From Alipay to WeChat: Who Killed Bank Credit Card Apps?
The banking industry is witnessing a new wave of "decluttering," with the target being independent credit card apps.
On May 13th, the Bank of China issued an announcement stating that its credit card - specific mobile app, "Binfen Shenghuo," will cease all services by the end of June.
Two days later, Mengshang Bank also announced that it will shut down its "Mengshang Credit Card" app.
Previously, the Postal Savings Bank of China announced that its "Postal Savings Credit Card" app will gradually stop updates. National joint - stock commercial banks such as Hengfeng Bank and Bohai Bank have successively shut down their independent credit card apps. Regional banks like Ningbo Bank, Jiangxi Bank, Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank, and Beijing Rural Commercial Bank have taken the lead in phasing out or merging their independent credit card clients. China Everbright Bank has promoted the in - depth integration of its "Sunshine Huimin Life" app with the main mobile banking app and streamlined its channels.
It's worth noting that the claim that the Bank of China is "the first state - owned large - scale bank to shut down its independent app" is actually a misinterpretation.
In fact, as early as 9 years ago, precisely in 2017, China Construction Bank officially took offline its credit card - specific independent app, "Palm Long Card," and integrated its functions into the mobile banking app.
Looking at it comprehensively, from China Construction Bank's "Palm Long Card" to the Bank of China's "Binfen Shenghuo," this "confluence" spanning 9 years signals the complete end of the era of independent credit card apps in banks.
However, the exit of independent apps doesn't mean the decline of credit cards. Instead, it shows that retail finance in banks has finally broken free from the superstition of "opening multiple entrances and blindly boosting monthly active users (MAU)" on the mobile Internet. Banks are now comprehensively cleaning up technological redundancies and returning to the financial essence of high ROI (Return on Investment).
Further speaking, against the backdrop of a continuous narrowing of the net interest margin and a downward trend in asset - end returns, banks have to shift from "seeking superficial glory" to "seeking substantial results."
From "Expansion" to "Falling Below 700 Million Cards": A Struggle in the Existing Market
Behind the intensive shutdowns of independent credit card apps lies an iceberg of data that makes industry insiders shiver.
Data from the People's Bank of China shows that as of the end of 2025, the number of in - use credit cards and combined credit - debit cards nationwide was 696 million, falling below the 700 - million mark. The scale has shrunk by nearly 120 million in 3 years.
It already seems rather bleak, but it's not the end. On May 15th, the latest data released by the People's Bank of China shows that as of the first quarter of 2026, the number of in - use credit cards and combined credit - debit cards nationwide was 687 million. That is to say, after three months, the number has shrunk by 9 million.
Why is the current situation of the credit card industry so harsh? In a nutshell, demand calls the shots.
The economist Joseph Schumpeter once pointed out that for every supply, there is a corresponding demand somewhere in the economy. From this perspective, credit cards and independent credit card apps are indeed influenced by user demand.
Not to mention the more distant past. When China Construction Bank shut down its "Palm Long Card" in 2017, the domestic credit card market was in a period of rapid expansion, the "incremental era." At that time, the mobile Internet was booming. From shopping in malls to dining, traveling, and entertainment, users needed convenient payment methods. Credit cards, which allowed card - less payment and offered the convenience of consumer credit, were favored and became widespread.
Following the trend, major banks launched various discounts, subsidies, and benefits to attract more users to apply for and use credit cards, accelerating their "expansion." To better meet user needs, gain an additional traffic entrance, accumulate user resources, and form synergy with credit business, banks launching independent credit card apps became an industry "standard."
The problem is that as time has passed, users no longer have to rely on credit cards for either convenient payment or consumer credit. Coupled with the low usage frequency of credit card apps, and the combination of multiple unfavorable factors, user activity is naturally low.
Overall, on one hand, the number of credit cards is shrinking, and on the other hand, user activity is low. The credit card industry has entered a "struggle in the existing market" mode. At the same time, the cost - effectiveness of maintaining dual - app operations has completely fallen below the critical point.
From China Construction Bank to the Bank of China: Bank Management Finally Figures Out the Math
From the perspective of banks, maintaining dual - app operations is indeed not cost - effective.
On one hand, most banks have their own main mobile banking apps, which already include functions such as credit card application, inquiry, and repayment, meeting user needs.
