Anniversary Financial Report Review of the Food Delivery War: Three Income Statements, Three Kinds of Victories
This earnings season in the autumn of 2026 is nothing more than a mid-term exam.
One night before the 2025 Spring Festival, at a restaurant somewhere in Beijing, Liu Qiangdong treated Wang Xing to a meal. During the dinner, Liu Qiangdong said a sentence: "Brother, I will officially enter the food delivery industry."
This sentence is like a pebble thrown into a lake. Four months later, Liu Qiangdong put on a red rider uniform, delivered several food orders on the streets of Beijing, and sat around eating hot pot with forty or fifty riders in the evening. He raised his glass and said: "I also specially went to deliver several food orders this afternoon."
At that time, no one expected that this war would last so long, let alone that in the autumn of 2026, a year and a half later, when the three platforms released their latest earnings reports at the same time, the definition of "victory" had undergone a fundamental change.
Three Income Statements, Three Kinds of Victory
On August 28, Meituan released its second-quarter earnings report for 2026. The core local business achieved an operating profit of 5.67 billion yuan, with a profit margin of 7.9%. A quarter ago, this figure was still a loss of 2.03 billion yuan.
For Wang Xing, this "hemostasis report" did not come too late. In the third quarter of 2025, Meituan's core local business set a record loss of 14.07 billion yuan — that was the most brutal moment of the war. Now profits have turned positive again. Although the 7.9% profit margin is less than 40% of the pre-war level, the city wall of the defenders has not collapsed after all.
Eight days earlier, on August 20, Alibaba handed in another report card: China's instant retail revenue was 53.295 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 45%. Wu Yongming did not focus on the peak order volume in the earnings report, but paid more attention to "the continuous quarter-on-quarter improvement of the unit economic benefit of Taobao Flash Delivery", which was attributed to "the increase in unit order value and fulfillment efficiency".
Alibaba's victory does not lie in the total amount, but in the economic model of each single order. When JD impacted the market with tens of billions of subsidies, Alibaba took a different approach: not to compete for who delivers more, but to compete for who delivers more value.
JD was the first to hand in its paper. On August 13, JD's 2026 Q2 earnings report showed that new businesses including food delivery had an operating loss of 9.85 billion yuan, narrowing by 4.92 billion yuan compared with the same period in 2025, and nearly 5.9 billion yuan narrower than the phased high of 15.74 billion yuan in the third quarter of 2025. CEO Xu Ran wrote eight words in the performance announcement: "The profit trajectory has ushered in a clear inflection point."
From 15.74 billion yuan to 9.85 billion yuan, JD cut its loss by nearly 40% in three quarters. But Xu Ran's wording is very cautious — what she said is "inflection point", not "profit". JD's food delivery business is still bleeding, but the bleeding has slowed down somewhat.
Three companies, three measuring scales. Meituan measures the thickness of profit, JD measures the slope of loss, and Alibaba measures the efficiency per order. The market has not produced three extra victories out of thin air, but the standard of "winning" has changed from "who has more orders" to "who can make the accounts add up".
Narrative Shift: What Exactly Is Left Behind
In the early days of the war, scale was the only pass.
In April 2025, Liu Qiangdong made the accounts very straightforward at JD's headquarters: "I can never make money by selling food and meals at the front end, as long as I make money from the supply chain." He added: "Now 40% of cross-sales customers will buy our e-commerce products, and the money we lose is more cost-effective than buying traffic from Douyin or Tencent."
This is the first set of narratives: the essence of JD Food Delivery is not food delivery, but the entrance to the supply chain and the customer acquisition channel for e-commerce.
To make this story convincing, JD listed three sets of figures in its 2025 Q2 earnings report: the peak daily orders during the 618 shopping festival exceeded 25 million, more than 1.5 million "high-quality merchants" settled in, and more than 150,000 full-time riders. Xu Ran announced at that time that food delivery "has successfully achieved our initial strategic goal" — which means that JD has obtained a seat at the poker table.
But a seat at the poker table is not the end point. In the 2026 Q2 earnings report, the number of orders, merchants and riders all disappeared, replaced by "significantly narrowed year-on-year investment scale", "improved operational efficiency" and "diversified revenue sources".
Liu Qiangdong's story of supply chain return is still waiting to be verified.
Alibaba's shift is more direct.
