Is JD.com going to build cars? What does it really want to master?

Is JD really going to "build cars"?

On October 14th, a seemingly ordinary cooperation announcement caught wide attention in the new energy vehicle circle: JD, in collaboration with GAC Group and CATL, will jointly launch an "affordable car for the masses" targeting the general market, and it is scheduled to make its official debut on November 11th. According to media reports, based on the available information, this car might be a battery-swap modified version of GAC Aion's UT platform. JD won't be directly involved in manufacturing but will be responsible for product co-creation, user insight, and online sales.

This seems more like a marketing cooperation, but in essence, it could be JD's strategic move to secure a position in the "new-generation automotive consumption entry point."

It's not about building cars directly but trying to participate in defining a car. Not operating a factory but aiming to reconnect the chain among batteries, platforms, sales, and users. This is not a car-building movement but a typical attempt by a platform to "restructure the supply chain."

What JD wants has never been the car itself.

I. Why is JD getting involved now? What it lacks is not cars but an anchor for traffic

When JD announced "joint car-building," on the surface, it was a marketing move, but in fact, it was a deep adjustment to the platform's future business model.

In the past decade, JD built its business on the basis of "genuine products + logistics" and established a strong brand image in categories such as 3C, home appliances, department stores, and daily necessities. However, three problems it faces have become increasingly clear:

First, there is a bottleneck in the growth of its core business.

Li Hang, a senior practitioner in the e-commerce industry, believes that the growth rate of high-margin categories represented by 3C has been slowing down year by year, and department stores and daily necessities have long been besieged by Pinduoduo's low-price strategy. Users' time and attention are shifting to content platforms. Douyin's interest-based e-commerce is reshaping the consumption chain, and JD is facing a double blow of "traffic loss + higher traffic cost." Although JD has counterattacked through live-streaming sales and 10 billion subsidies, it has yet to find a new category anchor with "high frequency + high price + high decision-making power."

Second, there is an aging user structure and changing user behavior.

Li Hang further added that JD's typical user profile tends to be middle-class and rational, and it is less competitive than Douyin and Kuaishou in the instant conversion mechanism of fast - consumption scenarios. However, automobile consumption, especially new energy vehicle consumption, has a long decision-making process, dense information, high transaction prices, and a long service cycle, which exactly match the consumption logic and psychological expectations of JD users.

Third, there is an evolution of the platform logic: from selling goods to influencing supply.

Peng Deyu, a well - known industry commentator, pointed out that JD is no longer satisfied with "selling existing cars" but wants to participate in defining "what kind of cars users want."

"Through this 'affordable car for the masses' project, JD, in the name of 'product co-creation,' has truly gained partial power to define certain car models. It collects user research, configuration preferences, and price sensitivity through its platform first, and the manufacturing end optimizes the products based on user insights. This is the standard platform reverse - customization logic, which is very similar to its promotion of the 'JD - made' private brand back then," Peng Deyu said.

According to a report from Nanfang Daily, this cooperation has restructured the automobile consumption process. The traditional "bare car" purchase model has been broken, and instead, the service concept of "one - stop solution" has emerged. Consumers can flexibly choose from various packages other than the standard version according to their own needs, such as the "customized car cover version," "car accessory assembly version," and "maintenance - enhanced version," covering the entire process from car selection, configuration, to later maintenance, significantly reducing users' decision - making and usage costs. As an important promoter of this project, JD Auto has been committed to building a one - stop automobile consumption ecosystem covering "purchase, configuration, maintenance, usage, and replacement." Currently, JD has nearly 3,000 car - maintenance stores, over 40,000 cooperative stores, as well as large modification stores and self - operated film - pasting factories, forming a national service network to provide users with high - quality services throughout the entire life cycle of the car.

If Xiaomi, by building cars itself, is betting on overall vehicle control and vertical integration, then JD is betting on decision - making power, distribution power, and supply - chain influence on the user side. Its plan is to become the "digital hub" of the automobile industry chain without burning money on production lines.

In an era when consumer attention is scarce, cars are becoming the "super - entry point" after mobile phones. Of course, JD can't afford to be absent.

II. The tripartite cooperation is not just about "cooperation" but a game of roles

On the surface, this is a "powerful alliance" - JD leads in terms of traffic and the user side, GAC provides a mature vehicle platform, and CATL contributes battery technology and a battery - swapping ecosystem. It seems that the resources are complementary and the division of labor is clear.

