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Maserati makes its foray into the electric vehicle track, don't only keep your eyes on rich female customers.

每日资本论2026-11-16 09:41
This century-old sports car brand needs to quickly come up with a new luxury narrative that can convince consumers "what makes this car worth the money".

Will the Trident shine brightly again after going electric? Perhaps the "Queen of Supercars" thinks exactly so.

Recently, some media reports said that the cooperation project between Maserati and Zunjie has been named "Maserati Design", which is jointly promoted by Huawei, JAC and Stellantis. The appearance of the new car has been confirmed, and further mass production updates are planned to be released in the fourth quarter of 2027.

According to the disclosed division of labor, Huawei provides intelligent cockpit, intelligent driving and electric drive systems, JAC is responsible for vehicle engineering and manufacturing, and Maserati contributes styling design and overseas channels. The product line includes a mid-to-large size pure electric SUV and a large pure electric GT. The GT is expected to be launched first, wearing the Zunjie badge in the Chinese market and retaining the Trident logo overseas. The body and main components are produced in Hefei, then shipped to Italy for interior finishing, calibration and final assembly.

But the other side of the transaction must be made clear. The announcement issued by JAC Motors at the end of September was cautiously worded: the three parties of the company, Huawei and Stellantis "do have communication on cooperation intentions", the content and form of cooperation have not been determined, and no binding formal agreement has been signed. Stellantis declined to comment on market rumors, adding that Maserati's brand strategy will be officially announced at the investor day event to be held in Modena, Italy this December.

This means that what the outside world sees is a fairly specific roadmap, but legally it is still a letter of intent without a signature.

It is worth noting that the core reason why this not-yet-fully-implemented cooperation has sent shockwaves across the global luxury car market is not that "another luxury brand has found a Chinese partner", but that it has gone far beyond the conventional boundaries of previous cooperation between international luxury brands and Chinese partners in China.

Previously, Lotus, smart and MINI have had precedents of Chinese R&D and manufacturing for global supply, and Audi and BMW are also adopting local intelligent solutions. However, it is still rare in the traditional super luxury camp for Chinese partners to take charge of core intelligent electric technologies, vehicle engineering and manufacturing at the same time, before the products enter overseas markets as super luxury brands. To put it in a straightforward phrase that makes Chinese people proud: In the past, we "traded market access for technology", this time we are "trading technology for brand value".

Of course, for Maserati, the urgent question it needs to answer is: as a super luxury brand with annual sales of less than 8,000 units and a net loss of more than 800 million euros, after losing product iteration capabilities and brand premium, what can it rely on to continue to be chosen by overseas consumers? Going electric can solve the problem of "whether there are electric products", but can it solve the problem of "why it is still worth buying"?

01

Maserati's decline in the Chinese market is a path that erodes layer by layer from the symbolic level, and the first thing to collapse is the "symbolic value" of the brand symbol.

An unavoidable topic is that after the 2011 Guo Meimei incident, "rich lady's car" became the most stubborn public label of Maserati in China. Around 2015, with the explosion of the wechat business group, the Moments template of "successfully getting a Maserati" further deeply tied the Trident to a widely mocked culture of showing off wealth.

But this kind of traffic is "toxic". It brought exposure, but continuously hollowed out the sense of scarcity and community recognition that super luxury brands rely most on. When the core customer group of a brand starts to avoid it because they "don't want to be recognized as a wechat business", the crack in the symbolic value has opened irreversibly.

After the collapse of symbolic value, the loosening of the quality base accelerated the loss of trust. In February 2025, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration of the United States disclosed that Maserati recalled 27,354 vehicles in the United States due to the possible failure of the rearview camera image caused by the infotainment system software, covering multiple main models such as Grecale, MC20, Levante and Ghibli.

For a brand based on the narrative of "Italian handmade luxury", a large-scale software defect recall covering almost all product lines on sale is far more damaging than the maintenance cost — it directly shakes the simple expectation that "super luxury equals higher reliability".

What is even more destructive is the collapse of the price system. The official guide price of Grecale Folgore is 8.988 million yuan, and the dealer quotation in some areas once dropped to 3.588 million yuan; the fuel version of Grecale dropped from 6.508 million yuan to a starting price of 3.888 million yuan.

