profit ceiling is very clear - the structural complexity, energy - consumption control disadvantages, and platform closure of the dual - system make it difficult to generate high - end profit margins. In the entire industry, Li Auto has already shifted to 800V pure - electric vehicles, XPENG is carefully planning a dual - platform structure, and AITO is focusing on intelligent driving and vertical integration. Only LEAPMOTOR still remains at the level of "making an affordable Li