Chasing BYD, Geely Galaxy, Chery Fengyun, and Changan Qiyuan Present Their Interim Reports.

The phased report card of new energy is for summarizing, correcting, and more importantly, moving forward.

When domestic brands lead the Chinese auto market with the "One Super and Three Strong" (BYD as the super giant, and Geely, Chery, and Changan as the three leading forces), on the one hand, it truly allows the Chinese people to witness the rise of Chinese automobiles. On the other hand, it can also be seen that the competition among the top players has never ceased.

Actually, since the beginning of this year, there have been quite a few dramas of open and covert struggles among these domestic brands. Whether it's the quarrels on forums, the veiled remarks of corporate leaders, or the mutual attacks among their "online trolls", the core issue is that their markets and products are in direct competition, reaching a point where they have to fight tooth and nail.

Combining the data of the "One Super and Three Strong" for the whole year of 2024 and the first half of this year, some new changes can be clearly seen:

For example, Geely has overtaken Chery. In 2024, Chery led Geely by 340,000 vehicles, but in the first half of this year, Geely led Chery by about 200,000 vehicles.

In 2024, BYD led the second - place by 1.74 million vehicles. By the first half of this year, this figure had decreased to 710,000 vehicles. The second - place is catching up with the first - place, and this gap is narrowing at a visible rate.

In 2024, Geely led Changan by 530,000 vehicles. By the first half of this year, this figure had increased to about 580,000 vehicles.

Similarly, the growth rates of BYD, Geely, Chery, and Changan in the first half of the year were 31.5%, 47.4%, 14.8%, and 3.8% respectively. It can be seen who is truly more competitive. The core reason is: whoever grasps the core area of new - energy competition can accelerate the pace of strategic counter - attack.

Speaking of the new - energy layout of several leading domestic automakers other than BYD, from 2023 - 2024, the Galaxy, Qiyuan, Fengyun, and Long/Hi - 4 series opened the prelude for Geely, Changan, Chery, and Great Wall to enter the core mainstream new - energy market. In 2025, from Chery to Geely, from Changan to Great Wall, each company is going all out to catch up with BYD.

What kind of report cards have the new - energy series of these four leading domestic automakers presented? Standing at the milestone where the systems are almost in order, what kind of development thinking has each company put forward?

By analyzing the independent new - energy camps of each company, we can understand the development prospects of these four domestic automakers in the new - energy market in the next one or two years. We can also see which of these four automakers has a better chance to get infinitely close to BYD, to compete, PK, and march side by side.

Why did Fengyun and Qiyuan fail to catch up with Galaxy?

As mentioned above, the core reason why Geely can stand out in the competition with Chery and Changan and narrow the gap with BYD is strategic choice and perseverance.

First, Geely Galaxy started to germinate with the Galaxy L6 and L7 in 2023 and cultivated its system. In 2024, after the Galaxy E8 had a mediocre performance and the Galaxy E5 achieved great success, Geely Galaxy became an independent new - energy brand. After the successive launches of Geely Xingyuan and Galaxy Xingjian 7, its development momentum is obvious to all.

Since this year, many products of Geely Galaxy have been selling like hotcakes. Including Xingyuan, which reached a monthly high of 40,000 vehicles, and the hot sales of Xingjian 7 and Xingyao 8, Geely Galaxy's monthly sales have basically been around 100,000 vehicles this year, laying a new rhythm for Geely's rapid development.

Second, Chery Fengyun was actually regarded as a new - energy brand targeting Geely Galaxy since the beginning of 2024. Several products such as A8, T9, and T10 were launched. Especially in the second half of last year, Fengyun's monthly sales reached 16,000 vehicles, but this rhythm did not last long.

For example, Fengyun A8, the leading model for Fengyun, has been performing mediocrely since its launch, with a maximum monthly sales of only more than 6,000 vehicles. Fengyun T9's monthly sales reached 10,000 vehicles in the fourth quarter of last year, but in 2025, the minimum sales of this model were only 980 vehicles, and it has been hovering between 2,000 and 3,000 vehicles in recent months. Since its launch, T10 has not sold well, with a maximum monthly sales of only more than 1,000 vehicles.

This year, Fengyun, which has 4 products, has a monthly sales of only between 5,000 and 6,000 vehicles. It was not until July 9th this year when Fengyun A9L was launched that Chery announced that Fengyun had become an independent new - energy brand, raising the flag to fully embrace new - energy, which can be said to be a full - fledged targeting of Geely Galaxy.

Looking at Changan, in fact, Qiyuan also germinated in 2023, following in the footsteps of Geely Galaxy. In the first half of 2024, several core products such as A05, A07, and Q05 brought monthly sales of more than 18,000 vehicles to Qiyuan, but it has been hovering around 10,000 vehicles. However, after the E07 was launched at the end of 2024, it targeted a very niche market and failed to bring incremental sales to Changan Qiyuan, wasting market opportunities and time.

It was not until Changan became a new central - state - owned enterprise in June this year that after all of Changan's new - energy business was merged into Qiyuan, Qiyuan had a direct improvement in sales. Especially after the inclusion of Changan's minivan Lumin, Qiyuan's monthly sales reached a new high of 40,000 vehicles in June this year.

