Wearable devices are becoming more segmented, extending from wrists to fingers. Yes, that's exactly what it means literally.

Wearables are undergoing a split. The growth rate of smartwatches has dropped to 12%, while that of smart rings has soared to 49%. This is not merely the ebb and flow of a single category but a redivision of the entire wearables landscape. What enables smart rings to break free from the shadow of smartwatches, and how will this battle unfold?

The Three - Stage Evolution of the Category

Wearable (wrist - worn) devices have carried the gene of all - encompassing functionality since their inception.

Unification Stage: From 2014 to 2018. Smartwatches were defined as mobile phones on the wrist. Notifications, calls, sports tracking, navigation, and payment were all must - haves. The logic was simple: the more all - around the device, the better.

Diversification Stage: From 2018 to 2022. Cracks began to appear. Garmin attracted serious athletes with long - lasting battery life and professional sports data. Xiaomi turned fitness bands into lightweight activity trackers that didn't require an app and had a weekly battery life. Consumers started to realize that different scenarios called for different devices.

Independence Stage: From 2023 to 2026. Smart rings emerged independently from the form of fitness bands. Oura spent over a decade proving that the absence of a screen is not a flaw but a feature. (Actually, there was also Jawbone earlier; we'll discuss it in a separate issue.) Samsung introduced the Galaxy Ring to the mass market. In 2024, the initial stock was 400,000 units, but the demand far exceeded expectations, and an additional 600,000 units were urgently ordered. Chinese brands quickly entered the market.

The underlying logic of diversification has remained unchanged. When a single form tries to cover all scenarios, the scenarios sacrificed due to over - integration will naturally give rise to specialized categories. Smartwatches are suitable for daytime use, while smart rings are ideal for nighttime. It's not about replacement but more like a division of labor.

Three forces converged from 2024 to 2026, transforming smart rings from a niche category into an independent market segment.

Technology. Optical heart rate sensors and accelerometers can now fit into an 8 - millimeter - thick ring casing. Bluetooth 5.3 keeps power consumption at the milliwatt level, and flexible batteries support a 5 - to 7 - day battery life. In 2018, a smart ring would have been a brick that needed to be charged twice a day. By 2026, you might even forget you're wearing the ring the next day.

Demand. More and more people on social networks are complaining that smartwatches are too heavy to wear while sleeping. Behind this is a simple fact: not all scenarios require a screen. Sleep monitoring doesn't need notifications, yoga doesn't need GPS, and stress management doesn't need intelligent voice.

When all - day wearability becomes more important than having more features, the form advantage of rings is established. Meanwhile, the sense of data redundancy is also building up. Many users find that the daily exercise goal completion notifications from smartwatches have little real - world value. Instead, the 24 - hour continuous resting heart rate and HRV are more meaningful. Rings perform better than smartwatches in these two aspects, as the blood flow signals from fingers are cleaner and the wearing consistency is more stable.

Category Education. Oura spent over a decade teaching the market what smart rings are. Samsung, with the backing of the Galaxy brand, introduced it to a wider audience. IDC predicts that the global sales of smart rings will increase from approximately 1.7 million units in 2024 to 3.2 million units in 2028, with a compound annual growth rate of nearly 30%. New entrants in 2026 don't need to explain what the product is for; they just need to say: "I'm half as cheap as Oura."

The Competition May Just Be Beginning

Oura: The Category Definer

Oura represents the iPhone moment for smart rings. In October 2025, it completed a $900 million Series E financing round, with a post - investment valuation of $11 billion. Its revenue in 2024 exceeded $500 million, and it is expected to double to $1 billion in 2025. A total of 5.5 million rings have been sold, with more than half sold in the past year.

Its core barrier is not the hardware. Chips are available to everyone. The real barrier lies in the algorithmic model. The sleep and HRV analysis capabilities trained with millions of nighttime data are hard for new entrants to catch up with in the short term.

