It is suggested that all Dida users find their own Tongcheng
On June 29, the Hong Kong stock market witnessed an industrial merger and acquisition that will reshape the landscape of the travel and tourism industries.
Tongcheng Travel and Dida Chuxing jointly issued an announcement stating that the former, through its wholly - owned subsidiary eLong, Inc., has launched a voluntary conditional cash offer for the latter. The offer price is HK$1.3875 per share, representing a premium of approximately 12.8% over Dida Chuxing's closing price on the previous trading day, with a total consideration of approximately HK$1.424 billion.
Five major shareholders of Dida Chuxing have signed irrevocable undertakings, indicating their intention to accept the offer for shares representing approximately 53.70% of the issued share capital. After the completion of the transaction, Tongcheng Travel intends to maintain Dida Chuxing's listing status.
On the day after the announcement, Dida Chuxing's share price soared by over 96% at one point. The reaction of the capital market reflects a certain degree of recognition of the industrial logic behind this transaction. At a time when the growth of mobile Internet traffic has plateaued and both the travel and tourism industries have entered a phase of competition for existing customers, "Dida - like" companies may really need to find their own "Tongcheng".
The High Wall of Traffic and the Gap in the Ecosystem
Dida Chuxing's story began in 2014, originally named Dida Carpooling. It was the pioneer in China's ride - hailing sharing market. However, the first - mover advantage of the pioneer is almost negligible in the face of the overwhelming competition from traffic giants.
In 2015, Didi's ride - hailing sharing service was launched and it took the top spot in the industry within just a few months. Since then, the situation has reversed several times. Didi suspended its ride - hailing sharing service due to safety incidents, allowing Dida to regain the first place. In 2023, Hello's ride - hailing sharing service captured 47.9% of the market share in terms of the number of rides, pushing Dida to the second place.
Upon closer examination, the root cause of each of these setbacks over the years lies in the lack of a traffic entry point.
For Didi, the ride - hailing sharing service is just an additional feature in its app. In addition to the entrance on Alipay, Hello also has its blue bicycles scattered across urban and rural areas as offline customer acquisition touchpoints.
In contrast, Dida Chuxing has to rely on long - term market investment to acquire each new user. Over time, the high cost of customer acquisition has ultimately become a "fixed expense" for Dida.
Specifically, although Dida's sales and marketing expenses decreased by 28.8% year - on - year from RMB 171 million in 2024 to RMB 122 million in 2025, its revenue during the same period also decreased by 36.2% from RMB 787 million to RMB 502 million. As a result, the ratio of sales expenses to revenue increased from approximately 21.7% in 2024 to approximately 24.2% in 2025. In comparison, Didi's sales expense ratio in 2025 was only 7.4%.
This is reflected in the share price. The company's shares broke below the issue price on the first day of listing and have been on a downward trend ever since. On June 10, 2026, the share price hit a record low of HK$1.02 per share. As of June 29, Dida Chuxing's total market capitalization has been hovering around HK$1.3 billion, less than one - third of its value at the time of listing.
It's not just Dida. Other ride - hailing platforms such as Ruqi Chuxing and Caocao Chuxing are also facing the pressure of overall downward - fluctuating share prices. Behind the lack of attention from the capital market for the ride - hailing industry is a deeper structural problem: single - service ride - hailing platforms lack high - frequency and low - cost customer acquisition scenarios, and the sporadic nature of users' travel needs makes it difficult for platforms to build a stable traffic moat.
The crux of the problem doesn't solely lie in profitability. Dida Chuxing adopts a light - asset model. It doesn't own vehicles or hire drivers, but only acts as an information intermediary, which has also kept Dida Chuxing away from losses. In the first half of 2025, the gross profit margin of its travel - related services was 65.6%, approximately 3.5 times that of Didi.
The company has maintained profitability for seven consecutive years, with an adjusted net profit of RMB 138 million in 2025. As of the end of 2025, Dida's current assets were approximately RMB 1.897 billion, including approximately RMB 967 million in cash and cash equivalents, and its asset - liability ratio was only 27.88%, which proves that Dida Chuxing's business model is viable.
This is exactly the value that Tongcheng Travel can provide. In 2025, Tongcheng Travel's annual revenue was approximately RMB 19.4 billion, a year - on - year increase of 11.9%; its adjusted net profit was approximately RMB 3.403 billion.
As of the end of 2025, Tongcheng Travel had accumulated over 400 million registered users; in the first quarter of 2026, the number of annual paying users reached 254 million, and the total number of annual service person - times reached 2.05 billion. More than 87% of its registered users are from non - first - tier cities, which highly overlaps with Dida Chuxing's user profile.