Comparing the strategies of these companies, in fact, there are many similarities in their paths, but the firm determination for change and the rapid response capabilities of each company are quite different, which has led to differences in their development.

Geely Galaxy can be said to be the fastest and most thorough. It resolutely merged Geometry Automobile at the earliest time and fully integrated it into Geely Galaxy. It shut down the new - energy models under the Geely brand and comprehensively integrated Geely's new - energy business into Geely Galaxy. This not only focused the entire R & D and system on the most important market but also quickly brought about changes in the layout of dealers, reducing internal competition among models, power balance, and games, and promoting the rapid development of Geely Galaxy.

Of course, since the integration started in September last year, Geely's strategic thinking has been relatively clear. The Geely brand focuses on the fuel - vehicle market, while the new - energy camp has only two lines. One is Geely Galaxy, which targets the economy market, with both pure - electric and plug - in hybrid models. The second is the merged Lynk & Co and Zeekr, which target the mid - to - high - end market, with both pure - electric and super - hybrid models. The brand segmentation is clear, and the brand recognition of Lynk & Co with a cumulative sales of one million vehicles and Zeekr with 500,000 vehicles has been established.

The author believes that the core reason why Chery Fengyun and Changan Qiyuan have not achieved the rapid development rhythm of Geely Galaxy lies in the unclear internal division of labor in new - energy.

For example, Chery's new - energy camp is quite rich, which is in line with Chery's consistent style of "having many children to fight". There is not only the PHEV & EV camp of Chery's own brand models but also Chery New Energy, which merged Ant, Ice Cream, and ICAR. There is Fengyun, an independent hybrid product series, Jetour New Energy, which focuses on off - road new - energy vehicles, and the pure - electric and range - extended new - energy series of the mid - to - high - end brand Exeed. There is also ZEEKR, which cooperates with Huawei, and other camps including new - energy models of brands such as KARRY and KAIYUE.

It can be said that Chery's new - energy architecture is the most complex, and the layout is relatively large. Especially, Chery's own new - energy models will inevitably compete with Fengyun for the market and resources. For example, Chery has plug - in hybrid versions of Tiggo 9 and Explorer 06, as well as pure - electric models such as QQ Ant and Ice Cream series. And Fengyun also has plug - in hybrid models of different levels, sizes, and price ranges in the A series and T series. There are problems of lack of unity in both promotion and terminal dealer sales.

Changan's situation is basically the same. Except for Deepal and Avatr being independent, Changan also divides into two major sectors: Yinli and Qiyuan. Among them, Yinli mainly focuses on fuel vehicles, and Qiyuan is for new - energy vehicles. However, in reality, there are still plug - in hybrid models such as the UNI series in the Yinli series. Models such as Eado EV and Lumin, which were originally Changan's new - energy models, have a certain degree of mutual influence with models in the Qiyuan series.

Although Great Wall has the Long series and Hi - 4 series, it can be said that Great Wall's new - energy camp has not formed a matrix - style and brand - style pattern like Geely, Changan, and Chery, and it is more difficult to interpret the data analysis.

From series to brands, who will support the future?

In China's highly competitive auto market, strategic focus and investment will definitely become the core driving force for enterprise development. Since the original new - energy series of these three companies have all developed into new - energy brands, the direct competition among them has become more obvious.

Looking back at the development and results of Galaxy, Fengyun, and Qiyuan, it can be seen who has truly made up their mind to act quickly, especially the proportion of these three brands in their respective new - energy business. We can analyze it with the data for the whole year of 2024.

In 2024, the sales volume of Geely Galaxy after merging Geometry was 492,000 vehicles. The total new - energy sales volume of Geely that year was 888,200 vehicles. This means that Geely Galaxy accounted for 55.4% of Geely's new - energy business in 2024.

In 2024, the sales volume of Changan Qiyuan was 145,800 vehicles. The total new - energy sales volume of Changan's self - owned brand that year was 666,100 vehicles. Qiyuan accounted for 21.89%.

In 2024, the sales volume of Chery Fengyun was 113,000 vehicles. The total new - energy sales volume of Chery that year was 531,600 vehicles. Fengyun accounted for 21.26%.

In the first half of this year, Geely's new - energy sales volume was 725,100 vehicles, and Geely Galaxy's sales volume was 548,400 vehicles. Galaxy accounted for 75.63% of Geely's new - energy business. From 55.4% to 75.3%, it can be seen that Geely Galaxy's contribution to Geely's new - energy business is gradually increasing. In the larger mass - consumption market, Geely Galaxy has a very strong driving force for Geely's overall new - energy sales.

In the first half of 2025, Changan's self - owned new - energy sales volume was 392,900 vehicles, and Qiyuan's sales volume was 169,200 vehicles. Qiyuan accounted for 43% of Changan's new - energy business. Compared with the 21.89% for the whole year of last year, the brand image and strategic focus of Changan Qiyuan after integration can be said to be clearer.

In the first half of 2025, Chery's new - energy sales volume was 329,000 vehicles, and Fengyun's sales volume was 37,900 vehicles. Fengyun accounted for only 11.52% of Chery's new - energy business. Whether compared with Fengyun's 21.26% new - energy proportion last year or the performance of the three brands, Chery Fengyun has faced difficulties in development and transformation in the first half of this year. It is not difficult to understand why