The business model is a combination of hardware sales and subscriptions. Rings start at $349, and the monthly membership fee is $5.99. In 2025, the B2B corporate health business contributed approximately $85 million, accounting for 28% of the revenue, and has acquired over 200 large corporate clients. The global corporate health market is worth over $50 billion, which represents Oura's untapped potential on the B - side.

However, Oura also has a vulnerability. When RingConn offers similar functionality at $299 without a monthly fee, the $6 monthly cost becomes a factor that needs to be repeatedly justified. How long the brand premium can last depends on how deep its algorithmic barrier is.

Samsung: Ecosystem Lock - in

The strategic intention of the Galaxy Ring is not to sell more rings. Its real role is to be a piece of the Samsung Health ecosystem. The data is integrated with the Galaxy Watch, and payment is integrated with Samsung Wallet. Every step conveys the same message: if you use a Samsung phone, a Samsung ring is the shortest path to a complete health experience.

Interestingly, the Galaxy Ring is actually compatible with all Android 11 and above phones. Samsung officially hinted that it is best suited for Galaxy phones, but tests have shown that the experience on non - Samsung phones is almost as good. Samsung deliberately blurs this point. It doesn't expect the ring to be a huge independent revenue source. Instead, it is more concerned about whether a $399 ring will make users more likely to stay in the Galaxy camp when they next change their phones.

This also means that if the shipment volume and retention data fall short of expectations, Samsung may reduce its investment at any time. It's not that Samsung is not optimistic; it's just that the priority can change at any time, as seen in Samsung's withdrawal from the Chinese market.

Chinese Brands: Speed for Market Share

RingConn, Amazfit, Meizu, and Dreame form a rapidly emerging matrix of Chinese brands. Their core weapon is a single one: supply - chain speed. Shenzhen can complete mold sampling and trial production within a few weeks, resulting in a crushing cost advantage.

However, their product positioning still varies.

RingConn positions itself as a subscription - free alternative to Oura. The Gen 2 is priced at $299, and the Gen 2 Air is priced at $199. It was the first to introduce sleep apnea monitoring. Its sales channels are mainly Amazon and independent websites, and it frequently offers discounts. In early 2026, there was a promotional price of $239.

Amazfit, backed by Huami, follows the sports ecosystem route. The sports algorithms and hardware capabilities accumulated by Zepp Health over the years are its trump cards. Its rings are more like lightweight sports trackers, forming a product matrix with smartwatches and fitness bands. The price ranges from $200 to $300.

Xiaomi hasn't officially entered the game yet. However, given its scale and supply - chain capabilities, once it enters, the price is likely to be as low as $100 (a few hundred RMB), which would be a fatal blow to the entire category's pricing system.

Actually, Chinese brands' overseas expansion paths are highly similar: they first increase sales volume on Amazon or TikTok, then build their brands through independent DTC websites, and finally upgrade their brands through KOL collaborations. The path taken by Anker and AfterShokz is being replicated by RingConn and others.

However, the structural bottlenecks are also obvious. It's difficult to build brand premium, there is insufficient accumulation in software and algorithms, and overseas B2B channels are almost non - existent. Additionally, it's currently difficult to differentiate the appearance of rings. If these shortcomings are not addressed, they will be stuck at the ceiling of the cost - effective mass - market strategy.

Apple: The Absent Giant

The most conspicuous absentee is Apple.

It has a large number of smart ring patents, including surround touch sensors, NFC payment rings, and health solutions linked with the Apple Watch. Technically, it has the ability to develop smart rings, but it hasn't.

Duan Yongping once commented on Apple's product philosophy, and his words may provide the best answer. In essence, he said that Apple is not a commercial - oriented company but a user - oriented company. A commercial - oriented company rushes into a growing market to occupy a position, while a user - oriented company first asks: "Can we create a significantly different user experience?" If not, it would rather not do it.

Applying this framework to smart rings, the answer becomes clear.

The form of a ring naturally limits interaction. There is no screen and no space for swiping and tapping. Apple's expertise in intuitive interaction design has limited scope in the small circular space. It's not used to doing something just for the sake of it.