However, Tongcheng Travel's ambition is not just to "infuse blood" into Dida. As of the end of 2025, Tongcheng's transportation business revenue was RMB 7.93 billion, and its accommodation business revenue was RMB 5.45 billion. Users can book flights and hotels on Tongcheng, but the "last mile" from the transportation hub to the hotel after getting off the plane or train is not within Tongcheng's service scope.
Dida is connected to approximately 21 million certified private car owners, covering urban commuting, inter - city travel, holiday returns, and transportation hub transfers. This is a transportation capacity network that has undergone real - name authentication, facial recognition, and vehicle verification, and it is a scarce asset in the travel industry that is difficult to replicate in the short term.
What's more crucial is the frequency. Travel is a low - frequency consumption activity, occurring only a few times a year, while ride - hailing sharing is a high - frequency, weekly or even daily active scenario. Through Dida, Tongcheng can extend its services from low - frequency travel to high - frequency daily commuting.
In essence, this transaction is Tongcheng paying HK$1.424 billion for a springboard to leap from a "low - frequency OTA" to a "high - frequency travel platform".
The Boundary between OTA and Ride - Hailing Platforms is Blurring
Taking a broader view, this transaction reflects a deeper industrial trend: the boundary between OTA and ride - hailing platforms is blurring.
Ctrip has "Ctrip Car Rental", Meituan has "Meituan Taxi", and Fliggy has "Fliggy Car Rental". Every OTA platform is trying to complete the puzzle of ground transportation. Tongcheng is not the first player to cross the border, nor will it be the last.
In June 2026, Didi App 8.0 was launched, and the app name was changed from "Didi Chuxing" to "Didi". New entrances such as "Delivery", "Travel", and "Car Owner" were added to the home page. The official statement is that it is continuously expanding from "instant travel" to "planned travel" and from "transporting people" to "transporting goods".
Removing the word "Chuxing" is to remove the label and make users associate "Didi" with "lifestyle services". One is moving from travel to lifestyle services, and the other is moving from tourism to daily travel. Didi and Tongcheng are moving in different directions but meeting at the intersection of travel.
Tongcheng's acquisition of Dida happened in the same month as Didi's "de - travel" transformation. The competition logic in the travel market is shifting from "transportation capacity scale" to "scenario coverage". The one who can occupy more nodes in the user's complete travel chain will have more say.
Tongcheng has the "booking" scenario (flights, hotels) but lacks the "travel" scenario (transportation from the hub to the destination). Didi has the "travel" scenario and is now complementing the "booking" scenario (it launched train and flight ticket services at the beginning of 2024). Two paths, one destination.
From a more macroscopic perspective, this transaction also implies a shift in the valuation logic. Dida was listed at an issue price of HK$6, while Tongcheng launched an offer at HK$1.3875, less than one - quarter of the issue price.
For a platform with over 400 million registered users, covering 366 cities, and having maintained profitability for seven consecutive years, this price is difficult to explain with simple financial indicators. The market's valuation of Dida reflects doubts about its viability as an "independent third - party ride - hailing platform"; the premium offered by Tongcheng is a bet on its synergy value as "a part of Tongcheng's travel ecosystem".
The same asset can have a huge difference in valuation in different contexts, which is exactly a microcosm of the current wave of integration in China's Internet industry.
Whether this transaction can ultimately be completed is subject to several conditions: More than 50% of the voting rights are held before the offer deadline, regulatory approval is obtained, and Dida continues to maintain its listing status.
Five major shareholders have signed irrevocable undertakings, indicating their intention to accept the offer for shares representing approximately 53.70% of the issued share capital. The acquisition funds will be provided by China CITIC Bank (International) in the form of a loan of up to HK$1.5 billion. Judging from the current progress, the probability of completion is relatively high.
The ride - hailing sharing industry itself also faces policy - related uncertainties. In February 2026, the Ministry of Transport clearly stated that ride - hailing sharing belongs to "civil mutual assistance" and profit - making is strictly prohibited. How to maximize commercial value within the regulatory framework is a challenge that Tongcheng Travel and Dida Chuxing need to face together.
If the transaction is completed, Dida will no longer be an "independent third - party" facing the high wall of traffic alone, but will become a part of Tongcheng's travel ecosystem.
For more platforms like Dida that "have good products but lack good entry points", Dida's path provides a reference. Instead of struggling alone in the cracks between traffic giants, it is better to find a "Tongcheng" that can complement its own shortcomings and fill the other party's gap.
After all, in an era where traffic equals power, not every company needs to become a platform, but every company needs to figure out which ecosystem it will survive in.
This article is from the WeChat official account "Super Focus foci", written by Bai Mo and published by 36Kr with permission.