The US has cut off the supply of engines for the C919. Is the domestic "Chinese heart" ready?

At the Yangtze River Delta Economic Cooperation Symposium on June 7th, the large aircraft project once again became a hot topic of public attention.

Just a few days ago, C919 indeed became the target of sanctions. As for the problem, it still lies in the oft - mentioned “power heart”.

According to media reports, the U.S. Department of Commerce has currently suspended the licenses of some U.S. companies to sell products and technologies to the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC). These products and technologies are used in the development of the C919 aircraft.

As a significant national project representing China's innovation and breakthrough in the aviation industry, an undeniable reality is that for this highly - anticipated domestic large aircraft, its core power still relies on imported engines.

It should be noted that before this, the C919 had been tested and had accumulated over 28,000 hours of safe flight, and was gradually moving towards commercialization. The “U.S. cut - off of C919 engines” is like forcibly removing the “foreign heart” of China's large aircraft. The result is that the delivery and flight of the C919 large aircraft are hindered, and the responsibility for research and development of domestic engines and the improvement of the industrial chain has become even greater.

But the real question is, in the face of Western technological blockade, when can the “Chinese heart” truly achieve self - control?

The good news is that at the AES100 engine development work summary meeting held in Zhuzhou, Hunan on June 5th, the official announced that the AES100 engine had been issued a production license and sales contracts had been signed.

This indicates that the AES100 engine has moved from the design and R & D stage to the mass - production stage, laying the foundation for its market entry and the development of low - altitude equipment. Meanwhile, there have also been continuous good news about the Yangtze - 1000A (CJ - 1000A).

It is no exaggeration to say that truly Chinese - made civil aviation engines are on the way.

A Long - Planned Siege

Taking a broader view, in the global aviation industry, a basic fact is that the manufacturing of a large aircraft cannot be completed by a single country alone, but relies on a global supply - chain ecosystem of hundreds or thousands of companies. Boeing in the United States and Airbus in France have always followed this rule.

As China's first main - line airliner developed in accordance with international airworthiness standards, the components of the C919 have also relied on many industrial chains and global division of labor since its birth. This means that in terms of the technical route, this aircraft has always adopted the internationally - recognized “main manufacturer - supplier” model.

Put simply, COMAC is responsible for the overall design and integration of the C919, while more than 40% of its core components need to be globally procured. Among them, the most critical engine of the C919 is the LEAP - 1C engine jointly produced by General Electric in the United States and Safran in France, accounting for about 30% of the total cost of the aircraft.

The reasons for enterprises to procure components from various places on a large scale are simple: first, different roles in the division of labor have different resource capabilities; second, this operation has a price advantage. By integrating various factors, the delivery cost can be reduced. Therefore, the global production of large aircraft has been regarded as a model of commercial cooperation efficiency in the past few decades and continues to this day.

However, it is precisely the United States, which established this set of rules in the past, that has broken this long - standing convention. Looking deeper, with China's rise, especially the growth of its manufacturing industry, from Huawei in the past to the domestic large aircraft today, the situation is the same.

In summary, it is not difficult to find that such tactics are more like a long - planned “siege” against China. After all, in the U.S. export control policy, “any product that uses U.S. technology or components needs to comply with U.S. export regulations”. Even if French companies are involved in production, as long as U.S. technology is involved, they must obey U.S. bans.

Considering the uncertainty of trade barriers and geopolitical risks, it can be concluded that the cut - off of engines for the C919 is not essentially about “maintaining U.S. priority and supply - chain security” as the outside world claims, but rather about using so - called “maximum pressure” to force the opponent to make concessions in market access, tariffs, and key mineral exports.

Considering that objectively, many components or subsystems of the C919 are within the scope of influence, such as the flight control, hydraulic, and avionics systems, it will indeed bring some resistance to the delivery of China's commercial aircraft to a certain extent.

The Solid Fortress of Engines

Objectively speaking, regarding whether the C919 can be regarded as a domestic large aircraft, global cooperation and independent innovation are not contradictory. In most product definitions of the C919, such as the layout of components like the wings, fuselage, and tail, the parameters of range and seating capacity, as well as the engine level, power supply, and what kind of systems to install, China has independent decision - making and design rights. This is also an important reason why the C919 was previously hailed as China's own large aircraft.

However, compared with countries in Europe and America, the biggest difference is that U.S. companies still hold core technologies in fields such as automation technology and engine manufacturing. In particular, aviation engines are known as the “flower of industry” and the “pearl on the crown”.

The core reason why aviation engines are difficult to manufacture is that they need to operate reliably for a long time in environments of intake, compression, high temperature, high pressure, and high - speed rotation. Moreover, the R & D cycle is long, the investment is huge, and the safety requirements are extremely high. Therefore, the technical barriers are daunting.

