Das zentrale Disziplinarkomitee hat es aufgeführt. Ein Staatsvermögensakquisition führte zu einem Verlust von 1,7 Milliarden Yuan.

Recently, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission have made public a typical case.

In September 2020, in order to achieve the "doubling plan" for enterprise listings set by the higher - level authorities, Xinyu City in Jiangxi Province acquired a foreign private listed company from local state - owned enterprises without sufficient justification and relocated it to its own area. The main business of this company did not fit well with the local industries, and there had long - standing financial problems. Nevertheless, for the sake of achieving the goal, the local government rushed to complete the acquisition within less than four months.

Subsequently, the company's liquidity crisis emerged. To avoid a "collapse", the local government repeatedly provided illegal loans to it and even continued to inject funds after having evidence of financial manipulations in the company. In July 2023, the company was forced to delist, which brought significant economic losses to the local state - owned assets. According to a report by Caixin, the company is Qixin Co., Ltd., and the total amount of pending legal disputes exceeds 1.7 billion yuan.

This is not the only case.

Recently, the CCTV program "Focus Interview" also reported another case of local investment promotion: The economic zone in Yichun, Jiangxi, not only spent nearly 2 billion yuan to acquire shares in order to attract the automobile manufacturer Nezha, but also took over the costs of land and factory buildings. Together with multi - year rent concessions and a bonus of 20,000 yuan per vehicle, the offered preferential policies were regarded as an indirect violation of relevant policies and regulations.

Today, the "Intelligent Factory", which was put into operation in 2021, is an empty workshop with dusty production lines.

The two cases are very similar in structure: Under the pressure of quantitative targets, the decision - making period was shortened and the argumentation process was simplified, which ultimately led to greater losses of state - owned assets.

In fact, state - owned investments face two completely different red lines. What the CCDI criticizes are procedural violations, where the argumentation was bypassed and problems were ignored. This is a violation of the bottom - line. What "patient capital" really needs to solve are the periodic losses that occur due to technological iterations or market fluctuations despite error - free decision - making processes.

If it fails to separate "legitimate losses" from "illegitimate transfers" through a delicate institutional design, it will probably be difficult for state - owned assets to be truly "patient".

Final Accountability: A New Signal at the Institutional Level

In early 2026, the "Implementing Regulations on Accountability Review for Illegal Business and Investment Activities of Central State - owned Enterprises" came into effect. The General Office of the State Council issued a regulation at the same time, which has brought "final accountability" to a new level.

From an institutional perspective, there are some remarkable changes in this reform.

First: The scope of accountability review has been expanded. The original 11 categories have been expanded to 13, and new areas such as technological innovation and foreign investments have been added. The detailed clauses amount to 98, covering the main scenarios of state - owned assets in business and investment.

Second: The time dimension has been expanded. The clear definition of "final accountability for important decisions" means that regardless of whether a person's position changes, is transferred, or retires, as long as it is an illegal decision - making process with losses, the accountability will follow them for life. This institutionally ends the illusory logic that "as long as there are no problems during the tenure, everything is okay when one leaves".

Third: An error - tolerance mechanism has been introduced. The policy has also clearly defined the cases of "exemption from liability for proper actions": If a decision is made in accordance with laws and regulations, conscientiously and without personal gain, one can be exempted from liability despite losses due to unforeseen circumstances or changes in the external environment. A gradual treatment system has been established from "accountability review" to "exemption from liability", which gives managers room to make bold decisions in the fields of technological development and trials.

Logically, this institutional arrangement creates a "cost - awareness" for state - owned asset decisions. It forces decision - makers to act as carefully as if it were their own money. The phenomenon of "making decisions without thinking, making promises without consideration, and leaving without taking responsibility" that occurred in some regions before was because decision - makers did not bear personal consequences.

Of course, the result of the institution ultimately depends on the depth of implementation. If one can accurately distinguish between "normal investment risks" (e.g., technological failure) and "illegal business mistakes" (e.g., interest transfer, lack of procedures), this system will lead state - owned assets from "scale expansion" to "quality - orientation". On the contrary, if the criteria are too vague, it could lead to state - owned asset institutions falling into a state of "collective inaction", which would harm the political goal of the state's promotion of technological innovation.

Patient Capital: An Unsolved Problem

Almost simultaneously with "final accountability", "patient capital" has been another term frequently mentioned at the political level in the past two years. Both concepts have the same background: State - owned assets are the source of more than 80% of the capital in the primary market (VC/PE). The question of how this money can really support long - term investments in technological innovation is a structural problem.

Of course, it must be noted that the CCDI points out procedural violations and faulty acquisitions, while patient capital needs to solve the problem of losses in error - free processes.

The two concepts of final accountability and patient capital obviously contradict each other in practice.

Let's first consider the contradiction in the time dimension. The return period of hard - tech and basic research often lasts 10 to 15 years or longer. This requires decision - makers to think in a way that "success does not necessarily have to be achieved during my tenure".

But the final accountability obligation extends the time axis of risk binding. If a hard - tech project fails in the eighth year due to technological iteration and the decision - maker at that time has already retired, they can still be subject to an investigation. This unlimited risk pressure can easily lead to "patience" turning into a "wait - and - see policy".

To protect their career security, decision - makers tend to invest in late - stage projects where the return is already foreseeable, rather than in real early - stage projects.

