Audi is having a mental breakdown. Did it suddenly go back on its word and decide to continue making gasoline-powered cars?
The automotive circle is never short of drama.
Not long ago, #Audi CEO Gernot Döllner announced the withdrawal of the plan to completely stop selling fuel-powered vehicles by 2033.
Originally, it was agreed that no new fuel-powered vehicles would be launched after 2026. Now, it's taking a step back. Not only will it not stop selling fuel-powered vehicles, but it will also continue to develop new internal combustion engines in the next decade.
The attitudes of BBA (BMW, Benz, Audi) towards new energy have always been hesitant and wavering.
As early as March 2024, at #Mercedes-Benz's general shareholders' meeting, CEO Ola Källenius officially announced an adjusted strategy, changing the goal of "full electrification" by 2030 to "new energy vehicles accounting for 50% of sales."
#BMW has never proposed a clear timeline for stopping the sale of fuel-powered vehicles. CEO Oliver Zipse is even an "opponent." Since 2021, he has repeatedly emphasized in public that "full electrification is unrealistic and dangerous."
At the industrial level, the competition between fuel-powered and electric vehicles is becoming increasingly fierce.
As Huawei, Xiaomi, NIO, Li Auto, and XPeng are redefining luxury, BBA is feeling an unprecedented chill.
Those who want to wear the crown must bear its weight.
The old kings of the fuel-powered vehicle era are destined to face the challenges of the new kings.
BMW CEO Oliver Zipse (left) and Great Wall Motor's Wei Jianjun
01 The Centennial Aristocrats with "Failed Entrepreneurship"
When BBA ventures into new energy, it may seem like a transformation, but it actually follows the logic of entrepreneurship.
They are facing new technologies, new price systems, and new consumer groups.
Although they all entered the field with capital, they all ended up with a poor finish.
Mercedes-Benz directly cooperated with BAIC, investing 11.9 billion yuan to build a high-end electrification production base in Shunyi, Beijing. It aimed to have 150,000 new energy vehicles roll off the production line before 2022.
Audi allocated 18 billion euros, with 10 billion euros for a pure-electric high-voltage platform and 8 billion euros for a hybrid system. It planned to launch 30 new energy models between 2022 and 2026, including 20 pure-electric ones.
BMW also invested 9.1 billion euros in 2024, focusing on electrification and intelligentization.
Coincidentally, with their large-scale investments, BBA achieved a peak in new energy vehicle sales in 2023. The sales of new energy models of BMW and Mercedes-Benz both accounted for nearly 20%, and Audi's reached 13.9%.
Although the proportion may seem low, in 2019, this figure for BBA was only about 1%.
But just when BBA thought they had successfully transformed, a sudden reversal occurred.
In 2024, BBA's global sales declined year-on-year. Mercedes-Benz's sales decreased by 3%, BMW's by 4%, and Audi's by 11.8%.
This even led to significant losses for BBA in the first half of this year: Mercedes-Benz's net profit decreased by 55.8%, BMW's by 29%, and Audi's by 37.5%.
Losing money is just the result and appearance.
BBA's mistake lies in being too hasty - they both adopted the "fuel-to-electric" conversion strategy and engaged in price wars.
The former used fuel-powered vehicle platforms to enter the electric vehicle market, producing a large number of "hybrid" new energy vehicles with poor performance and user experience.
The latter used price cuts to promote sales and clear the inventory of these low-reputation models.
This combination of strategies directly turned the potentially profitable new energy business into a brand-damaging one.
For example, the officially guided price of the Brilliance BMW i3, a "China-exclusive" model, was in the range of 350,000 - 420,000 yuan. However, in October 2023, the actual selling price dropped directly to start from 170,000 yuan.
For the inventory of "fuel-to-electric" converted vehicles, the price war was indeed effective. More than 6,000 vehicles were sold in one month, several times the usual sales volume.
Other members of BBA also followed suit.
The officially guided price of the 2024 Audi Q4 e-tron 40 Advanced was from 289,900 yuan, but some channels sold it for 165,200 yuan, a direct reduction of more than 120,000 yuan.
In order to sell cars, some even included "rejecting fuel-to-electric conversion" in their sales pitches.
Price wars are like a curse. Once you start, there's no end.
In the end, the original high-end brand image is damaged, and it becomes increasingly difficult to sell cars.
It should be noted that BBA's foundation lies in internal combustion engine technology and the culture of meticulous engineering.
Over their century-long development history, this has gradually evolved into a sophisticated social value calculation system. In the past, BBA cars were even regarded as status symbols by some people.
The new energy revolution happens to involve the subversion of traditional luxury.
A car with mediocre driving pleasure and poor riding experience can't win over consumers just with its logo.
When the strategy of operating luxury attributes collides with new market demands, BBA tends to safeguard the original value of its brand.
Overall, among the best-selling models of BBA, apart from the BMW i3 and Audi Q4 e-tron, there's also the Mercedes-Benz EQE SUV. Together, they sold about 97,000 vehicles last year, less than half of the sales of the AITO M9. In 2025, the monthly sales were even worse, dropping directly to less than 4,000 units in June.
BBA wants to be a "playboy" straddling both fuel-powered and electric vehicles, but consumers see them as backups for new car-making forces.
02 BBA's "Three Unexpected Situations"
In BBA's transformation story, there are "three unexpected situations" prepared by new car-making forces for them.
The first "unexpected situation" is the cruelty of market competition.
For BBA, their main sales markets are China, North America, and Europe.
Among them, China is the largest single market and the fastest-growing one.
