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Vestas refuses to even take responsibility for the shutdown of installation vessels, and the 22.5-billion-yuan South Korean offshore wind power project has been held back by a wind turbine contract.

预见能源2026-11-17 09:34
The Wando Jinrihai Offshore Wind Power Project has fallen into a deadlock due to the strict terms of Vestas.

The Wando Jinri Offshore Wind Power Project has hit a deadlock due to Vestas' contractual terms.

Energy Insight has learned that the Wando Jinri Offshore Wind Power Project, with a total scale of 4.5 trillion won (approximately 22.5 billion RMB), is currently mired in a deadlock over a wind turbine contract. Global leading turbine manufacturer Vestas is demanding that "the contract be signed within this year" but refuses to budge on risk-sharing clauses, pushing the signing of the EPC master contract from the end of November to December.

Also stranded is the policy financing of approximately 1 trillion won (about 5 billion RMB) from South Korea's National Development Fund, whose official application has not been submitted to date, shifting the overall financing target to the first half of next year.

This is no ordinary business delay. From the perspective of contractual procedures, the EPC master contract was supposed to be signed before the wind turbine supply contract, but Vestas' wind turbine liability clauses must be incorporated into the EPC master contract to form a closed loop. The formation conditions of the entire engineering contract actually depend on Vestas' stance.

The project owner and the EPC consortium composed of Hyundai Engineering & Construction, HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, and Korea Electric Power Technology can make concessions to each other, but cannot take on the delivery risks that manufacturers should bear on behalf of Vestas.

01

Vestas has the capital to tighten its contractual terms

To understand this deadlock, we first need to clarify Vestas' current operating position.

In 2025, Vestas recorded revenue of 18.8 billion euros, a year-on-year increase of 9%; net profit reached 780 million euros, up 55% year on year, both hitting all-time highs. Offshore wind turbine deliveries rose to 1977 MW, a year-on-year increase of 46.2%. By the end of the year, the combined order backlog stood at 71.9 billion euros, including 38.7 billion euros in service orders.

There is a notable structure in this set of data. Vestas' service division contributed more than 60% of its profits, with an EBIT margin of 25%; the offshore business is still in the capacity ramp-up phase of the V236-15.0MW model, where additional costs and amortization continue to squeeze the profit margin of new unit orders. The profit buffer does not come from selling wind turbines, but from selling services.

This structure means that Vestas has the financial conditions to remain tough on individual wind turbine sales contracts. It does not need to demand more on price, only to shrink the responsibility boundary to the manufacturer's side.

For example, losses caused by the shutdown of installation vessels due to severe weather, additional expenditures arising from changes in licensing conditions, and the attribution of cost overruns, these costs that are difficult to accurately price at the time of signing are pushed out of the manufacturer's scope of responsibility, and naturally fall onto the statements of the project party and the construction party.

According to data from BloombergNEF, Vestas' newly installed capacity in 2025 was 10.6GW, and its global ranking dropped from fifth in the previous year to seventh. This is the first time Vestas has fallen out of the top five since the institution released the ranking in 2013.

The top six are all Chinese turbine manufacturers: Goldwind with 29.3GW, Envision Energy with 20.9GW, MingYang Smart Energy with 18.9GW, Yunda Wind Power with 18.4GW, and Sany Renewable Energy and Dongfang Electric tied for fifth and sixth with 13.5GW respectively. Wood Mackenzie's statistical caliber is slightly different, but it also ranks Vestas in seventh place, with the top six seats occupied by Chinese enterprises.

02

The project party cannot take on the transferred risks

Financing cannot move forward accordingly

The Wando Jinri project has not done no accounting calculations. The total investment of the project has risen from 3.271 trillion won to 4.5 trillion won. If additional capital responsibilities are added on this basis, the project party's buffer space is already quite limited.

What Vestas is trying to push over is precisely the part that is hardest to price.

The reaction on the financing side is direct. The technical consultant of Hana Bank requested supplementary power generation assessment and technical due diligence materials, the preparation of the feasibility report is delayed, and the official application for the National Development Fund has not yet entered the review process. Hana Bank has pushed the targets for financing, financial covenants and disbursement to the first half of next year.

