Von Alipay zu WeChat: Wer hat die Kreditkarten-Apps der Banken umgebracht?

The banking industry is experiencing a new wave of "goodbye", and the victims are the independent credit card apps.

On May 13th, the Bank of China issued an announcement that its exclusive mobile credit card app "Colorful Life" will completely cease service at the end of June.

Two days later, Mengshang Bank also issued an announcement that it will shut down its "Mengshang Credit Card" app.

Previously, the Postal Savings Bank announced that its "Postal Savings Credit Card" app would gradually stop updates. National joint - stock banks such as Hengfeng Bank and Bohai Bank have successively closed their independent credit card apps. Regional banks like Ningbo Bank, Jiangxi Bank, Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank, and Beijing Rural Commercial Bank have already withdrawn or merged their independent credit card clients. Everbright Bank has promoted the in - depth integration of "Sunshine Enjoy Life" with the main mobile banking app and reduced channels.

It is worth noting that the closure of the independent credit card app by the Bank of China was misinterpreted as "the first large - state - owned bank to close its independent app".

In fact, the China Construction Bank took its exclusive independent credit card app "Long Card on Hand" offline officially 9 years ago, specifically in 2017, and integrated its functions into the mobile banking app.

Overall, from the "Long Card on Hand" of the China Construction Bank to the "Colorful Life" of the Bank of China, this "unification" over 9 years marks the complete end of the era of independent bank credit card apps.

However, the disappearance of independent apps does not mean the end of credit cards. Instead, it means that banks in the retail sector have finally overcome their dependence on "creating multiple entrances and blindly increasing monthly active users (MAU)" in the mobile Internet and have begun to eliminate technological redundancies and return to the financial core with a high return on investment (ROI).

Specifically, in the face of the continuous narrowing of the interest rate spread and the declining return on the investment side, banks need to shift from "vanity" to "valuing the essence".

From "territory conquest" to "reducing below 700 million cards" - The battle for the existing card volume

Behind the dense closures of independent credit card apps lies a mountain of data that "chills" industry insiders.

Central bank data shows that by the end of 2025, the number of credit cards and credit - collection cards in use in China was 696 million, falling below the 700 - million mark. In 3 years, the number has shrunk by nearly 120 million cards.

It seems to have already become "colder", but this is not the end. On May 15th, the latest data released by the central bank showed that by the first quarter of 2026, the number of credit cards and credit - collection cards in use in China was 687 million. That is, in three months, the number has shrunk by another 9 million cards.

Why is the situation in the credit card industry so stubborn? Simply put, demand decides.

The economist Joseph Schumpeter once pointed out that every supply in any part of the economy expects a corresponding demand. If we follow this statement, credit cards and independent credit card apps are affected by user requirements.

Leaving aside the past, when the China Construction Bank closed its "Long Card on Hand" in 2017, the Chinese credit card market was in the stage of rapid growth, the "growth period". At that time, the mobile Internet was in full swing. From shopping in shopping malls to dining, traveling, and entertainment, users needed a convenient payment method. Credit cards, which can make contactless payments, were not only convenient for payment but also practical for consumer credit, and thus became popular and widespread.

Banks responded by offering various discounts, subsidies, and benefits to encourage more users to apply for and use credit cards, and accelerated the "territory conquest". To better meet user requirements and create an additional traffic entrance to collect user resources and cooperate with the credit business, it had become an industry "standard" for banks to develop independent credit card apps.

The problem is that the situation has changed. Whether it is for convenient payment or consumer credit, users no longer have to rely on credit cards. In addition, the usage frequency of credit card apps is already low. Due to these negative factors, user activity is naturally low.

Overall, on the one hand, the number of cards is constantly shrinking, and on the other hand, user activity is low. The credit card industry is in the "battle for the existing card volume". At the same time, the cost - efficiency of operating two apps has clearly fallen below the critical limit.

From China Construction Bank to Bank of China - Bank management has finally done the math

From the bank's perspective, operating two apps is not very cost - effective.

On the one hand, most banks have their own main mobile banking apps, which already include functions such as credit card application, inquiry, and repayment and can meet user requirements.

On the other hand, each independent credit card app is a "money - eater" on the balance sheet:

First, the fixed costs for development and network security are very high.

The experienced financial expert Jiang Xufeng wrote in an article that the pre - development costs for a relatively complete credit card app amount to several million yuan. Then, the adaptation of multiple versions, daily maintenance, and high - quality network protection increase the fixed technological and operating costs for an independent app on the balance sheet to several million yuan per year.

Second, there has long been internal competition and self - depletion in marketing expenses.

In the past, many banks "fought" to increase the monthly activity of their credit card apps in order to increase user activity and demonstrate the market influence of their credit cards. Subsidies were concentrated on "Friday half - price", "grocery and movie tickets", and "daily discounts" for many years. However, this competes with the marketing expenses of the main mobile banking app and significantly reduces the "total investment - to - return ratio" on the bank's balance sheet.

To address and solve these problems, it has become an industry consensus in recent years to integrate the credit card business with the main mobile banking app and create a "super - app".

