Vigilance: International paper publishing could dismantle the moats of the photovoltaic, energy storage, and wind power industries. Who will guard the defense line of China's new energy security?
There is a high incidence of espionage in China's new energy field, and researchers need to tighten the string of confidentiality.
Yujian Energy noticed that CCTV News recently reported a major event. To improve the integrity of a submitted paper and target higher - level international SCI journals, a researcher at a domestic key laboratory skipped the mandatory confidentiality review process of the unit. In the publicly published paper, the core mechanical structure, material ratio, extreme operating condition parameters, and exclusive processing technology of a self - developed important device were fully disclosed. The paper was successfully published, and the individual's academic achievement was completed, but the domestic cutting - edge key technology was completely leaked to the outside world. After the incident, the researcher was seriously held accountable, the laboratory was rectified, the project was stopped, and the evaluation for awards was reset to zero.
This is not an isolated academic violation incident.
It points to a deeper dilemma: When China has taken the global lead in fields such as photovoltaics, energy storage, and wind power, some of our researchers and industry practitioners have not realized what those "ordinary data" in their hands mean. Overseas institutions are eyeing these data, and the first screw on the defense line is quietly loosening in papers, meetings, and photos.
01
The Ministry of State Security has issued consecutive warnings
New energy has become a hard - hit area for espionage
Since 2025, the frequency of notifications from the Ministry of State Security has increased significantly.
A notification in May 2025 clearly pointed out that overseas spy intelligence agencies have invested huge amounts of funds and resources, applying the latest scientific and technological achievements to infiltrate and spy on China, and have clearly targeted fields such as photovoltaics, semiconductors, rare earths, and high - end chips.
Immediately afterwards, at the beginning of June, the Ministry of State Security disclosed the case of Yu, a technical staff member of an energy enterprise.
Yu's story began with an outdoor walk. In 2017, when he was a technical staff member of an energy enterprise, he met a foreign tourist, Mr. A. After a few casual chats, under the guise of academic cooperation and topic discussion, Mr. A continuously asked Yu for wind power location maps, equipment operation and maintenance parameters, and energy storage technology details. Since 2017, Yu has earned more than 500,000 yuan in total and provided a large number of confidential documents related to national energy security to overseas. In 2019, after Yu left the energy company and tried to apply for a civil service position, he was exposed during the political review and was finally arrested.
Please note the core content that Mr. A asked for: wind power location coordinates, equipment operation and maintenance parameters, and energy storage technology details.
What do wind power location coordinates mean? They mean the geographical information of China's key wind energy resource areas, the exact location of power grid access points, and the layout of energy infrastructure around military facilities. Equipment operation and maintenance parameters expose the actual operating status, failure rate, and extreme operating conditions of wind turbines. Combined, these things are enough for overseas institutions to deduce the vulnerable points of China's new energy infrastructure.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of State Security has also monitored another infiltration method: Some companies with the background of overseas spy intelligence agencies, under the guise of building wind power anemometer towers, have quietly infiltrated the areas around China's important classified sites, illegally collecting sensitive data information and privately transmitting it overseas.
The anemometer tower itself is a conventional device for wind power development, but there are many issues involved in where it is built, what data it collects, and where the data is sent. If an anemometer tower is built near a military restricted area, it will collect more than just wind speed data.
02
The "perfect" paper in the photovoltaic laboratory
Has become a free technical manual for opponents
Let's get back to the issue of scientific research paper leakage itself.
Why did that researcher "skip the mandatory confidentiality review"? Because the more complete the paper data and the more detailed the parameters, the easier it is to publish in a high - impact - factor journal. This is the positive incentive given to him by the current scientific research evaluation system. He needs to graduate, get a professional title, and obtain projects, while confidentiality review will only add trouble, slow down the progress, and may even lead to the paper being rejected by the journal due to "classified information".
This logic also holds in the photovoltaic field.
In 2025, JinkoSolar sued the Indian company Waaree in the United States for infringing on the core patent of N - type TOPCon, with a technical similarity of over 90%.
In the same year, it was reported that the data of TOPCon batteries in a photovoltaic laboratory of a domestic university was leaked. The school sealed the server overnight, and the biggest suspect was an Indian doctoral student studying photovoltaic technology at the school.
In the photovoltaic laboratory of this 985 - level university, Indian students account for almost half. Nationwide, 65% of Indian students in China are studying science and engineering majors such as electrical automation, photovoltaic technology, and biopharmaceuticals.