The bank's logic is not complicated, without a closed loop between the wind turbine contract and the EPC contract, technical consultants cannot make meaningful assumptions about availability, shutdown losses and overrun probability. An engineering contract with unclear risk attribution is a set of unquantifiable cash flow fluctuations in the project financing model.

The Sinan Niuer project provides a comparable reference sample. The project received 750 billion won in support from the National Growth Fund, was selected as the "No.1" super project, with a total investment of about 3.4 trillion won.

But on the other hand, Sinan Niuer previously failed to pass the preliminary feasibility review because its B/C ratio was only 0.57. Later, it bypassed the review procedure by controlling the direct capital contribution of state-owned power generation enterprises below the pre-feasibility study threshold and replacing equity with fund contributions.

A closed contract loop is the minimum condition for financing to start, not proof that economic efficiency is up to standard. If Wando Jinri hastily signs the contract to meet the time limit and swallows the risk clauses, the subsequent review will face a project with a more fragile cost structure.

There are also three unclosed preconditions outside the contract, the capital contribution agreement of the project company is undecided; the radar replacement installation and operation cost sharing agreements with the Air Force and Army have not been signed; the acceptance negotiation with residents of Wando County is still in progress. Vestas' schedule is not on the same frequency as the closing rhythm of these conditions.

03

Both South Korea and Japan are stuck in the stage "from target to construction site"

Putting Wando Jinri back into the Northeast Asia map, Vestas' terms are only the first visible part.

Among the 10 large-scale projects selected in South Korea since 2022, as of May 2025, only the Jeonnam 1 Park and Nakyang 2 projects have entered the construction stage, and both Phase I and Phase II of Wando Jinri are in the unstarted list. The cumulative commissioned offshore wind installed capacity is about 0.35GW, and the gap with the 10.5GW target for 2030 is clear. The target remains on paper, but the progress at the construction site has not kept up.

The situation in Japan repeats at another magnitude. Mitsubishi Corporation-led consortium announced in August 2025 that it would withdraw from three projects in the waters of Akita and Chiba, and the 20 billion yen deposit it paid was confiscated, pointing to the mismatch between rising construction costs and expected returns. The distance between target and implementation presents a similar shape in the South Korean and Japanese markets: it is not that there is no project list, but that the projects on the list cannot reach the stage of financing closure and construction start.

The entry point for Chinese enterprises is not on the track of turbine replacement. Wando Jinri has selected 40 units of Vestas V236-15.0MW model with 20-year operation and maintenance services, a field that Chinese turbine manufacturers cannot directly enter in the short term. But the bottleneck of offshore wind power in Japan and South Korea is not only the turbines themselves.

Dajin Heavy Industry has previously publicly stated that Japan and South Korea are key emerging overseas offshore wind markets, and the company as a core supplier is actively participating in bids, with the judgment based on the limited local supply capacity of foundation structure production.

MingYang Smart Energy entered the South Korean market through a localized cooperation agreement with South Korean turbine manufacturer Unison, and became the first Chinese wind turbine manufacturer to enter the Japanese wind power market after its project in Nyuzen Town, Japan was connected to the grid.

Neither path has yet reached scale, but the gaps they point to are not in complete turbines, but in foundation structures, offshore engineering equipment and localized cooperation.

Vestas pushes risks downstream through contractual terms, and the downstream cannot take them, so the project stays there. The more projects that are stalled, the longer the patience of the Japanese and South Korean markets for another supply chain option will last.

This is not a judgment about "replacement", but a judgment about "where the gap will open first".

What Wando Jinri needs to focus on next is still the order of four things: whether the wind turbine supply contract can be landed, when the EPC master contract will be signed, when the National Development Fund will enter the formal review, and whether the capital contribution agreement and radar agreement can be closed synchronously. This order cannot be reversed.

The wind turbine contract is the first key point, not because it is more important than the other three, but because the pricing and timing of the other three are embedded in the liability clauses of the wind turbine contract.

Vestas treats "within this year" as a negotiation tool, but the real question the project party needs to answer is not whether the contract can be signed in December, but in the signed contract, who's statement will ultimately bear the responsibilities for installation vessel shutdown, permit changes and cost overruns.

This answer can determine when the 1 trillion won can be mobilized more than any party's ultimatum.

This article is from the WeChat official account "Energy Insight", and is authorized for release by 36Kr.