The advantages of the "super - app" on the balance sheet are obvious: First, the customer acquisition cost (CAC) drops significantly. There is no need to ask users to download two apps and offer double subsidies, which directly reduces the "business and administrative expenses" on the balance sheet. Second, the cross - selling conversion rate (Cross - selling) increases significantly. In the past, 90% of users in the independent credit card app only made account inquiries and repayments and could not see other bank products. After integration, the repayment traffic can be converted into asset management and asset allocation AUM, which increases the net profit from non - interest income. Third, the waste of capital caused by two servers and maintenance teams is avoided, resources are highly consolidated, and the investment - to - return ratio (ROI) in fintech is higher.

That's exactly why large - state - owned banks like the China Construction Bank and the Bank of China, as well as regional banks, have all closed their independent credit card apps without prior agreement.

The "integration path" of China Construction Bank vs. the "maintenance of an independent ecosystem" of China Merchants Bank

Although many banks have closed their independent credit card apps, there are also banks that still focus on independent apps. The two approaches have a dual - line pattern, with advantages and disadvantages, and offer completely different digital existence models to the industry.

In 2017, the China Construction Bank began the "surprising abolition" of its "Long Card on Hand", which initiated the "China Construction Bank model" of integrated overall planning. In addition to the China Construction Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China and the Bank of China are currently integrating credit cards as a core tab or a large ecosystem into the main mobile banking app.

The advantage of this model is that resources are no longer scattered. The main app has a large traffic volume, and credit cards can naturally absorb the cross - conversion of hundreds of millions of savings users. The disadvantage is that the main app becomes a "super - app", the functions become too complex, and the brand perception of credit cards among young users may be diluted.

In comparison, China Merchants Bank and China CITIC Bank still adhere to their independent apps and provide exclusive and precise services to credit card users. Since China Merchants Bank is the pioneer, this can be called the "China Merchants Bank model".

The advantage of this model is that the credit card business can be expanded to many consumption scenarios. In fact, the "CMB Wallet" of China Merchants Bank and the "M Credit" of China CITIC Bank have successfully moved away from the pure financial function and become "local life and consumption platforms" with in - depth penetration. They meet the living needs of young consumers through restaurant and movie tickets and show an independent, young, and modern brand image.

The disadvantage is, as mentioned before, that the operating costs and marketing expenses for independent credit card apps are high and continuous, and long - term subsidies are required.

In addition, external Internet giants are very powerful. Companies such as Meituan, Alibaba, and JD.com control the local life and consumption market, and there is not much market space left for bank credit cards and independent apps.

Take China Merchants Bank as an example. In 2025, when JD.com entered the delivery service and there was a "three - way battle" in the local life market, the non - interest income of China Merchants Bank's credit cards (mainly the commissions from merchants when users use the cards) decreased by 15.73% compared with the previous year, which was the largest decline in the past five years.

After comparing the two models, it is not difficult to see that the "China Merchants Bank model" of maintaining an independent ecosystem may pose greater challenges and a stronger test of the comprehensive capabilities of banks.

Should Alipay and WeChat Pay be blamed?

Who is the "culprit" for the accelerated closure of independent credit card apps?

Many people think it should be Alipay and WeChat Pay. The reason is simple: They have captured the direct connection to small - amount consumption scenarios, which leads users to have the habit of binding cards in Alipay and WeChat for payment. They don't have to open the bank app, let alone the exclusive independent credit card app.

This is actually an important reason, but from the perspective of Yilan Business, this is only an external factor. The core internal factor is the breakdown of the banks' own "scenario belief" and the end of the traffic dividend.

Here, the China Construction Bank provides an observation window.

When the China Construction Bank closed its "Long Card on Hand" in 2017, it was the peak of mobile Internet traffic. The bank had good reasons to use this "sky - high traffic" to bind rich life scenarios and make credit card usage more frequent. But looking back, two key factors were decisive for the China Construction Bank's turn:

The first key factor is that the China Construction Bank has sharply realized that "banks cannot keep up with Internet giants in the competition for frequent life scenarios". This is because Internet giants have a stronger traffic advantage and have been active in daily life areas for many years, which has built a high protective wall.

This is also the harsh industry reality. Yilan Business found that in April 2018, media such as China Fund News sighed that "the daily activity of all bank apps does not even reach half of that of Alipay", which well illustrates the above - mentioned "cannot keep up" with Internet giants.

The second key factor is that in 2017, the China Construction Bank's mobile banking app already had 266 million users and 42.52 million monthly active users, which means much higher traffic than the independent credit card app. In this case, it is obviously safer to make "additions" in the main app than to develop and continuously invest in an independent credit card app.

Nevertheless, these two key factors were not so noticeable when the entire industry was creating many traffic entrances and was in the "scenario belief". It was only when the traffic dividend gradually ended that other banks woke up: Instead of investing a lot of money in the independent app to sell movie tickets and distribute restaurant vouchers and always lagging behind Alipay, Meituan, and WeChat, it is better to guide users to the mobile bank and operate asset management, which is what banks are best at and most profitable in.

Fortunately, the main mobile banking app is always a "foundation" that banks can deeply explore and fine - tune.

The maturity of the Chinese retail finance sector

It is necessary to mention that neither the "China Construction Bank model" nor the "China Merchants Bank model" is completely separate.

In the market game, banks usually do not follow only a single route. For example, although the China Construction Bank closed its "Long Card on Hand", it later introduced "CCB Life", which provides a "life + finance" one - stop service, with the main emphasis on the main app. Although China Merchants Bank adheres to the independent ecosystem of its credit...