Launching while going public, what is the commercial space industry scrambling for?

Some time ago, the Long March 12B carrier rocket was launched at the Dongfeng Commercial Space Innovation Experimental Zone, and its maiden flight mission was a complete success. This rocket, with a total height of about 72 meters and a low - Earth orbit carrying capacity of no less than 20 tons, set a new record for the carrying capacity of domestic single - core stage rockets. It is equipped with nine 100 - ton - class liquid oxygen kerosene engines. It is the first rocket developed by the Commercial Rocket Co., Ltd. of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, achieving a closed - loop in the "launch site" industrial chain.

Looking through the official mission briefing, there are still some details worth noting. The briefing states that "no recovery test was conducted in this mission, and a first - stage recovery test will be carried out at an appropriate time later."

This is a new - generation carrier rocket with "reusability" as its core positioning. Its predecessor, the Long March 12A, had its second stage successfully enter orbit during its maiden flight in December 2025, but the first - stage recovery failed.

According to engineering common sense, subsequent models should continue to verify the recovery technology during their maiden flights.

However, the Long March 12B chose to focus on achieving orbit insertion during its maiden flight, and the recovery verification will be carried out "at an appropriate time later."

Meanwhile, another private rocket company, Interstellar Glory, has set an aggressive goal of "achieving orbit insertion and sea - based recovery on the maiden flight" for its Hyperbola 3 carrier rocket. In May this year, it completed the sea - based recovery landing shock performance assessment test with high - profile and is sprinting for its maiden flight by the end of this year.

On one hand, there is the cautious approach of the "national team," and on the other hand, there is the extreme leap of private enterprises to "accomplish everything in one go." These two completely different technological rhythms point to a common structural force. The year 2026 is a year of concentrated outbreaks of IPOs in China's commercial space industry, with more than 10 enterprises intensively striving for listing.

Landspace Technology entered the "in - inquiry" state on the Science and Technology Innovation Board in just 22 days; Galaxy Power reached a post - investment valuation of over 15 billion yuan after completing a 2.4 - billion - yuan Series D financing; Guoxing Aerospace submitted its prospectus for the third time and raised 3.55 billion yuan in the Pre - IPO round; Kuaizhou Rocket plans to apply for listing on the Science and Technology Innovation Board by the end of the year after the change of state - owned capital control.

Now, it seems to be the time when the flames at the launch site resonate with the stock exchange. Will the progress of core technology research in China's commercial space industry be systematically reshaped by the financial exit cycle? Does the dominance of "financial time" over "technological time" already constitute the most hidden and real new driving force for this industry?

The Timing of Spectrum and the Nature of Capital

Why has 2026 become the "critical window period" for commercial space IPOs? This question makes me think of a reason, which is the "first - come, first - served and permanent occupancy" rule for low - Earth orbit and spectrum resources.

According to the spectrum occupancy rules of the International Telecommunication Union, constellation operators must complete the deployment of a certain proportion of satellites within a specified time after obtaining frequency allocation; otherwise, they will lose their priority.

Data shows that China's GW constellation plans to deploy about 13,000 satellites, and the Qianfan constellation plans about 14,000 satellites, with a total of nearly 28,000 satellites. As of the end of 2025, the number of actually orbited satellites in both constellations was less than 150.

The period from 2026 to 2027 is a critical window period for achieving the deployment of thousands of satellites.

Missing this node not only means the possible loss of the pre - emption right for spectrum resources but also means being permanently squeezed out of the "seats" in the limited physical space of low - Earth orbit.

By then, it will be too late to make up for it with funds.

The combination of orbital position and frequency has physical exclusivity. Once lost, it is lost forever.

This hard constraint at the physical level has given rise to a cruel industrial logic. A launch failure is a technical problem that can be re - examined, rectified, and re - launched; a launch delay is a strategic problem that may lead to the collapse of the overall constellation plan.

Under this pressure, "launching is justice" has become an irrational but rational choice. Enterprises would rather bear the risks brought by insufficient technical verification and must send satellites into orbit within the window period.

Since April this year, the networking launches of the Qianfan constellation have significantly accelerated, with the seventh to ninth batches of networking satellites being launched continuously in the past two months.

In the official statement of the maiden flight mission of the Long March 12B, it is particularly emphasized that its "high - density and regular launch capabilities will precisely match the large - scale networking needs of Internet constellations." Behind these statements is the networking anxiety driven by the spectrum countdown.

If spectrum resources are a hard countdown at the physical level, then the exit pressure of primary market funds is a soft countdown at the capital level, which is equally non - negotiable.

The typical duration of a venture capital fund is "5 + 2" or "7 + 2" years. This means that for commercial space enterprises established around 2018 - 2020, the exit nodes of their early investors will arrive concentratedly from 2025 to 2027.

Here, I would like to quote the statement of an investment banker close to the Galaxy Power project, which I think is quite representative. He said, "The primary market can no longer accommodate the scale of these companies. They must go to the secondary market."

