Sind die Roboter aus der Frühlingsgalarei veraltet? Im Jahr 2026 sollen Roboter weniger tanzen und mehr arbeiten.
In 2025, a yangko dance performance by Unitree robots at the Chinese New Year reception has shaken up the capital markets. In 2026, various companies are vying for the valuable spots at the New Year reception. This year, there are countless demonstrations to attract the attention of the audience. The audience seems to be already accustomed and tired of the pursuit of beauty. It's simply about robots running, dancing, or fighting. The view that they are "big toys" is ubiquitous.
Looking back at 2026, various unicorn companies have constantly searched and made mistakes in success and uncertainty. Humanoid robots have performed almost all "visible" movements at public events: running, dancing, sliding, fencing... These movements have repeatedly increased the number of views on video platforms, but at the same time, they have also lowered the value of robots in the industry.
The real turning point is this: When all companies can show off, showing off is no longer a competitive advantage.
The capital markets were the first to sense this change. While the company values have risen rapidly, the orders, deliveries, and scaling data have clearly lagged behind. There is an ever - increasing gap between technological progress and commercial implementation.
Therefore, the word "bubble" is appearing more and more frequently in industry discussions - not because technological progress has stagnated, but because the standards for success have quietly changed.
When the technology demonstration fails
During this process of reorienting the evaluation criteria, the Chinese market is not isolated. An annual report from the top of the global robotics industry provides a valuable reference point.
On January 26th, when China just announced the list of robots for the New Year reception, The Robot Report published the "2026 Robotics Industry Forecast". With 38 pages of detailed data and interviews with industry experts, the report outlines the real picture of the industry after the hype. For the Chinese robotics industry, which is caught between capital frenzy and commercial implementation, this report is a rare mirror image.
The central statement of the report is: "In 2026, we no longer want to see robots dancing or demonstrating martial arts. Show us what they can really do usefully." This open statement by Aaron Prather of the ASTM International Standards Organization represents the paradigm shift of the entire industry from technological demonstration to commercial implementation. In the past two years, the promotional videos of robotics companies were full of impressive demonstrations such as rolling backwards, sliding, and dancing. But when investors and customers ask, "Who will buy the 1000th robot?", the clicks on these videos cannot be converted into orders. The report shows that although there were 463 financing rounds in the humanoid robot industry in 2025 and more than 150 companies entered the market, the actual delivery volume only increased by 17%, while the company values soared by 300% - this discrepancy is a typical warning sign of a bubble.
The report specifically mentions a trend: As the number of deployed robots increases, companies' tolerance for "technological showmanship" drops rapidly, while the importance of reliability, predictability, and total operating costs is weighted more and more. In other words, when robots change from "pilot projects" to "everyday tools", the evaluation criteria also change fundamentally.
This change is not only happening abroad. The Chinese market is going through almost the same process: In the early stages, the demonstration of capabilities is enough to support the company value. But when the number of participants increases significantly, only the capabilities that can be integrated into real processes are repeatedly validated and strengthened.
The real turning point was in the third quarter of 2025. The humanoid robot Digit by Agility Robotics became the first product in the industry to be certified on - site by the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). This milestone is far more significant than any viral video. In a real e - commerce warehouse in San Antonio, Digit has already transported over 100,000 pallets. The commercial value of a single robot is quantified by simple and raw indicators such as "how many paying customers are there" and "how much goods have been moved". At the same time, the premiere of the humanoid robot Atlas by Boston Dynamics at CES 2026 was also pragmatic - in a 15 - minute demonstration of factory part sorting, it was required several times for a human to intervene remotely. This honesty has won respect in the industry because it shows the real technological maturity, not a perfectly edited demonstration.
The report shows a second important change: the restructuring of the investment logic. From 2024 to 2025, large - scale financings (over $50 million per round) accounted for 88% of the total financing amount but only 8% of the transactions. This means that the capital is concentrated on a few top companies that are considered "commercially validated". After Figure AI completed its Series C financing, the company has received a total commitment of over $1 billion in capital and reached a company value of $3.9 billion. The reason lies in the first delivery of robots to paying customers in December 2024. The investor F - Prime Capital directly says: In 2026, there will be 3 to 4 clear "winners" in the humanoid robot industry, and the other companies will either be acquired or have to close - not because the technology is not advanced enough, but because they are unable to find a balance between "high technological uncertainty" and "limited commercial validation".
For Chinese industry players, the greatest value of this report is not the description of what is happening in the US market, but the provision of a new evaluation system. While Chinese capital investors are still celebrating the "XX billion yuan financing of a company", the US industry is focusing on three hard indicators: the payback period (in the manufacturing industry, a payback period of 16 months is required), the ability to switch tasks (can the robot expand from a single task to multiple tasks), and the operating data (how much goods have actually been transported, how many operations have been carried out). Examples such as Amazon's installation of 1 million robots, Waymo's expansion from 4 cities to 5 and the plan to enter 15 new markets, and Symbolic's acquisition of Walmart's advanced system and robotics business for $200 million - the commonality of these examples is that "scaling" replaces "concept validation" and "customer repeat rate" replaces "demo effect".