Therefore, BBA's transformation isn't actually difficult. They just need to follow the path of Chinese car companies in China.
They can learn from BYD and build a "technology pool," occasionally pulling out a new technology to shock the industry.
They can also learn from Li Auto and use the concept of "dad cars" to get some people to switch to new energy vehicles first.
Of course, they can also learn from Wuling Hongguang and use extremely cost-effective mini cars to dominate the parking lots of office buildings.
However, it's obvious that BBA underestimated their Chinese competitors. They thought that as long as they were quick, even the hasty "fuel-to-electric" conversion could help them gain a foothold in China.
As a result, they ended up in a difficult situation.
There's no shortage of good and affordable cars in China now.
Since BBA's products can't compete with their opponents, they can only take a beating.
Even worse is the second "unexpected situation": the technological gap.
In the past decade or so, all Chinese car companies have survived by creating hit products through technology.
Whenever the technological route isn't clear and the creation of hit products isn't thorough, car companies will be severely punished by the market.
In 2022, the pricing of the XPeng G9 was too high and its configuration was confusing. It was revised right after its release, and its sales plummeted.
In 2023, the highly anticipated Li MEGA had poor sales due to its overly unique appearance.
Even Huawei was once questioned by its peers and had to take a desperate gamble under the pressure of the "soul theory."
There's only one way to regain the market, which is to focus on technology, carry out upgrades, and compete head-on with opponents with extreme cost-effectiveness.
The NIO ET5 in the 300,000-yuan price range can achieve sub-4-second acceleration and is equipped with a lidar.
The Great Wall Tank 700 can automatically adjust the suspension height during off-road driving to avoid scraping the bottom.
The BYD Yangwang U7 can still drive for a certain distance even when one tire blows out.
It's normal for Chinese car companies to participate in track tests and winter tests.
At the very least, you can fish in the trunk or have hot pot inside the car.
The underlying logic is that the design of the electric vehicle platform is reasonable, maximizing the usable space.
The track version of the NIO ET5 with painted patterns
When it comes to comparing technical parameters, BBA is like being publicly shamed.
BMW boasts about its "0-100 km/h in 6.2 seconds" luxury performance in front of NIO's "sub-4-second 0-100 km/h acceleration." Mercedes-Benz's latest intelligent interaction system, MBUX, needs to recognize users' voices line by line and repeatedly listen for key instructions.
However, Chinese in-car systems can easily understand the context.
The third "unexpected situation" for BBA is the cost subversion.
Generally speaking, it's impossible for a company that has only been established for a decade or so to compete with a century-old enterprise in terms of supply chain capabilities.
For example, Mercedes-Benz has long sourced engine parts from Germany, Japan, and the United States. BMW's new energy vehicle battery packs are exclusively supplied by South Korea's SDI and Sweden's Northvolt.
With stable cooperation and economies of scale, the prices of raw materials purchased by BBA from these companies should be relatively low.
However, in reality, when BBA forms an interest community with its supply chain partners, they'll stick to the cooperation even if the costs of quality inspection, warehousing, and logistics are extremely high.
In early 2019, a strike at Audi's factory in Hungary directly led to a shortage of engines and key components for models such as the A3 and Q3. The brand had no choice but to endure a loss of production capacity of 230,000 vehicles.
This is an important reason why established enterprises find it difficult to make changes.
Now, in the new energy vehicle track, Chinese car companies are playing a different game.
In the battery field, companies such as CATL and BYD have reduced the cost of lithium iron phosphate (LFP) battery packs to the range of 0.45 - 0.50 yuan per watt-hour through technologies such as CTB (Cell-to-Body) integration and large-scale production. The cost is only 55% - 58% of that in Europe.
This has driven the development of China's energy storage industry. Companies such as EVE Energy and Grepow have further reduced the cost of China's energy storage systems to 0.8 - 0.9 yuan per watt-hour, while the global average is 1.2 - 1.8 yuan per watt-hour.
In terms of intelligentization, RoboSense and Hesai Technology, which have a market share of over 70%, have, in cooperation with companies such as Huawei and DJI, reduced the price of lidars from often 50,000 yuan per unit in 2019 to less than 3,000 yuan in 2024.
Thanks to good cost control, the BYD Seal, a 250,000-yuan-class mid-sized pure-electric sedan, is 40,000 - 60,000 yuan cheaper than the Tesla Model 3. BBA can only envy and resent this.
03 Is BBA's Mentality Really Collapsing?
Think about it. What do we get when we buy a new energy vehicle now?
Refrigerators, color TVs, big sofas, assisted driving, lidars...
NIO offers "NIO Houses" for car owners' parties and battery swap vouchers. Xiaomi provides test drives by the president and carbon fiber steering wheels. Great Wall's Wei Jianjun is not only building electric vehicles but also developing China's first large V8 engine. His technical capabilities have made fans call him "dad" collectively at auto shows.
At the Shanghai Auto Show, Wei Jianjun personally drove the Tank 300 Hi4-T user co-created modified version
Affordable and high-quality products, a sense of luxury, and a star-chasing experience.
Chinese car companies are so comprehensive that BBA always seems to be a little lacking.
At the corporate level, BBA has strong R & D capabilities but weak determination to transform.
In 2018, at BMW's general shareholders' meeting, CEO Harald Krüger emphasized the core position of fuel-powered vehicles for BMW. Two years later, the production of the BMW i8 was discontinued, and the R & D process of the dedicated pure-electric platform was also interrupted, directly leading to the delay of models such as the iNext.
Meanwhile, although BBA has strong service capabilities, its attitude of taking responsibility for car owners is weak.