Galaxy Power has raised more than 5.3 billion yuan in total, with a 2.4 - billion - yuan Series D financing in the latest round, pushing its post - investment valuation to between 15 billion and 15.8 billion yuan; Guoxing Aerospace has raised about 6.1 billion yuan in total, with a 3.55 - billion - yuan Pre - IPO round financing, and its post - investment valuation is 11.554 billion yuan. These figures mean that there are almost no institutions in the primary market with the ability and willingness to continue to take over. The only capital outlet that can accommodate this scale is the public market.

However, the access window of the public market is not always open.

The "Guideline No. 9" issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange at the end of 2025 clearly sets "successful orbit insertion of reusable rockets" as the core condition for commercial rocket enterprises to apply the fifth set of listing standards on the Science and Technology Innovation Board.

This is a phased policy dividend. The industry generally believes that as the industry reshuffle is completed and the pattern of leading enterprises is finalized from 2027 to 2028, the listing threshold will be significantly tightened.

The policy window period highly overlaps with the fund exit period, forming a narrow "intersection interval." Enterprises must complete core technology verification, obtain constellation networking orders, and apply for IPO within 2026 - 2027.

All three are indispensable and are prerequisites for each other. Without recyclable technology, there is no listing qualification; without listing, there is no continuous capital to support networking orders; without networking orders, there is no income growth narrative after listing.

In my opinion, this is a concentrated outbreak of the time - related contradictions in the capital cycle.

Industrial capital, such as rocket R & D, factory construction, and launch site deployment, follows the engineering and physical time, which requires a long cycle of design, verification, and iteration. While financial capital, such as venture capital and private equity, follows the time of the fund's duration and the return expectations of limited partners.

When these two time rhythms conflict, the urgency of financial time often overwhelms the calmness of engineering time, forcing technology research to rearrange nodes according to the capital exit rhythm.

The "Recovery" Transforms from a Means to an End

The policy intention behind the issuance of the Shanghai Stock Exchange's "Guideline No. 9" is very simple. It is to screen out commercial rocket enterprises that truly have core competitiveness rather than staying at the conceptual stage by setting clear technical thresholds, thus maintaining the quality bottom - line of listed companies on the Science and Technology Innovation Board.

Setting "successful orbit insertion of reusable rockets" as the core condition is reasonable in the regulatory logic. Recyclable technology is indeed the key to reducing launch costs and achieving a commercial closed - loop.

However, once a policy becomes the guiding stick for enterprise behavior, it will produce an inducing effect beyond the expectations of policy designers.

When "achieving recovery" is directly linked to "obtaining IPO qualification," the position of recovery technology in the enterprise's objective function is rearranged. For example, it transforms from "an economic tool developed to reduce customers' launch costs" to "a required action to meet the listing conditions."

The difference between the two lies in the complete change of the evaluation criteria.

If recovery is for reducing customers' costs, the measurement criteria are whether the launch unit price has actually decreased, whether the customer orders have increased accordingly, and whether the number of re - uses has steadily increased.

If recovery is for meeting IPO conditions, the measurement criteria become a set of binary variables: Has recovery been achieved? Was it a success or a failure?

As for the actual economic benefits of recovery, the reuse cycle, and how much the cost has been reduced, they become secondary. Because at the IPO pricing stage, the capital market is more concerned about the "ability label" of "having" this ability rather than how much commercial value this ability has created.

The Long March 12B clearly chose the path of "not attempting recovery during the maiden flight but collecting data and verifying recovery at an appropriate time later." Its official statement emphasizes that "adhering to the development idea of step - by - step verification and continuous iteration, the flight data collected throughout the maiden flight will provide valuable practical evidence for subsequent research on key reusable technologies and state optimization."

This is a typical example of engineering rationality. First, let the rocket successfully enter orbit, collect complete flight data, and then promote recovery verification on the basis of fully digesting the data.

However, the routes of some private enterprises seem much more radical. For example, the goal of Interstellar Glory's Hyperbola 3 to "achieve orbit insertion and sea - based recovery on the maiden flight," and the recovery attempts of Zhuque 3 and Long March 12A in 2025, among which the first - stage recovery of Long March 12A failed.

There is nothing wrong with these attempts. Engineering exploration requires trial - and - error. What needs attention is the rhythm of goal - setting. If an enterprise sets "orbit insertion and recovery" as the maiden - flight goal before completing its first orbit - insertion flight, it is difficult to completely rule out the consideration of IPO narrative construction in this choice of technological path.

In December 2025, during the launch of the Long March 12A Y1 carrier rocket, the second stage successfully entered orbit, but the first - stage recovery failed. The official statement read: "The flight test mission obtained key engineering data of the rocket in the real flight state, laying an important foundation for the subsequent development of reusable rockets and the recovery of the first stage."

From a pure technical perspective, this was a valuable "failure." It verified the orbit - insertion ability, collected key data during the recovery phase, and provided practical evidence for subsequent improvements.