However, a deeper analysis of the participation methods of the three parties reveals that their demands are different, and there is "competition - cooperation and exploration" hidden in the cooperation.

JD: Wants to control the "user entry + consumption discourse power" without building cars

In this "affordable car for the masses" project, JD plays the role of a "customized co - creation" platform, collecting users' preferences regarding appearance, color, intelligent configuration, range requirements, and price expectations. Technically, it is not responsible for the overall vehicle development, but it locks in consumption trends in advance through the platform and influences vehicle planning.

Li Rui, the executive director of Qishijie Management Co., Ltd., believes that JD is not just a distribution channel. Instead, it aims to become a platform for "user - defined products" like Xiaomi and Honor in the mobile phone industry, outputting demand models to the manufacturing end. More importantly, by binding with CATL and GAC Group, JD can establish its own "closed - loop automotive consumption ecosystem" - the entire process from selection, deposit payment, test - drive reservation, battery - swapping service, to subsequent maintenance and finance can be completed within the JD ecosystem.

In other words, it doesn't want to own a car but wants to control "all the consumption of a user related to a car."

GAC Group: Seeks to gain online traffic and rejuvenate the brand while maintaining control

From GAC's perspective, this seems more like a "stock - utilization participation" + "brand rejuvenation attempt."

According to a report from Yicai Global, a person familiar with the matter close to GAC Aion said that the battery - swapping version of GAC Aion UT will be jointly launched with JD and Times New Energy Service. JD responded to the Science and Technology Innovation Board Daily, stating that this new car is jointly launched by the three parties, and JD mainly provides user consumption insights and exclusive sales, not directly involved in the manufacturing process. It is understood that GAC Aion UT is a pure - electric small car targeting the "100,000 - yuan Class A hatchback sedan" market. It was launched in February this year, with an official guide price of 69,800 - 101,800 yuan.

Wu Yuxing, an expert in brand strategic positioning, said that for GAC Group, this is a low - cost product reuse. At the same time, by leveraging JD's online influence and young - user traffic, it can make the Aion brand closer to mainstream consumers. However, GAC won't easily give up control. In the game between "platform dominance vs. vehicle - manufacturer control," who controls the rhythm, who signs the contract, and who is responsible for delivery and after - sales are the real power points. JD currently emphasizes "user insight" and avoids talking about the delivery end to avoid crossing the vehicle - manufacturer's red line.

CATL: Seizes the opportunity to bind the channel entry and layout the next step of "battery - as - a - service"

It is CATL's subsidiary, "Times New Energy Service," that is involved in this cooperation, responsible for the technology, platform, and standard - setting of the entire battery - swapping system. This is a new business line that CATL has been focusing on since 2023, with the core of transforming "batteries" from one - time sales products into recyclable service assets.

Cooperating with JD is actually a "battery - to - consumer" vanguard battle for CATL.

Peng Deyu believes that CATL wants to use JD's traffic and user stickiness to quickly promote the implementation of the vehicle - battery separation/battery - swapping package/BaaS model. In the long run, the popularization of battery - swapping can enable CATL to break away from the role of just a "supplier" and become a real "energy - solution platform."

Overall, this tripartite cooperation is not a traditional car - building alliance in essence but a new - type "platform - driven product co - creation" experiment.

Who is in the lead? Who is setting the standards? Who will be ultimately responsible?

The answer is: It's not settled yet. This game has just begun.

III. Platform - led car - building doesn't burn money, but it's by no means easy: JD's risks and challenges

In JD's plan, this is a "light - asset trial" - no factory construction, no handling of qualifications, and no responsibility for delivery. It focuses on user insight, product co - creation, and channel conversion, seemingly with controllable risks and promising returns.

However, reality is often more complicated. Even without directly building cars, JD inevitably stands at the forefront of consumers' expectations, and behind this lies a set of complex, operation - intensive, and high - risk systematic challenges.

The first hurdle: Can the brand's carrying capacity support the "JD car"?

Although JD has clearly stated that it is not the manufacturer, the public won't delve into the specific division of responsibilities in this tripartite cooperation. In users' eyes, this car is a "car sold by JD" or even a "car customized by JD." Once there are issues such as delivery delays, quality problems, service disruptions, or difficulties with battery - swapping, JD may be the one to bear the blame instead of GAC or CATL.

