The once richest man in Shanxi has fallen from grace, the rating of Meijin Energy has been downgraded, and its transformation has stalled amid coking losses and massive capital burn in the hydrogen energy sector.

Meijin Energy's hydrogen energy transformation failed, resulting in performance losses, a credit rating downgrade, and a reduction in the fortune of the richest man.

Yujian Energy learned that recently, Meijin Energy's credit rating was downgraded from A+ to A. The credit rating report's judgment on Meijin Energy is that the coking business has no profit margin, the losses in the hydrogen energy business continue to expand, the gap between cash assets and interest-bearing debts is narrowing, all the equity of the controlling shareholder is pledged, and the overdue debts remain unresolved.

Five years ago, this company was still a benchmark for transformation in the capital market. In 2021, its net profit attributable to the parent company was 2.541 billion yuan, with a gross profit margin of 30.25%. The Yao Junliang family has held the position of the richest person in Shanxi for seven consecutive years since 2017. Now, the company has accumulated losses of 2.266 billion yuan in two years, the gross profit margin has dropped to 1.86%, and the family's wealth has shrunk from 32.9 billion yuan to 7.6 billion yuan.

It has only been four years from the position of the richest man to the credit rating downgrade. During these four years, Meijin Energy has told the market a grand story of hydrogen energy transformation, but before the story is realized, the cash flow has already signaled a red light.

Eight years of hydrogen energy layout gone in vain, and the revenue contribution has decreased instead of increased

Yujian Energy believes that Meijin Energy's structural dilemma lies in the fact that the hydrogen energy business has not yet formed the ability to generate self-sustaining cash flow, while the traditional profit center of coke has already lost ground.

The 2025 financial report shows that the revenue from the coal coking business was 17.561 billion yuan, accounting for 97.73% of the total revenue; the revenue from the hydrogen energy business was 409 million yuan, accounting for only 2.27%. A company labeled as the "leader in hydrogen energy" by the market still has an income structure that is essentially that of an independent coking plant. More notably, the hydrogen energy revenue decreased by 48.42% year-on-year, almost halving from 792 million yuan in 2024. The gross profit margin of this business is -31%, which means that every yuan of revenue is eroding profits.

These are a set of paradoxical numbers. Meijin Energy started to layout the hydrogen energy business in 2017 and built a complete industrial chain of "hydrogen production - storage and transportation - refueling - application", spanning eight years. However, the proportion of hydrogen energy revenue not only failed to increase but decreased from 4.38% to 2.27%. During the same period, the company's R & D expenses were cut by 33%, and the number of R & D personnel decreased by 14%.

In November 2025, the board of directors reviewed and approved the proposal to terminate the "Hydrogen Fuel Cell Power System and Hydrogen Fuel Commercial Vehicle Parts Production Project (Phase I, Stage I)". This project was one of the core projects funded by the convertible bonds in 2022. The original planned total investment was 1.502 billion yuan. When it was terminated, the cumulative investment of the raised funds was only 73.4333 million yuan, and the investment progress was 29.37%. The remaining 179 million yuan has been permanently used to supplement working capital.

The company's explanation is: Jinzhong City was not included in the national fuel cell vehicle demonstration urban agglomeration, and the policy and market environment have changed. Li Fenzhenzi, a researcher at Zhongyan Puhua, said that more than 85% of the national fuel cell vehicle promotion volume and 70% of the hydrogen refueling stations are concentrated in the five major demonstration urban agglomerations, and non - demonstration areas cannot even get subsidies.

Meijin Energy's hydrogen energy strategy presents a typical time mismatch: the industrial cultivation cycle is much longer than the patience of capital, and the cash flow of the traditional main business can no longer support this long - term battle.

The major shareholder with 100% pledged shares is gambling on the future with a "9999 - year" term

Liquidity risk is the most realistic constraint variable at present.

As of the first quarter of 2026, the company's monetary funds were 2.313 billion yuan, and the interest - bearing liabilities were 9.267 billion yuan. The remaining balance of the "Meijin Convertible Bonds" that has not been converted into shares is 2.789 billion yuan. The convertible bond interest rate increases from 0.3% in the first year to 3% in the sixth year, and the time cost is accumulating.

The channel for convertible bonds to be converted into shares is narrowing. The initial conversion price was 13.21 yuan per share, and it was revised downward to 5.26 yuan per share in June 2024. However, as of June 30, 2026, the stock price triggered the clause for downward revision of the conversion price again. On June 30, the board of directors proposed another downward revision. Every downward revision is an affirmation of the market's re - evaluation of the company's value and an act of diluting the rights and interests of the original shareholders. Once this cycle starts, it is difficult to reverse in the short term.