Carlos Tavares, former CEO of Stellantis Group, publicly criticized some Chinese dealers for "year-round discounting" at the 2024 Paris Motor Show. But when the terminal price of a car falls into the same price range as models from BYD, Li Auto and other brands, the problem is no longer "whether dealers are obedient", but that the brand itself has lost the ability to define prices.

The "rich lady" label is the first layer, the loss of quality control is the second layer, and the disintegration of the price system is the third layer — after the three layers are superimposed, Maserati has changed from an "unaffordable Italian supercar" to a "past its prime luxury brand that people only want to buy at a heavy discount" in consumers' minds.

As corroboration, some media reports show that Maserati has launched multiple rounds of deep price cuts in the second half of 2025, mainly focusing on the Grecale model. The fuel version of Grecale with an official guide price of 6.508 million yuan has its bare car price reduced to 3.888 million yuan after discounts, a price cut of more than 2.6 million yuan, which is equivalent to a 40% discount. The pure electric version of Grecale has an even greater discount, with an official guide price of 8.988 million yuan, and the bare car price after the price cut is only 3.588 million yuan, a huge price cut of 5.4 million yuan, equivalent to a 60% discount, so the market situation was very hot for a while.

The reason why the decline of brand value is hard to stop is that the product and management systems that support it have simultaneously experienced structural failure.

The break in product rhythm is the most direct hard constraint. The best-selling Levante and Ghibli have been discontinued, and their successors will not be launched until 2027 to 2028. The products on sale are reduced to one Grecale SUV, the MC20 series sports cars, and the GranTurismo/GranCabrio GT models.

In other words, in a market where super luxury brands most need to "keep telling new stories", Maserati has fallen into a product vacuum period of two to three years.

Electrification has followed a typical path of "shouting slogans first, then catching up on homework". Grecale Folgore follows the "fuel vehicle converted to electric" route, with a pure electric range of about 500+ kilometers, intelligent driving only at the basic L2 level, and the infotainment system experience has a generational gap with 300,000-yuan-level local Chinese competitors. The 1.6 billion euro electrification fund originally planned by Stellantis Group for Maserati was withdrawn, and the MC20 pure electric project was subsequently terminated. That is to say, Maserati not only missed the window of the explosion of China's new energy market, but also in the priority ranking of its parent company's resource allocation, it has been classified into the quadrant of "stopping bleeding" rather than "injecting blood".

Stellantis Group is not having an easy time either. In 2025, its net loss reached as high as 22.3 billion euros. Against this backdrop, Maserati's global deliveries in 2025 were only 7,900 units, down another 30% year on year, with a net loss of 840 million euros.

Parallel to management failure is the drift of strategic attention. In March 2025, Julie Taieb-Doutriaux served as interim General Manager of China, and in March 2026 she was appointed Head of the Asia-Pacific region. Frequent regional personnel adjustments are not necessarily a problem in themselves, but when they happen at the same time as product gaps, price loss of control and parent company contraction, the signal sent out is clear: Maserati's China business has long been in a "firefighting" rhythm.

After understanding the above three layers of logic, the nature of the "Maserati Design" cooperation becomes clear: It may not be an equal "strong-strong alliance", but a structural replacement around existing assets.

02

The division of labor among the three parties accurately outlines their real positions in the transaction. Huawei outputs product definition rights and intelligent technology stack, JAC provides the million-level manufacturing engineering capability that has been verified by the Zunjie S800, and Maserati cedes the right to participate in styling design and overseas channel network.

The essence of this arrangement is: Chinese partners contribute the core capability of "whether the product is competitive", and Maserati contributes the stock resources of "where to sell and what badge to wear". The "dual brand" arrangement of wearing the Zunjie badge in China and the Maserati badge overseas in itself shows both parties' judgment on the brand potential gap between the two markets — in China, the appeal of Huawei and Zunjie is enough to support high-end positioning; overseas, although the Trident has faded, it is still more efficient than promoting a new Chinese high-end new energy brand from scratch.