Wu Yuxing added that this is the "brand - commitment risk": Since you led the definition, you must bear part of the trust cost for the results. Especially under a name like "affordable car for the masses," the public's price and quality expectations are even higher, and any deviation may be magnified into a "JD failure incident."

The second hurdle: Weak service chain, and platform thinking can't replace overall vehicle operation

Automobile consumption is far more complex than that of mobile phones, digital products, and other commodities.

From placing an order to delivery, and then to subsequent maintenance, finance, battery - swapping service, and warranty claims, this is an operation chain that requires "heavy service + strong trust."

Peng Deyu pointed out that JD's experience in overall vehicle maintenance, test - drive management, offline service networks, and after - sales claims still needs to be tested. Platform thinking emphasizes scale, reuse, and data - driven operations, while overall vehicle service emphasizes response, delivery, and responsibility - taking. The gap between them is not technology but "people + systems."

The third hurdle: Blurred control rights and unclear risk attribution under multi - party collaboration

In this tripartite cooperation, who controls the rhythm? Who is responsible for the product cycle? Who decides on the marketing strategy? Who ultimately bears the user - related responsibilities?

These are currently unclear.

Once there are issues such as inconsistent rhythms, strategic differences, or even "misunderstandings" between the platform and the vehicle manufacturer during the project implementation, it may repeat problems like the "brand - blame" incident that occurred to a certain automobile company.

The most hidden risk: The car is just an entry point, and the real challenge is to build a "long - term retention" ecosystem

For JD, the biggest problem is not whether the first car sells well but whether this model can be replicated and developed into a platform - level capability.

The sale of a single car is just the starting point. The real battle lies in whether it can convert car owners into long - term users, establish its own automotive finance/after - market/data service system, and expand into a "JD Auto Platform" to form a closed - loop ecosystem instead of a one - time deal.

If it can't extract reusable strategies and scalable platform capabilities from this cooperation, then this cross - border car - building may just be a brand - popularity - consuming battle.

Not building cars is a strategic "safeguard," but platform - led car - building is indeed a high - stakes bet.

Conclusion: It's not JD building cars but a rehearsal for platform - defined automobiles

JD's "affordable car for the masses" project may not create a huge splash in terms of sales volume, nor is it guaranteed to become a hit. However, it still deserves serious attention because it attempts to answer a more profound question:

In an era when vehicle manufacturing is becoming more modular and user touchpoints are fully online, who is the one to define a car?

Looking back at the relationship between platforms and car - building in recent years, various models have emerged:

• Self - built brand, full - stack self - research (Xiaomi, XPeng): Heavy - asset investment and technology - closed - loop operation;

• Capital investment, integration of software and hardware (Alibaba + XPeng / Didi + NIO): Attempting to bind vehicle - manufacturer resources;

• Platform co - creation, soft participation (Huawei's smart - selection cars, Baidu's car - building platform): Using operating systems and user systems to drive manufacturing in reverse;

• Supply - chain customization + sales collaboration (JD's case here): Influencing the right to define with platform power.

From this perspective, JD's cooperation represents a lighter and more flexible "platform - led car - building paradigm": not getting directly involved, not burning money, not competing in the technology stack, but gradually accumulating influence on the "definition layer" of the overall vehicle through user data, consumption insight, and distribution systems.

In the context of the large - model era, this model has the potential for further expansion:

AI participates in vehicle definition: Based on personalized insights, intelligently generating user - preferred vehicle models; The platform becomes a "virtual vehicle manufacturer": Without owning a factory, it completes vehicle commercialization by aggregating manufacturing and service resources; The ecosystem binds vehicle manufacturers in reverse: The consumption platform outputs model standards, and the manufacturing end becomes a "delivery executor"; The user journey connects "from e - commerce to energy": The car becomes a "last - mile" super - terminal.

What JD is doing today is "selling an affordable car for the masses," and tomorrow it may be "defining a customized platform." The day after tomorrow, it may not even need a vehicle manufacturer to build the car.

So, the question is no longer "whether JD should build cars" but in the future of car - building, what is more valuable: the car itself or the interface that determines how the car is sold?

This article is from the WeChat official account "High - level Insights and Trends," author: Gao Heng, published by 36Kr with authorization.