At the level of the controlling shareholder, Meijin Group holds 1.646 billion shares, accounting for 37.38% of the company's total share capital, and all of them have been pledged. Among them, the pledged shares that will mature within the next year total 1.207 billion shares, corresponding to a financing balance of 3.584 billion yuan. As of the end of the third quarter of 2025, the total balance of various loans of Meijin Group was 23.089 billion yuan, the debts due within the next year were 9.897 billion yuan, and the net profit in the first three quarters was - 537 million yuan.

In May 2026, the major shareholder completed the replacement of the pledge of 172 million shares - the old pledge was released, and the shares were re - pledged to a new credit bank, and the overall pledge ratio remained at 100%. It is worth noting that the maturity date of some pledges is marked as "January 1, 9999", which is essentially a perpetual pledge arrangement.

In 2024, the company planned to relieve the predicament by privately placing shares to acquire the assets of the major shareholder, but the negotiation was terminated after half a year. In November 2025, the hydrogen energy project funded by the raised funds was terminated, and all the remaining funds were used to supplement working capital. In June 2026, the company and five responsible persons including the chairman were issued warning letters by the Shanxi Securities Regulatory Bureau for three problems such as non - standard management of raised funds and non - standard management of insider information registration.

These events, taken together, outline a picture of continuously narrowing financial flexibility and gradually shrinking capital operation space.

The increase in coke production does not lead to an increase in profits, and the entire industry is in the red

Placing Meijin Energy's performance in the industry coordinate system can better clarify the structural nature of the problem.

Yunmei Energy lost 486 million yuan in 2025. Kailuan Co., Ltd. changed from an annual profit of 1.8 billion yuan to a loss of 32 million yuan. The net profit of Shanxi Coking dropped from 2.582 billion yuan to 83 million yuan, and the gross profit margin of the coke business was - 16.07%.

Meijin Energy's coke production in 2025 was 8.0369 million tons, a year - on - year increase of 19.97%. With nearly a 20% increase in production, the profit turned from profit to loss - the increase in production without an increase in revenue is essentially a signal of the loss of pricing power. Guizhou Meijin Huayu New Energy Co., Ltd., a subsidiary, lost 456 million yuan. The company accrued asset impairment losses of 182 million yuan and credit impairment losses of 114 million yuan throughout the year, totaling about 300 million yuan.

In 2026, 49 institutions conducted a concentrated research on Meijin Energy. The focus of the institutions' attention was highly concentrated: Will it trigger the delisting risk warning? How to arrange for the maturity of the convertible bonds? The company's response is: The revenue in 2025 was 1.7969 billion yuan, and it will not trigger the delisting risk warning; the financial department has started to plan the funds and expand the financing channels.

These responses sound well - organized, but when the three figures of 2.313 billion yuan in monetary funds, 2.789 billion yuan in the remaining balance of non - converted convertible bonds, and 23 billion yuan in the major shareholder's debt are juxtaposed, the constraints faced by the management become clear at a glance.

The fortune has shrunk by 77%, and the trajectory of the richest man's seat shift

The change in the wealth of the Yao Junliang family is a side - view of Meijin Energy's valuation regression process.

In 2022, the Yao Junliang family ranked 132nd in the country with a net worth of 32.91 billion yuan. On the "New Fortune 500 Wealth - Creation List" in 2025, this figure became 7.6 billion yuan, ranking 447th in the country and third in Shanxi. 25.3 billion yuan of wealth evaporated, with a shrinkage rate of about 77%. In front of the Yao family are Wang Guangxi and his wife of Yongtai Energy and Yang Xia of Jinbo Biotech.

In 2025, Gao Fane, the widow of the company's founder Yao Juhuo, passed away, and the shares of Meijin Group she held were inherited by her six children. The equity structure within the family is being adjusted, but the external debt scale has not been reduced.

The market has certain expectations for the recovery of the coke price in 2026, and some institutions predict that the company will end its consecutive losses in 2026. However, the credit rating downgrade means a narrowing of financing channels, the low stock price means that the channel for convertible bonds to be converted into shares is blocked, and the major shareholder's debts remain unresolved. These three constraints form a mutually reinforcing closed - loop.

The Yao Junliang family has held the position of the richest person in Shanxi for seven years, and 25.3 billion yuan of wealth has evaporated in four years. Behind this is not only the shrinkage of the family's wealth but also a complete pricing cycle of the capital market for a company's eight - year transformation story. The story of hydrogen energy has been told for eight years, with 2.3 billion yuan in cash on the books and 2.7 billion yuan in convertible bonds waiting to be redeemed.

When the gap between the story and the cash flow continues to widen, there is no way to talk about valuation repair.

This article is from the WeChat official account "Yujian Energy", author: Zhao Jianan. Republished by 36Kr with authorization.