What is even more remarkable is that in the six forecasts for 2026 in the report, none is about technological breakthroughs, but all focus on business models, supply - chain restructurings, financing strategies, and industry integrations. This exactly confirms a hard fact: The competition in the robotics industry has shifted from "who has the coolest technology" to "who can achieve a commercial cycle faster". When US colleagues are discussing leasing models, Robot - as - a - Service (RaaS), and how to convince customers that "it's not profitable on the first day, but there is a clear path to task expansion", Chinese companies have to ask themselves if we are ready to answer the same questions for our customers?
From peak performance to minimum performance
This report does not attempt to make grand technological predictions. On the contrary, it repeatedly discusses an apparently simple but vital question: How are robots actually used in real production and service scenarios?
The respondents of the report are not only start - up companies but also corporate customers who have already paid for robots and are trying to integrate them into their daily operations. From the perspective of these users, there is a clear and hard line between technological demonstration and commercial value.
In recent years, it was common to define robots by their "peak performance" - how fast they can run, how high they can jump, how human - like their movements are. But in actual implementation, customers are more interested in another set of questions: Can it stably repeat a task? Do we have to reshape the process and the environment for it? If it fails, malfunctions, or needs maintenance, are the costs and risks controllable?
These questions don't sound particularly exciting, but they directly determine whether a robot is treated as a "presentation device" or a "production tool".
Against this background, the question "what is actually a useful robot" is no longer a philosophical question, but a clear line - it determines which companies can enter the delivery phase and which have to stay in an ever - longer validation period.
Numbers for problem - solving
The investment firm F - Prime writes directly in its annual report: "The market doesn't pay for novelties but for solving real problems. The robot Digit by Agility Robotics transported over 100,000 pallets in 2025. This number is repeatedly mentioned in the report because each transport of a pallet corresponds to a complete task cycle - recognition, grasping, moving, placing, returning. This proves not a 'one - time success' but'repeatability'."
What's even more important is that these 100,000 pallets were transported in a real e - commerce warehouse, together with human employees and in a non - standardized environment. When Agility published these data, Digit had already obtained OSHA certification - an evaluation by a state - recognized third - party laboratory in the real operating environment, which confirms that the robot is safe and controllable when human employees are around, the light changes, or there is water or obstacles on the floor.
This is the essence of the change in the evaluation system: from "peak performance" to "minimum performance". In the past, the industry liked to show what robots can do under optimal conditions; now, customers are more interested in whether the robot has problems under the worst conditions. Because in a real production environment, an unexpected failure can nullify a month's increase in efficiency.
16 months: The invisible line
The manufacturing industry generally requires a payback period of 16 months for robot investments. This period seems to be a financial indicator, but it forces companies to change their entire operating logic.
The report quotes the calculation method of a purchasing manager of a food factory: If the purchase cost of a robot is $100,000 and the implementation and integration costs are another $30,000 to $50,000 (including on - site adjustment, process reshaping, and employee training) and the ongoing maintenance costs are about $10,000 per year, this robot must create a quantifiable added value of about $10,000 per month - either by replacing labor, increasing productivity, or reducing waste. This calculation method forces companies to clarify before purchase what the robot will replace or what new things it will create. Vague descriptions like "great potential in the future" don't hold up in this context at all. Customers need a specific task list, clear performance indicators, and verifiable operating time.
An even more subtle change is taking place in the customers' definition of "perfection". The report quotes a logistics manager: "The robot doesn't have to be profitable on the first day. If it reaches the minimum performance and shows a clear path to task expansion, the return on investment will improve as it takes on more tasks." This is an important signal: Customers are starting to accept that robots need to "grow", but only if the "growth path" is clear and credible.
This means that companies are buying a "capability expansion system", not just a "single - task execution mechanism". For example, a robot originally used for stacking can learn unloading after 3 to 6 months and quality inspection a few months later. Its economic value will then increase continuously. But this "ability to switch tasks" must be validated before implementation - through demonstrations, through previous examples, through the transparency of the technological architecture.
The shift of decision - making power
The third change described in the report is less obvious but far - reaching: Within companies, the decision - making power regarding robot purchase decisions is shifting from the technology teams to the finance and operations departments.
In the past, an impressive technological demonstration was enough to convince the CTO to initiate a purchase. But when automation changes from a "pilot project" to an "everyday tool", the CFO and COO require a complete TCO analysis (total operating costs). In some cases, the implementation and integration costs are even higher than the hardware itself - which means that "cheap robots" may not really be cheap.
This decision - making logic has given rise to new business models. The report shows that 50% of the surveyed companies prefer leasing, and over 40% are considering RaaS (Robot - as - a - Service). The logic is simple: Instead of making a large capital expenditure and bearing the technological risk, companies would rather pay monthly and transfer the risk to the supplier. But the RaaS model places higher requirements on robotics companies: Every failure is a loss for the supplier; customers only pay monthly if the robot is "always available"; the pricing model must be based on sufficient operating data.
This restructuring of the evaluation system is essentially the inevitable result of the industry's transition from the "storytelling phase" to the "delivery phase". When there are only a few companies in the market, each company can define its own standards. But when over 150 companies enter the same market, customers need a unified measuring tool to judge who has really achieved something and who is just good at talking.