In August 2025, Wu Yongming said at the earnings call: "We are investing heavily in the instant retail business, quickly achieving phased results and winning consumer mindshare." At that time, Taobao Flash Delivery had been online for four months, and its primary task was to prove that it could bring high-frequency consumption back to Taobao.
Three months later, the narrative was slightly adjusted: "The scale of instant retail has expanded, and unit economic benefits have improved significantly." Three months later: "While maintaining market share, unit economic benefits continue to improve quarter by quarter."
Alibaba's three statements are like a microscope constantly zooming in the focus — from "consumer mindshare" to "scale", and then to "unit order value and fulfillment efficiency". What Wu Yongming wants to prove is never the scale expansion of Ele.me, but whether each order of Taobao Flash Delivery can support itself while bringing additional customer management revenue to Tmall.
Meituan, as the defender, is also taking the opportunity to examine itself.
In May 2025, Wang Xing said at the earnings call: "Low-quality and low-price 'involution-style' competition is unsustainable in the long run." This is not showing weakness, but a declaration of war — what Meituan wants to defend is not only orders, but also the quality of merchants, riders and fulfillment networks.
Half a year later, Meituan disclosed that the peak daily orders of instant retail exceeded 150 million, with an average delivery time of 34 minutes. Wang Xing's wording changed to "consolidate core competitiveness and maintain the industry's leading position" — after the subsidies were paid out, he wanted to prove that the order volume and network density had not been scattered by the two attackers.
Then in the second quarter of 2026, Wang Xing's words changed again: "Meituan firmly opposes involution. We will actively cooperate with relevant regulatory investigations. At the same time, in the process of striving to consolidate our leading market position, we will also reduce resource investment in low-quality orders."
From "anti-involution" to "consolidate advantages" and then to "withdraw from low-quality orders and repair profits", Meituan's narrative trilogy is a difficult transformation for a defender from "protecting territory" to "protecting profits". Fortunately, Meituan has seen the hope of climbing up from the lowest point.
War Ledger: How Much Real Money Has Been Burned
Narratives can shift, but the ledger does not lie.
If we extend the observation period, the price the three parties paid for this war is clearly visible.
From Q1 2025 to Q2 2026, JD's marketing and fulfillment expenses were 57.83 billion yuan more than the corresponding year-on-year base period; Meituan's logistics and promotion incentive expenses were 82.74 billion yuan more. Calculated from Q2 2025 when Taobao Flash Delivery was launched to Q2 2026, Alibaba's sales and marketing expenses increased by 95.45 billion yuan.
The three sets of figures are all in the broad caliber of the group, and also include expenditures on retail, warehousing and distribution, other instant retail, overseas business and user growth. But even so, the incremental cost of nearly 240 billion yuan is enough to keep any CFO awake at night.
The question is: what have these money brought in return?
The data from the National Bureau of Statistics gives a calm answer. After the revision of the fifth national economic census, the national catering revenue in 2024 was 5.618 trillion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 5.3%; it rose to 5.7982 trillion yuan in 2025, with the growth rate falling back to 3.2%; in the first half of 2026, the catering revenue was 2.8255 trillion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 2.8%.
In July 2025, when the subsidy war of food delivery platforms was the most intense, the national catering revenue was 450.4 billion yuan, with a year-on-year increase of only 1.1%; among them, the catering revenue of units above designated size decreased by 0.3% year-on-year.
In other words: platform orders can be quickly migrated under large subsidies, but the total demand for catering will not double synchronously. The essence of the food delivery war is a redistribution of market share — the orders that JD and Alibaba took away from Meituan did not make Chinese people eat more meals, but just moved the same meal from Platform A to Platform B.
This means that the "improvement" of the three platforms cannot be built on the increment of the overall catering market at the same time. If someone wins, someone else must lose.
It is very likely that more consumers have gained subsidy benefits.
AI Takes the Center Stage
Just as the three platforms replaced the scoring board for food delivery, another more expensive narrative entered the center of the earnings report at the same time: AI.
Alibaba is the most aggressive. Its capital expenditure in Q2 2026 was 67.68 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 75%, mainly used for AI infrastructure. Alibaba Cloud's external commercial revenue increased by 45%, and revenue from AI-related products achieved triple-digit growth for the 12th consecutive quarter. For Wu Yongming, AI is not a cost reduction tool for food delivery, but the second growth pillar parallel to consumption.
