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This trade secret infringement case, which saw a 20 million yuan compensation award, has been officially adjudicated. Why is the leading electrolyte enterprise unable to safeguard its core formula?

预见能源2026-11-17 09:34
Multiple structural dilemmas persist in the trade secret protection of the electrolyte industry, and targeted supporting arrangements are urgently needed to fill the relevant gaps.

The protection of trade secrets in the electrolyte industry faces multiple structural dilemmas that urgently need to be resolved.

Foresee Energy has learned that in November 2026, an official announcement from Capchem brought a case spanning more than six years to the public spotlight.

Kang Wei, former general manager of the Semiconductor Division, disclosed the technical details of two custom formulas to others orally after leaving his post, and guided the production and sales of the related products to the same customer. He was convicted of trade secret infringement in the first instance, sentenced to one year and two months of fixed-term imprisonment with a two-year probation, and fined 160,000 yuan; before the judgment, he had paid 20 million yuan in compensation to Capchem, which was recorded as non-operating income.

Between the 160,000 yuan criminal fine and the 20 million yuan civil compensation, there is a striking gap of orders of magnitude, which is exactly the real status of trade secret protection in the electrolyte industry: The criminal negation of the act is one thing, and the pricing of knowledge is another.

From his resignation in March 2020 to the report filed in May 2025, the infringing act went undetected by the right holder for nearly five years; it took another year and a half from the report to the issuance of the first-instance judgment. The "silence" in the first half is the silence of knowledge leaking out in oral form, and the prosecution in the second half is the movement after the legal machine is started.

01

Formulas Can Be Coded

Experience Cannot

The most noteworthy part of the Kang Wei case is not the amount of compensation, but the act of "oral disclosure" itself.

The judgment confirms that as the general manager of the Semiconductor Division, he was mainly responsible for the technical development and sales of the division's products. The water-based stripper and molybdenum etchant formulas he led the R&D of are recorded in the "Semiconductor Product Production Process Documents" managed by the company with codes, and he once downloaded the documents from his work email to his personal computer.

But it was not that document that completed the knowledge transfer, but his own words. After resigning in March 2020 and signing the "Resignation Confidentiality Agreement", Kang Wei disclosed the formulas to his new employer and guided production through oral communication. Documents can be audited, and emails can be monitored, but no technical means can physically isolate the empirical judgment stored in a person's mind, such as "adjust this proportion, and fine-tune which component at this temperature".

This is the structural problem of trade secrets in the chemical and materials industry: core knowledge exists in the composite form of "documents + tacit experience", while legal protection targets "information", and experience can hardly be fully contained in the container of "information".

The competitive barrier of electrolyte formulas never only lies in the combination list of several solvents, lithium salts and additives, but in the process judgment of "how to mix, in what order, and under what working conditions to make adjustments". Kang Wei's job description itself has explained the problem: He was at the two interfaces of technology development and sales at the same time, and objectively had the ability to bring the formula logic out of the organization; the subsequent facts show that this ability was used for infringing acts.

What enterprises can do is to store "what it is" and "why it is" separately, so that no position can reproduce the complete chain by memory — but this is essentially an organizational design issue, not a legal issue, and most enterprises submit a blank answer to this question.

The more hidden loophole lies in the time sequence. Kang Wei had already established a new material company with others at the end of 2019, and officially resigned and signed the confidentiality agreement more than three months later. The agreement stipulates "future obligations", but the preparation for knowledge transfer happened before the agreement took effect. The resignation confidentiality agreement can manage things after signing, but cannot control the intention that has already started before signing.

02

Non-Compete Agreements Are Getting Thicker

Their Effectiveness Is Getting Weaker

Electrolyte enterprises have not taken no action. Tianci Materials sued 12 parties including Yongtai Technology in July 2025, claiming 887 million yuan, accusing former chief engineer Li Sheng of stealing the process technology of liquid lithium hexafluorophosphate.

The criminal case of Li Sheng finished the final trial in September 2025: the Jiujiang Intermediate People's Court changed his first-instance sentence from four years and four months to three years and three months, maintained the fine of 4.5 million yuan, and also maintained the non-compete order of the first instance — "The defendant Li Sheng is prohibited from engaging in relevant work whose main content involves the production of the chemical products involved in the case within three years from the date of completion of the penalty execution or the date of parole."

Leading enterprises are fighting on two fronts at the same time, with a sufficiently tough attitude.