However, from a financial perspective, caution is needed.

The failure of the first - stage recovery means that the achievement time of the core IPO condition of "reusable rocket orbit insertion" is postponed.

If the relevant enterprise is in the critical stage of IPO application, this postponement may directly disrupt its listing schedule and thus affect the exit expectations of investors.

Therefore, when the success or failure of technology is directly related to whether an enterprise can be listed and whether capital can exit, a launch becomes both a technical event and a financial event.

Under this pressure, some enterprises tend to concentrate resources on high - risk recovery tests when the conditions are not fully met, or at least significantly advance the expected recovery schedule in their publicity narratives.

The logic here is that as the IPO window approaches, enterprises must present the valuation imagination space of "having recovery ability" to the market. So, they either conduct recovery attempts in advance or use more radical language in their technical goal statements.

If the recovery failure of the Long March 12A occurred in a private enterprise sprinting for IPO, its impact on the valuation logic would be more than just a technical setback.

State - owned Credit, Private Operation, and IPO Exit

In recent years, a new and increasingly clear "trinity" model has taken shape. State - owned capital provides credit endorsement and early - stage funds, private teams are responsible for market - oriented operation and technological innovation, and IPO completes capitalization exit and refinancing. This model has become the standard path for leading enterprises in China's commercial space industry.

Let's look at two typical cases.

The first is the Kuaizhou Rocket. In January 2026, Aerospace Sanjiang put up for transfer 29.59% of the equity of Kuaizhou Rocket; in April, Wuchuang Xinghang Fund under Wuhan state - owned assets acquired this equity for 3.29985 billion yuan and became the largest shareholder. The transaction terms included a hard requirement: removing the Aerospace Science and Industry brand and stripping the central - enterprise qualification.

This means that Kuaizhou Rocket is transforming from a subsidiary of a central enterprise into a market - oriented operation company controlled by local state - owned assets, with the goal of applying for listing on the Science and Technology Innovation Board from the end of 2026 to the beginning of 2027.

The second is Galaxy Power. Its shareholder lineup includes multiple local state - owned asset platforms such as Beijing Yizhuang State - owned Assets Investment Co., Ltd., Nanjing Innovation Investment Group, Sichuan Industrial Revitalization Fund, and Shenzhen Municipal Leading Fund.

After the Series D financing, the total shareholding ratio of state - owned shareholders has significantly increased, and market estimates suggest it has exceeded 30%. The same is true for Guoxing Aerospace, whose shareholders include industrial funds from many places such as Qingdao, Shenzhen, and Chengdu.

This structural design has clear economic rationality.

For private teams, state - owned shareholders bring not only funds but also credit endorsement, policy connection, land support, and industrial chain resources. In the commercial space industry that requires large - scale infrastructure investment, such as the construction of launch sites and the expansion of factory production capacity, the ability to obtain these resources directly determines the competitive position.

For local governments, investing in commercial space enterprises is to layout strategic emerging industry tracks, which carries the demand for regional economic transformation.

The construction of the "Star Valley" industrial landmark in Wuhan, the promotion of the "Rocket Star City" plan in Shanghai, and the construction of a commercial launch site system in Hainan are all extensions of this logic.

When local state - owned assets enter the market on a large scale, the commercial space industry is inevitably involved in regional industrial competition.

Shanghai plans to achieve an annual production capacity of 80 rockets and 200 satellites by 2027 and 150 rockets and 500 satellites by 2030. Behind these figures are real land planning, factory construction, and equipment procurement.

Li Xiayu, the chief engineer of the Technology and Standards Research Institute of China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, pointed out at an industry conference that the satellite Internet of Things will be a very important commercial breakthrough. Behind this judgment lies a key question: Is the production capacity outpacing the demand?

Currently, the revenue sources of China's commercial space industry highly depend on government orders and constellation networking contracts.

Some data shows that the revenue of Guoxing Aerospace from its top five customers accounts for as high as 78%, with an accounts receivable balance of 630 million yuan, of which 284 million yuan has an aging of more than two years. The customers are mainly local governments, state - owned enterprises, and scientific research institutions. This revenue structure means that once the fiscal situation tightens or the rhythm of networking orders is adjusted, the cash - flow risk will be exposed concentratedly.

More importantly, when multiple provinces are simultaneously promoting the construction of rocket and satellite manufacturing production capacity, while the large - scale paid market at the downstream application end has not truly taken off, the risk of over - capacity is real.

This is not alarmist. The photovoltaic and new - energy vehicle industries have both experienced an industry reshuffle period after rapid production - capacity expansion.

Although the commercial space industry has a higher technical threshold, the capital logic behind it is highly similar to these industries.

Therefore, the next two years will be an elimination race of "cash - flow verification."

IPO is only a financing means, not a commercial closed - loop.

Enterprises that successfully list will obtain funds for continued R & D and production - capacity expansion, while enterprises that encounter obstacles in listing or perform poorly after listing will face the