From a positive perspective, this path is not without precedents to follow. Stellantis Group has already run through the business model framework of "Chinese technology plus European channels" on the Leapmotor project. The market performance of Zunjie S800 in 2025 also proves that million-level products defined by Huawei and manufactured by JAC can be accepted by Chinese high-end consumers. If the same engineering and intelligent capabilities are injected into a pure electric GT or SUV with Italian design language, at least at the product power level, Maserati will for the first time have the qualification to talk with local Chinese competitors in the same technical generation.

But please note that between "being qualified to talk" and "being chosen", there is still a huge gap of brand restoration.

Cooperation can solve the "existence problem" on the product supply side, but it cannot automatically solve the "willingness problem" on the demand side. For a brand that has been hurt by repeated discounts in the 380,000-yuan price range, even if it launches a new car with qualified technology, consumers will still ask the same question: why don't I just buy Zunjie, which shares the same technology origin and may have a more competitive price?

The same is true for overseas markets: whether a product with a body-in-white produced in Hefei factory and partial final assembly processes completed in Italy can maintain the aura of "Made in Italy" among super luxury customer groups depends on whether the brand narrative is self-consistent, not on engineering capabilities.

From this, it is not difficult to see that if this electrification move is to avoid falling into another cycle of "having products but no brand", the risks to be avoided are distributed at at least four levels.

The biggest risk is the irreversible acceleration of brand dilution. Maserati's core value lies in the symbolic capital of "Italian design plus racing heritage", not engineering capabilities. In the cooperation, Maserati's role is limited to styling design and overseas channels, which is a pragmatic division of labor in the short term. But in the long run, if all product definition rights and core technologies come from partners, the Trident will gradually degenerate into a "design skin plus channel label". The premium of super luxury brands has always been built on an "irreplaceable engineering narrative" — for example, Ferrari's premium comes from F1 technology spillover, and Porsche's premium comes from lap records on the Nürburgring. A product whose three electric systems and intelligent driving are defined by others can hardly help Maserati rebuild such a narrative.

The coordination cost and quality consistency challenge brought by "dual brand, dual-track governance" also cannot be underestimated. The same set of engineering solutions, delivered according to Zunjie's standards in China and Maserati's standards overseas, puts extremely high requirements on the unity of supply chain quality control, software calibration and after-sales service system. Maserati's dealer network in the Chinese market has shrunk significantly. If the channel capacity is insufficient when the new cooperative products are launched, the efforts on the product side may be swallowed up by the shortcomings of the terminal experience.

The time window issue is also a risk that is not easy to avoid. Further updates on the mass production of cooperative models will not be disclosed until the fourth quarter of 2027. In the first half of 2026, Maserati's global sales have slipped to 2,737 units, while China's imports in the same period were only about 266 units, down about 48% year on year. If the brand's presence continues to decline at the current speed before the end of 2027, when the new cars arrive, it will face a weaker channel foundation and more blurred brand memory than today. The restoration of super luxury brands has a cruel feature: products can be supplemented through cooperation within three years, but the restoration of trust often takes much longer.

What is easy to ignore is the credibility of the parent company's strategic commitment. Stellantis Group's "no comment" stance on Maserati, and the arrangement of leaving the brand's future strategy to be announced at the investor day in Modena, Italy, is of course a normal governance rhythm, but what the market really needs to observe is not the PPT at an investor day, but the actual flow of funds and resources.

Although in 2024 and 2025, Stellantis Group injected 350 million euros and 850 million euros of capital into Maserati respectively to maintain its operation, its move to withdraw 1.6 billion euros of electrification investment is equally clear. The logical judgment is that a brand that relies on parent company capital injection to maintain continuity rather than its own cash flow to support the product cycle has limited strategic patience. Cooperation can share development costs, but it cannot change a fundamental fact: Maserati needs to use its own sales volume and brand premium to prove that it is worth Stellantis Group keeping it at the table.

For a brand that is about to usher in its 112th anniversary, what is more dangerous than losses is that Maserati needs to quickly find a new luxury narrative that can convince consumers — especially those who don't care about the "rich lady meme" at all, but only care about "why this car is worth the money".

This article is from the WeChat Official Account "Daily Capital Theory", author: Bai Kaishui's Thinking, published with authorization from 36Kr.