The most obvious example is that since its debut on November 4, 2008, after tens of thousands of tests and improvements over more than a decade, the failure rate of a LEAP - 1C engine has been reduced to only 2 times per million flight hours. If the pre - production design is considered, the time cycle can be as long as several decades.

Obviously, the reliability brought about by this is unmatched by the engines of ordinary military or small civil aircraft. The absolute high - standard requirements make the manufacturing of commercial engines the most difficult “peak” to climb in the industrial field.

So, from a technical perspective alone, there are certain barriers. For China, the bigger challenges lie in two other aspects.

First, China has a weak foundation and a late start in this field.

Liu Daxiang, an academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, once said, “Since 1949, China has never studied large - scale civil engines.” This shows that when Europe and America had developed to the fifth - generation engine technology, China still had to start from the first - generation research. The key technologies to be broken through to reach the fifth - and sixth - generation levels have piled up, and the difficulties are imaginable.

Even though China has made breakthroughs in the field of military engines, such as the WS - 10 engine equipped on the J - 20 fighter jet, the technical requirements for commercial engines are higher, and the combination of reliability and economy is crucial. Even though China has made considerable achievements in materials science in the past, it has not yet made the most critical breakthrough in manufacturing civil aviation engines.

Second, the Chinese commercial engine industry not only endures heavy pressure but also faces a market dominated by three giants - The global civil aviation engine market has long been monopolized by General Electric, Pratt & Whitney, and Rolls - Royce. The market share of China's domestic small and medium - sized engines is less than 5%. In such a monopolized market, latecomers not only face the problem of technical breakthroughs but also strict patent blockades and market - entry license barriers.

In addition, the LEAP - X series of engines belong to large - jet airliner engines used in a new generation of single - aisle airliners with a capacity of 150 - 200 seats. The design of such engines often involves high - temperature alloy materials, the manufacturing of turbine blades, combustion chamber technology, and thermal management systems, which are all highly confidential and cutting - edge technologies. Without sufficient sharing of technical data, it is difficult for China to obtain valuable commercial information and original blueprints through cooperation with the global industrial chain.

All these signs indicate that the technical and market fortresses of engines are difficult to break but must be broken.

Initiate a Long - Term Battle for Domestic Substitution

In fact, China was not unprepared for the supply - cut crisis.

From imitation in the early days of New China to later introduction, and then to accelerated independent R & D in the 21st century, catching up and making breakthroughs have been what China has been doing in the past few years.

Even when the C919 was procuring external engines, the “backup plan” within the aviation industry was accelerating. Among them, the Yangtze - 1000A (CJ - 1000A), as China's first domestic commercial high - bypass turbofan engine, has completed test flights on the Y - 20 military transport aircraft, with a thrust of 13 tons, approaching the level of the LEAP - 1C.

The Yangtze - 1000A (CJ - 1000A) is a powerful attempt by China to catch up with the world's top engine technology. Looking at the timeline, this engine has been making efforts all the way.

In May 2018, the CJ - 1000A completed its first ignition test, initially verifying the reliability of its components and systems and having basic adaptation functions.

In March 2025, the Yangtze - 1000A started the verification flight work on the C919. Shi Jianzhong, a director of Aero Engine Corporation of China, announced at an aviation technology conference that the trial operation performance of the Yangtze - 1000A “exceeded expectations”.

In May, the engine was installed on a real C919 aircraft for test flights, with the goal of completing airworthiness certification within 2025.

It is reported that this engine uses cutting - edge technologies such as fourth - generation single - crystal turbine blades and 3D - printed combustion chambers. Its design performance is comparable to that of the imported LEAP - 1C, with a single thrust of about 13.5 tons, similar to the LEAP - 1C (12.4 - 13.4 tons), a bypass ratio of 9:1, and consisting of about 35,000 parts. Its fuel efficiency can be 3% - 8% higher than that of the LEAP - 1C. It is planned to be installed on the C919 for verification by the end of 2025 and commercially delivered from 2026 - 2027.

In addition to the Yangtze - 1000A (CJ - 1000A), the AES100 engine developed by Aero Engine Corporation of China is another alternative. This is China's first 1000 - kilowatt - class advanced civil turboshaft engine independently developed in strict accordance with international airworthiness standards. So, what is the strength of this engine?

Fortunately, it can operate safely and stably under complex conditions such as icing, heavy rain, and strong electromagnetic environments, and has the characteristics of high safety, good economy, convenient maintenance, and wide environmental adaptability.

Of course, in addition to the completed engine products, what is even more surprising is that Chinese enterprises have also made key breakthroughs in the fields of materials and manufacturing