On the other hand, each independent credit card app is a "money - swallowing black hole" in the financial statements:
First, the rigid costs of R & D and network security are high.
Jiang Xufeng, a senior financial practitioner, wrote in an article that the upfront technical R & D cost of developing a relatively well - functioning credit card app can reach millions. After that, multi - version adaptation, daily maintenance, and high - level network security protection directly push the annual rigid technical and operational investment of an independent app in the financial statements to tens of millions of yuan.
Second, marketing expenses have been in a long - term self - consuming competition.
Previously, in order to enhance user activity and demonstrate the market influence of their credit cards, many banks "worked hard" to boost the monthly active users of their credit card apps. Subsidies were often focused on "50% off on Fridays," "Two types of life vouchers (meal vouchers and movie vouchers)," "Daily discounts," etc. However, this practice competed with the marketing funds of the main mobile banking app, significantly reducing the "overall business input - output ratio" in the bank's financial statements.
To address these issues, the industry consensus in recent years is to integrate credit card business with the main mobile banking app to form a "super app."
In the financial statements, the benefits of the "super app" are obvious: First, the customer acquisition cost per customer (CAC) is significantly reduced. There is no need to guide users to download two apps and pay double download subsidies, directly reducing the "business and management fees" in the financial statements. Second, the cross - selling conversion rate (Cross - selling) is significantly improved. In the past, 90% of users in independent credit card apps only checked accounts and repaid debts and couldn't see other bank products. After integration, the repayment traffic can be smoothly converted into assets under management (AUM) for wealth management and asset allocation, increasing non - interest net income. Third, it avoids the redundancy of funds for two sets of servers and maintenance teams, highly intensifies resources, and has a higher return on investment (ROI) for financial technology.
Precisely because they have figured out this math, from state - owned large - scale banks like China Construction Bank and the Bank of China to regional banks, they have all shut down their independent credit card apps.
China Construction Bank's "Integration Route" vs. China Merchants Bank's "Adherence to an Independent Ecosystem"
Although many banks have shut down their independent credit card apps, some banks still insist on deeply cultivating independent apps. These two approaches present a dual - line confrontation, each with its own advantages and disadvantages, leaving different digital survival samples for the industry.
In 2017, China Construction Bank's "bold move" of shutting down its "Palm Long Card" initiated the "China Construction Bank model" of overall integration. In addition to China Construction Bank, banks like the Agricultural Bank of China and the current Bank of China directly include credit cards as a core tab or a major ecological section within the main mobile banking app.
The advantage of this model is that resources are no longer scattered. The main app has a large amount of traffic, and credit cards can naturally undertake the cross - conversion of hundreds of millions of savings users. The disadvantage is that the main app becomes a "super app" with overly complex functions, and the brand perception of credit cards among young users may be diluted.
In contrast, banks like China Merchants Bank and China CITIC Bank still adhere to independent apps, providing exclusive and precise services for credit card users. Since China Merchants Bank is a pioneer, this can be called the "China Merchants Bank model."
The advantage of this model is that it can expand business from credit cards to many consumption scenarios. In fact, apps like China Merchants Bank's "Palm Life" and China CITIC Bank's "Dongka Space" have successfully shed their pure financial nature and transformed into deeply - penetrated "local life consumption platforms," meeting the life needs of young consumers through meal vouchers and movie vouchers, and showing an independent, young, and fashionable brand image.
The disadvantage is that, as mentioned before, the operating costs and marketing expenses of independent credit card apps are high and continuous, requiring long - term subsidies.
Moreover, external Internet giants are quite powerful. Companies like Meituan, Alibaba, and JD.com control the local life consumption market, leaving limited market space for bank credit cards and independent apps.
Taking China Merchants Bank as an example, in 2025 when JD.com announced its entry into the food delivery market and a "three - way battle" was staged in the local life market, the non - interest income of China Merchants Bank's credit cards (mainly the commission income from merchants when users swipe their cards) decreased by 15.73% year - on - year, the largest decline in the past five years.
After comparing the two models, it's not difficult to find that the "China Merchants Bank model" of adhering to an independent ecosystem may face more severe challenges and put a more prominent test on the comprehensive capabilities of banks.