I have a more specific judgment on this: Apple will not launch a smart ring in the medium - to - short term, from 2026 to 2028. It's not that it fails to recognize the value of this category, but rather that it is waiting for two things to mature. One is that the screen - less interaction technology reaches a stage where it can create a significantly different experience, such as a combination of gesture control and AI voice that is good enough. The other is that the data closed - loop of Apple Health is complete enough to make the ring an integral part of the ecosystem rather than just another independent accessory.

If Apple never enters the market, Oura will set the quality benchmark, and Chinese brands will target the mid - to - low - end market. The category will grow slowly at the current annual growth rate of 30%. If Apple enters, the category will explode, just like AirPods did for true wireless earphones, but the survival space of Oura and Chinese brands will be severely squeezed.

This is the "Sword of Apple" hanging over the industry. When it will fall depends on when Apple can create that significantly different ring.

8% May Be the Ceiling

Will smart rings repeat the story of smart glasses?

From 2013 to 2015, Google Glass generated a lot of hype for the smart glasses category, but few consumers actually bought them, and they ended up gathering dust in drawers. During the AI glasses boom from 2023 to 2025, except for Meta Ray - Ban, which achieved some sales with its fashionable appearance, most brands' products had shockingly short lifecycles.

The real risk that smart rings face is similar: for how many people is wearing a ring for sleep monitoring a real necessity?

According to user surveys conducted by Garmin and several third - party institutions in 2024, the nighttime wearing rate of smartwatch users is approximately 30% to 40%. That is to say, more than 60% of smartwatch users don't wear their watches while sleeping. If 10% of these 60% of people are willing to buy a ring for more comfortable nighttime monitoring, the ceiling of this category is about 6% to 8% of all wearable device users. It's a good business but not a story that will sweep across the market.

The biggest trap in this category is not the lack of demand but misinterpreting the high demand of some people as a standard for everyone.

Conjectures on the End - Game of Wearables

Let's return to the initial question: where is this going?

My judgment is that it won't lead to one device dominating all. Eventually, a hierarchical combination will form, which I call the Wearable Pyramid.

At the top are smartwatches. They are responsible for scenarios that require screen interaction and GPS, such as outdoor sports, business trips, and daily commuting. Brands like Apple, Samsung, OPPO, VIVO, and Huami offer products priced from $200 to $1000.

In the middle are smart fitness bands. They are in charge of activity tracking and basic monitoring, such as step counting, calorie tracking, and lightweight sports. Brands like Xiaomi, Whoop, and Fitbit offer products priced from $30 to $150.

At the base are smart rings. They are responsible for scenarios that require seamless and continuous wear, such as sleep monitoring, HRV tracking, stress management, and resting heart rate baseline monitoring. Brands like Oura, RingConn, Dreame, and Huami offer products priced from $200 to $400 (the price may be lower in the future).

Users wear smartwatches during the day and smart rings at night. They wear rings on weekdays and smartwatches for weekend sports. It's not an either - or choice but using the right device at the right time. The three devices are not in a replacement relationship but a division - of - labor relationship.

How big is this pyramid? In 2025, the global shipment of wearable devices reached 610 million units, a year - on - year increase of 9.1%. Smart rings currently account for less than 1%, but the 49% growth rate indicates that it's not a zero - sum game. It is capturing the nighttime scenarios of smartwatches and filling the retention gap of fitness bands.

The rise of smart rings is not a story of a new product replacing an old one.

It's more like a precise surgical operation. Smartwatches are still the best wearable devices during the day, but smart rings have accurately targeted a scenario that smartwatches have never really solved well: seamless nighttime monitoring.

Oura spent over a decade proving one thing: users' willingness to wear a device continuously is more important than its features.

This statement can be applied to any wearable product...

This article is from the WeChat official account "Yiou New Consumption" (ID: EO - Consumer). The author is "Seven - and - a - Half - Year Trainee", and it is published by 36Kr with authorization.