Meituan has embedded AI into the capillaries of local life. Its R&D investment in the second quarter was about 7.7 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 22.5%, accounting for 7.3% of revenue. "Xiaotuan" helps users make decisions, CatPaw serves merchants, and "Tuanbao" ensures rider safety. Wang Xing said: "We will firmly increase investment in ecology and technology, and promote AI to integrate into real business scenarios."
JD did not disclose independent AI investment, but emphasized supply chain efficiency. In the first half of 2026, JD Industrial deployed more than 70 AI agents in the chain from procurement to fulfillment. Unlike Alibaba which is looking for a second growth curve and Meituan which is transforming the local life entrance, JD still tries to put AI back into the gears of the supply chain.
All three companies have brought AI to the forefront, but the rules of the ledger have not changed. AI needs to prove its ability to increase revenue or reduce costs, and food delivery needs to prove user retention, cross-purchase and supply chain profits. The two future narratives will eventually return to the same income statement.
Prediction: Three Playing Styles in the Second Half
Standing at the one-year anniversary of the food delivery war, the next step of the three platforms may be three different playing styles.
JD: The Verification Period of Supply Chain Return
The quarterly loss of 9.85 billion yuan seems huge, but Xu Ran's statement of "inflection point" is not entirely unfounded. JD's real bargaining chip is not the front-end food delivery, but the back-end JD Logistics and supply chain network. If the cross-purchase brought by food delivery and the improvement of supply chain efficiency can be reflected in the profit margin of the retail business in the next four quarters, JD's narrative can be closed. On the contrary, if retail profits cannot cover the loss of food delivery, JD's "supply chain return" narrative will also face more doubts.
Prediction: JD's food delivery business will continue to narrow its losses in the second half of 2026, but the annual loss of new businesses may still exceed 30 billion yuan. The real test will come in 2027.
Alibaba: The Independent Profit and Loss of Taobao Flash Delivery
The revenue of instant retail reached 53.295 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 45%, but Alibaba has never separately disclosed the profit and loss of Taobao Flash Delivery. The "quarter-on-quarter improvement" of unit economic benefit is a vague statement — how much has it improved? How far is it from break-even? Alibaba needs to present a clearer unit economic model in the next two quarters. However, the increment that food delivery brings to traditional e-commerce is indeed visible to the naked eye.
Prediction: Alibaba will disclose the independent operating data of Taobao Flash Delivery for the first time in the third or fourth quarter of 2026. If the unit loss is close to break-even, Alibaba's instant retail narrative will be revalued.
Meituan: Dual-Driver of Profit Repair and AI Efficiency
The quarterly profit of 5.67 billion yuan is a positive signal, but the 7.9% profit margin is still far from the pre-war level of 21%. Meituan's repair path depends on two variables: first, whether the industry competition is really becoming rational (whether the supervision will continue to restrict the subsidy war), and second, whether AI can bring substantial efficiency improvement in rider scheduling, merchant operation and user recommendation.
Prediction: The profit margin of Meituan's core local business will rebound to the range of 10%-12% in the second half of 2026, but it is difficult to return to the pre-war level within the year. The improvement of AI on fulfillment efficiency will begin to be reflected in the financial statements in 2027.
Conclusion: A War Without Endgame
At that dinner before the 2025 Spring Festival, when Liu Qiangdong said to Wang Xing "I will officially enter the food delivery industry", the two probably did not expect that this war would evolve into a year-and-a-half-long war of attrition costing hundreds of billions of yuan.
What's more unexpected is that as the war goes on today, the definition of "winning" has become so diverse. JD wants to prove that the supply chain can generate returns, Alibaba wants to prove that every single order can make the accounts add up, and Meituan wants to prove that this network can still make profits after securing its territory.
All three companies say they are improving. But improvement is not equal to victory, loss reduction is not equal to profitability, and unit economic improvement is not equal to already profitable. The food delivery war has no endgame, it has just moved from the first stage of "burning money to seize territory" to the second stage of "proving business models".
This earnings season in the autumn of 2026 is nothing more than the first mid-term exam of the second stage. The real report card may not be revealed until the spring of 2027.
By then, the AI story may have rewritten the rules of the entire game.