Should Alipay and WeChat Pay Take the Blame?
Who is the "culprit" behind the accelerated shutdown of independent credit card apps?
Many people think it should be Alipay and WeChat Pay. The reason is simple. They have taken away the direct access rights in the small - value consumption scenario, causing users to get used to binding cards and making payments in Alipay and WeChat. They don't need to open bank apps, let alone independent credit card apps.
This is indeed an important reason, but in the view of Yilan Business, it's only an external factor. The core internal factor is the collapse of banks' "scene superstition" and the end of the traffic dividend.
Here, China Construction Bank provides an observation window.
In 2017, when China Construction Bank shut down its "Palm Long Card," it was the peak period of mobile Internet traffic. Banks had sufficient reasons to take advantage of this "huge traffic wave" to bind rich life scenarios and make credit card usage more frequent. However, looking back, two key points determined China Construction Bank's shift:
The first key point is that China Construction Bank acutely realized that "banks can't compete with Internet giants in competing for high - frequency life scenarios." This is because Internet giants have stronger traffic advantages and have been deeply involved in daily life for many years, with high - built moats.
This is also a harsh industry reality. Yilan Business found that in April 2018, media such as China Fund News sighed that "the daily active users of all bank apps are less than half of Alipay," vividly demonstrating the situation of "being unable to compete with Internet giants" mentioned above.
The second key point is that in 2017, China Construction Bank's mobile banking app had 266 million users and 42.52 million monthly active users, with much higher traffic than the independent credit card app. At this time, adding functions to the main app was obviously a more stable option than creating an independent credit card app and making continuous investments.
Even so, during the period when the entire industry was opening multiple traffic entrances and indulging in "scene superstition," these two key points were not very prominent. It wasn't until the traffic dividend gradually ended that other banks woke up: Instead of spending a lot of money to sell movie tickets and offer dining vouchers in independent apps and never being able to compete with Alipay, Meituan, and WeChat, it's better to guide users to the mobile banking app and focus on wealth management, which is what banks are best at and most profitable at.
Fortunately, the main mobile banking app has always been a "fundamental base" for banks to deeply explore and conduct refined operations.
The Coming - of - Age Ceremony of China's Retail Finance
It's necessary to note that neither the "China Construction Bank model" nor the "China Merchants Bank model" is completely isolated.
In the market competition, banks often don't stick rigidly to a single route. For example, although China Construction Bank shut down its "Palm Long Card," it later launched "CCB Life" to provide a one - stop "life + finance" service, but it has always focused on the main app. And although China Merchants Bank adheres to the independent ecosystem of its credit card app, it also emphasizes "Payment, Wealth Management, and Borrowing in One App" on the splash screen of its main app.
The real trend worth noting is that with the continuous shutdown of independent credit card apps, the "subtraction era" of mobile finance is irreversible. On the basis of focusing on and deeply cultivating the main app, banks' digital channels are shifting to lighter - weight external ecosystems such as WeChat mini - programs and UnionPay QuickPass components.
In this trend, there are both the cost advantage of "lighter weight" and the ecological complementarity brought by channel migration.
A report recently released by QuestMobile shows that the dual - channel drive of "App + mini - program" has become the "standard" for bank digitization. What excites the industry is that the user overlap between the two channels is low, indicating that mini - programs don't divert the core users of the main app. Instead, they "successfully reach the long - tail users or light - weight service scenarios that the app fails to cover, forming an effective complement."
Whether it's the current market competition or the evolving future trend, the main app is the core of banks. Looking back, in 9 years, the banking industry has transformed from the superstition of "opening multiple entrances" to the rationality of "building the core precisely," marking the coming - of - age ceremony of China's retail finance.
This also means that the decision of China Construction Bank to shut down its "Palm Long Card" in 2017 has become the "standard answer" for the entire industry 9 years later. The collective shutdown of independent credit card apps is not the end of credit cards but the inevitable path for China's banking industry to shift from "seeking superficial glory (inflated monthly active users of apps)" to "seeking substantial results (real asset AUM and high ROI)."
It can be said that this is the essence of banks' "decluttering" of independent credit card apps.
This article is from the WeChat official account "Yilan Business." Author: Xiangma. Editor: Xue Xiang. Republished by 36Kr with authorization.