But toughness does not equal effectiveness. Article 13 of the Judicial Interpretation (II) on Labor Disputes, which came into force in September 2025, anchors the effectiveness of non-compete restrictions on a narrower fulcrum: the employer must prove that the worker actually knows and has access to the trade secret, and the restricted scope, region and time limit are compatible with the secret he has accessed.

The direction of this provision is correct — non-compete restrictions cannot be generalized as a universal blockade on talent flow, but it also pushes the burden of proof back to the enterprise.

The reality for a large number of electrolyte enterprises is: The authority management of the formula database is extensive, R&D personnel can freely access complete records, and the confidentiality agreement templates are general. Once entering litigation, "what exactly he has accessed" often turns into a consumption war of assembling evidence after the fact.

The indictment of Tianci Materials suing Shenzhen Yan Yi, Zhejiang Yan Yi and other 12 parties in April 2026 (claiming 1.472 billion yuan) reveals another layer of paradox. The indictment alleges that after the defendants illegally obtained the technologies of liquid lithium hexafluorophosphate and liquid lithium bis(fluorosulfonyl)imide from Li Sheng, they used them in specific projects of Zhejiang Yan Yi, and "at the same time illegally disclosed the trade secrets of Jiujiang Tianci to the public by applying for patents and other means".

The premise of trade secret protection is "non-disclosure", while the patent system exchanges protection for public disclosure. When a departing employee writes the stolen technical solution into a patent, the right holder is not facing a retrievable document, but an irreversible public text that has entered the public domain.

The advantage of confidentiality will instantly turn into a desperate situation of rights protection when encountering malicious disclosure. The industry fact pointed to by both cases is the same — the "legal shell" with patents as the channel is being used as a tool to launder trade secrets.

03

93% of Global Market Share

And a Confidentiality Agreement That Cannot Go Beyond National Borders

The position of China's electrolyte industry in the world hardly needs demonstration. In 2025, the actual shipment volume of Chinese electrolyte reached 2.235 million tons, accounting for 93.05% of the global total; Tianci Materials ranked first for ten consecutive years with a shipment volume of 720,000 tons, taking up 32.2% of the global market share. However, there is a growing gap that cannot be ignored between the absolute advantage in market share and the geographical radius of protection capability.

The gross profit margin of Capchem's overseas business in the first half of 2025 was 45.4%, while the domestic gross profit margin was only 19.69%. Going global is a rigid demand for profit structure, not an unnecessary extra.

Tianci Materials plans to build a 150,000-ton integrated electrolyte base in Morocco, while Capchem operates production bases in Europe and lays out delivery centers in Southeast Asia. While the production capacity goes global, the rules for formula management, R&D collaboration and personnel flow must also follow — but in cross-border scenarios, the combined set of "resignation agreement + criminal report" that still works domestically will have significantly reduced effectiveness.

Different jurisdictions have different standards for the enforceability of non-compete restrictions, different criteria for identifying "reasonable confidentiality measures" of trade secrets, and different costs for evidence preservation and cross-border evidence collection.

The lithium battery industry going global is facing a mature "patent jungle". Japanese, South Korean and European and American enterprises hold basic patents in the fields of electrolyte and separator, and trade secrets are exactly the type of rights that are hardest to claim across borders in the patent jungle — patents have registration, clear boundaries and an international retrieval system, while trade secrets have none of these, only civil procedure systems that vary greatly from country to country.

Leading market share but narrow protection radius means that for every point of expansion of an enterprise's production capacity presence overseas, the exposure of its formulas will expand by one point, while the available legal tools will become fewer. This is not the short board of a single company, but a lesson that the entire industry has not yet made up in the process of globalization.

The Kang Wei case ended with the judgment of one person, but it marked the property right status of a type of assets in the electrolyte industry.

Formulas are stored in engineers' minds, non-compete agreements cannot control the window period before signing, there is a gap of two orders of magnitude between criminal fines and the value of knowledge, and the speed of going global is faster than the growth of cross-border protection capabilities.

After the Capchem case, more enterprises will write more detailed confidentiality processes and submit reports earlier, but as long as core knowledge still exists in the organization in a form that "can be disclosed orally, memorized and taken away", the 20 million yuan compensation is only an after-the-fact price, not a pre-emptive defense line.

The competition in the electrolyte industry has advanced to the level of formula iteration speed and global delivery capability, but its governance of knowledge assets still stays at a status maintained by personal loyalty and post-event punishment. If this gap is not filled, the cost of the next "taking away by a single sentence" will not be lower than this time.

This article is from the WeChat official account Foresee Energy, written by Zhao Jianan, and published by 36Kr with authorization.