Why didn't Curry choose ANTA?

Text by | He Zhexin

Edited by | Qiao Qian

On June 2, 2026, Stephen Curry, a star player of the current NBA Golden State Warriors, announced on his personal social media that his personal brand, "Curry Brand", would officially sign a contract with Li-Ning.

ESPN quoted people familiar with the matter as saying that the contract has a validity period of up to ten years. The content covers basketball products, sports casual clothing, Curry's right to sign athletes under his personal brand, and a complete product line of golf clubs. The specific amount of the contract has not been disclosed.

As a result, Li-Ning has become Curry's new partner after he ended his twelve-year cooperation with Under Armour in November 2025. It is worth noting that before Li-Ning, Anta also had contact with Curry's side, and there were rumors of a cooperation at one time, but it didn't materialize in the end. Some media speculated that in addition to the offer, what really tilted the balance in favor of Li-Ning was the autonomy the latter was willing to give, which is a more difficult-to-replicate bargaining chip than the amount of money.

This actually fits Curry's consistent logic of "not choosing mainstream brands". Thirteen years ago, Curry did not renew his contract with Nike and switched to Under Armour, which was a "rookie" among sports brands at that time. A frequently-told version is that Nike had many star players. At that famous proposal meeting, the other side mispronounced Curry's name, and there were still traces of other players in the PPT, which made him feel that he was not being taken seriously enough. Under Armour "got lucky" and has used this past event as part of its brand narrative for many years.

At first, Curry was just a signed player of Under Armour. In November 2020, he got his eponymous sub - brand "Curry Brand" within the Under Armour system. Since then, he has launched multiple generations of signature shoes from Curry 8 to Curry 13, opened the first single - brand store in Chengdu, and signed endorsement players represented by De'Aaron Fox.

More crucially, when Curry parted ways with Under Armour in 2025, he took this independent brand with him. According to the agreement between the two sides, Curry retained all trademarks and intellectual property rights of Curry Brand and could freely look for new retail partners; Under Armour included this separation in a restructuring plan with a maximum total of about $255 million.

When traditional sports brands sign stars, in essence, they are buying traffic and influence. However, when Li-Ning signs Curry, in essence, it has to offer the company's supply chain and R & D resources to "make clothes" for an independent brand that does not belong to itself. And one day in the future, this asset may also be taken away again in a package. Such an apparently unequal agreement is obviously not something that everyone is willing to accept.

Curry's in - depth participation in signature products further amplifies this attribute of "making clothes for others". In an exclusive interview two years ago, Curry once talked to 36Kr about the R & D process of Curry 12. From the initial two - dimensional sketches to three - dimensional modeling and then to the final samples, Curry would be deeply involved.

"If I say I don't like a certain design, they need to readjust it." Curry said at that time. This means that any enterprise that cooperates with Curry Brand not only has to invest resources but also needs to cede a considerable degree of decision - making power.

In the past few years, to cope with the growth pressure, Under Armour has continuously promoted organizational streamlining and cost control. Although the brand opened an independent store for Curry Brand in Chengdu, the subsequent investment has obviously become more cautious. For Curry, who hopes to further expand his personal brand territory, this is obviously not enough to meet his needs.

Back to the deal itself. According to Curry's unconventional signing method, Li-Ning in the final round is obviously the one willing to offer more chips.

Anta is no longer short of NBA stars. In 2014, it signed Klay Thompson from Nike. The KT series has reached its tenth generation, and it is the signature shoe series with the longest cooperation time between an active NBA player and a Chinese brand. In 2023, it signed Kyrie Irving, created the KAI series for him, and appointed him as the chief creative officer. Including Gordon Hayward and others, Anta has signed more than ten NBA players, making it the Chinese brand that has signed the most NBA players.

For Anta, Curry is undoubtedly a very valuable asset, but he is not irreplaceable. For Curry, joining Anta means that he won't be the only top - star here, and the resources will inevitably be diluted. Moreover, Anta's KAI and KT series have already accumulated their own sales volume and audience, and also have a channel foundation in overseas markets. Curry's arrival is more like icing on the cake rather than timely help.