Now let's consider the mismatch in risk logic.

The basic model of venture capital is that "some high returns cover the majority of losses". This is an industry rule, not a moral problem. But the historical logic of "preserving and increasing the value of state - owned assets" requires that every loss has a reasonable explanation.

The two logics are essentially incompatible: The first accepts a high failure rate as the price for high returns, while the second prefers a single review of each project.

And finally, there is a lack of an exit mechanism.

The stricter review for IPOs, the pressure on valuation in the secondary market, and the immaturity of the domestic industrial acquisition market make the possibilities for a "decent exit" very limited. If one has to wait for ten years and can only rely on an IPO in the end, the risk compensation is actually quite low.

From the perspective of front - end investors, the current situation of "patient capital" is as follows: Politically, it is strongly advocated, but there is pressure everywhere in the practical phases of capital raising, investment, management, and exit, which contradicts this concept.

The Pressure - Transfer Chain of LPs and the Real Situation of GPs

To understand this problem, we need to start from the perspective of capital providers.

Most LPs behind GPs, including local state - owned and industrial funds, are not really "long - term capital providers". They themselves are under the pressure of budget balance and performance evaluation, and this pressure is naturally transferred to the lower levels.

The market trend is very clear: A few years ago, people looked at book returns, and now only DPI is accepted. If a fund is eight to ten years old and the DPI is still not above 1, it will be difficult for LPs to believe in the meaning of "patience". Instead, they will think that "they are stuck".

In this context, the rise of S - funds has structural reasons. The primary market needs a transition mechanism. You invest in the first five years, and I take over in the next five years. A temporary exit allows the original capital to flow again, so that "patience" can be realized at the level of financial technology, rather than just remaining a sentimental call.

GPs are between LPs and invested enterprises and have to withstand double pressure.

On the one hand, there is a natural discrepancy between the "5 + 2" or "7 + 2" - year term of RMB funds and the return period of more than ten years for hard - tech projects. Investors know very well that if a project is not exit - ready within the term, they will not only face inquiries from LPs but also various buy - back agreements and discounting of equity transfers.

As early as 2024, Wang Ran, the founder and partner of Yicai Capital, openly said that the core requirement of local state - owned capital providers is not investment returns, let alone technological innovation, but to support the local economy through investment promotion. Therefore, they will always prioritize investment promotion in investment consideration and even make requirements for multiple reinvestments. This means that "various market - oriented GPs are gradually turning into local government investment promotion offices in the investment circle".

In other words, local state - owned capital providers would rather do nothing than do something wrong. They generally prefer structured return plans with senior and junior positions to transfer the risk to others as much as possible, even if they have to give up some commercial returns. The decision - making and implementation efficiency is extremely low. When there are problems, they first think about personal exemption from liability, rather than the maximum economic interests of LPs.

"Error tolerance" has already become a compulsory subject for state - owned assets in participating in venture capital investments.

On the other hand, the psychological mechanism of investors has changed under the background of "final accountability". Although people talk about long - term thinking, everyone tries to acquire projects "closer to the exit", which leads to the reverse valuation of early - stage projects and less money flowing into the areas that really need patient capital.

This is a remarkable paradox: The policy encourages early and small investments, but institutional pressure drives capital into the late stages.

Where is the Solution to the Problem?

Based on the above analysis, the industry consensus is gradually concentrating on three directions.

First: Adjusting the evaluation logic. The profit or loss of a single project should not be the only criterion. If a net increase in the asset portfolio can be achieved at the level of the entire fund, it should be regarded as acceptable. This is in line with the basic rule of venture capital. Only when looking at the overall picture of the portfolio instead of individual accountability review, do GPs have room for real risk allocation.

Second: Diversifying exit channels. Easing the review of corporate mergers and acquisitions, promoting the secondary market for equity transfers, and developing S - funds can provide "decent exit opportunities" for patient capital. If the exit is only possible through an IPO, long - term capital will become "capital waiting for the stock market", which has nothing to do with patience.

Third: Clarifying the criteria for "exemption from liability for proper actions". This is currently the section with the highest uncertainty and also what investors are most interested in. If one can clearly distinguish between failure due to technological iteration and failure due to "interest transfer" or "lack of procedures", decision - makers really have room for error tolerance. Otherwise, "exemption from liability for proper actions" is just a false sense of security on paper.

In recent years, different regions have also been working on exploration of exemption from liability.

In July 2024, the High - Tech Zone of Chengdu released a whole - lifecycle capital support system. Error - tolerance rates between 30% and 80% were set for policy funds in different phases such as seed funds, angel funds, venture capital funds, industrial funds, and M&A funds, and the error - tolerance rate for market - oriented funds was set at 20%.

The management regulations for the Angel Investment Fund in Nanhai District, Foshan, Guangdong, clearly stipulate that the fund can tolerate losses of up to 80%, which raises the "upper limit" of the error - tolerance rate again. The Gold Hibiscus Investment Fund in Hunan has also clearly stipulated that the error - tolerance rate for technological innovation projects can be up to 50%.

The head of a state - owned venture capital enterprise in Shenzhen said that the error - tolerance of state - owned venture capital in the past generally only ranged from 20% to 30%, while the maximum error - tolerance rate is now up to 80%.