Since Dwyane Wade's retirement in 2019, Li-Ning has long lacked a top - tier global - influence spokesperson in the NBA arena. Its basketball resources are more concentrated in the CBA system and the domestic market. After incorporating Curry into its territory, Curry Brand can almost enjoy all the investment of Li-Ning's basketball resources. More importantly, Curry retains the right to sign players for Curry Brand - this is a very important condition, and it is obviously more likely to be met by a "no - other - choice" partner.

Possible resource conflicts are not limited to basketball. In addition to basketball, Curry Brand's territory also covers golf. One of Curry's greatest hobbies as he approaches the end of his career is golf. And Anta has already made in - depth layouts in the golf category through FILA and Descente. Once signed, the golf product line of Curry Brand is almost destined to compete directly with the group's internal brands. On the other hand, this market is almost blank for Li-Ning.

For Li-Ning, which has long hoped to enhance its overseas influence, this is almost a path that did not exist before. Li-Ning and Curry have a vast and almost blank market in signing top - tier American university and high - school sports stars - they may even reach some sponsorship agreements covering entire schools, which is of great significance to Li-Ning.

The financial figures also confirm the asymmetry of the two sides' needs for this contract.

In 2025, Anta Sports' revenue reached 80.22 billion yuan, a year - on - year increase of 13.3%. If the affiliated Amer Sports is included, the group's total revenue exceeded 100 billion yuan as early as 2024. It owns a number of brands such as Arc'teryx, Salomon, and Wilson. "Other brands" such as Descente and Kolon have maintained high - speed expansion throughout the year. Anta's share in the Chinese sports footwear and apparel market is about 23%, ranking first, and it ranks among the top three globally. For such a company with "multiple cards in hand and upward - trending performance", Curry is just one of many options.

Li-Ning is in a different situation. In 2025, Li-Ning's revenue was 29.598 billion yuan, a year - on - year increase of 3.2%, reaching a record high. The net profit was 2.936 billion yuan, with a net profit margin of 9.9% - stable but with a moderate growth rate, and its scale is less than 40% of Anta Sports'. In its portfolio, Curry is almost the only trump card that can immediately leverage the global basketball narrative.

In other words, Li-Ning's need for Curry is far greater than Curry's need for Li-Ning - and this is exactly the ideal signing partner in Curry's mind. In fact, the news of this cooperation was released by Curry himself, instead of the brand's statement as per industry practice, nor was it jointly announced by both sides, which fully proves that the balance of this cooperation has tilted in favor of Curry.

It is not difficult to find that Curry's ambition for Curry Brand is just like Jordan's for Jordan Brand back then. The question is whether Li-Ning can shape Curry into the next Jordan, which remains to be tested by time. At present, there are at least two obstacles.

Firstly, its business model is unreplicable. In 1984, Nike and Jordan created an unprecedented star commission model: for every pair of Jordan shoes sold, Jordan himself could get a commission. All parties estimate this ratio to be about 5% (there is also a more conservative estimate of 4%). In 2024 alone, it brought Jordan about $300 million in income. The revenue of Jordan Brand has increased from about $2.8 billion in 2018 to about $7 billion in 2024, accounting for 13.6% of Nike's total revenue. In fact, it is already an independent brand parasitizing within Nike (this statement has also been confirmed by Nike insiders). This model has not been replicated by any sports brand so far, and even Nike itself has not signed a "second Jordan". Perhaps, Nike just doesn't want to cede more brand - leading power.

Secondly, the return rate of the basketball business itself is not what it used to be. Even if a star similar to Jordan emerges, it is almost impossible to replicate the glory of Jordan Brand back then. Li-Ning has to face a sports category that is entering a slow - growth period. How to truly transform Curry, along with his independent brand that "makes clothes for others" and may be taken away at any time, into the brand's growth engine instead of an expensive marketing expense may be the ultimate test of this ten - year contract.

If it succeeds, this will become a landmark case in the globalization process of Chinese sports brands; if it fails, it will also become an expensive experiment for the industry to re - examine the "super star + independent brand" model.