Without evaluating the right or wrong of this practice itself, Yujian Energy only puts forward an assumption. If an overseas student takes all the process parameters of a Chinese photovoltaic laboratory back to his country, an Indian enterprise may make up for the technical short - board that originally took five years in just three months.
In fact, those parameters include the defect density of the passivation layer, the extreme temperature value of the high - temperature process, and the thixotropic coefficient of the metal paste, each of which was tested by Chinese enterprises at a high cost.
Moreover, in the latest notification of the Ministry of State Security in May this year, it was mentioned that some scholars were deceived by the so - called scientific research cooperation and manuscript invitation from overseas institutions and exchanged internal classified data for the opportunity to publish papers with their names.
An overseas manuscript invitation can exchange for three years of experimental data of domestic researchers. The other party can buy out a latest technical manuscript by paying a few hundred dollars for the page fee.
Overseas institutions are very clear about this account.
03
Energy storage technology is being "legally" taken away
Export control cannot block the loopholes in awareness
The situation in the energy storage field is more complicated.
In 2024, CATL accused its competitor of poaching the technical team and copying patented technology, resulting in a high overlap of cell product parameters, and claimed 150 million yuan in compensation.
Yujian Energy believes that personnel flow is the most traditional channel for technology outflow, but by no means the only one.
In 2025, it was reported that Reliance Industries in India planned to allow Chinese energy storage enterprises to set up battery production plants in India through technology authorization or joint - venture factories, so as to introduce Chinese equipment, materials, and processes.
If this cooperation model is combined with insiders defecting to overseas intelligence agencies, the preparation process of lithium iron phosphate, the sintering temperature curve and doping ratio of high - nickel ternary materials will flow out as a whole.
Of course, the country has been tightening control.
At the beginning of 2025, the Ministry of Commerce, together with the Ministry of Science and Technology, proposed to adjust the "Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited and Restricted from Export by China", adding restricted export items such as the preparation technology of lithium iron phosphate for batteries and the preparation technology of lithium manganese iron phosphate. In the same year, China implemented export control on lithium batteries and manufacturing equipment for the first time, comprehensively managing the weight - energy density, materials, and process equipment.
But can these policies control an extra line of parameters in each submitted paper? Can they control an extra technical question answered at each academic conference? Can they control an accidentally photographed equipment panel in each laboratory photo?
No.
The policies govern the action of "export", but cannot govern the "careless" mindset.
Previously, during the tendering period of an offshore wind power project, an overseas enterprise tried to obtain the design parameters of China's independently developed floating wind power foundation in the name of "technical exchange". The project team strictly implemented the confidentiality review and avoided the outflow. This is a good example.
But the Ministry of State Security also mentioned in the notification that in 2025, an enterprise suffered an economic loss of 640 million yuan due to the leakage of trade secrets. No one can calculate how much of this 640 million yuan was caused by "careless mistakes".
04
Consciously and actively defend the security of new energy
It can't only rely on official documents
Let's go back to the original question: Who should tighten the first screw on the defense line?
The Ministry of State Security repeatedly emphasized in the warning that scientific research confidentiality "is not only to protect one's own scientific research results, but also to contribute to the protection of national science and technology security".
This statement is formal, but the truth is not false. When a photovoltaic researcher writes "sintering temperature range: 585℃ - 605℃" in the appendix of a paper, he may think it is just an ordinary data. But what he doesn't know is that when overseas peers see this data, they can deduce his equipment model, process route, material system, and even judge the upper limit of the yield rate of this production line.
Writing papers is not illegal, and publishing in SCI journals is not a sin. Real academic exchange is the exchange of ideas, methods, and directions, not the full disclosure of core structures and exclusive parameters. Extreme operating condition parameters, material ratios, and unpublished experimental data should perhaps never appear in the supplementary materials of public literature.
At the 2025 Tianjin Summer Davos Forum, Pham Minh Chinh, the Prime Minister of Vietnam publicly stated that "since China has developed, it should have the obligation to help the weak". Indian media was even more outraged, accusing China of "holding back Indian manufacturing by not transferring technology". The EU is brewing a policy of "no technology transfer, no entry into the European market".
These words can be regarded as diplomatic rhetoric, but also as a signal: The whole world is eyeing China's new energy technology and trying to get it.
And the ways to get it are not necessarily stealing and robbing. Sometimes, it is a review comment on a paper: "Please supplement detailed experimental parameters." Sometimes, it is a question - and - answer session at an academic conference: "Can you share your thermal management solution?" Sometimes, it is a manuscript invitation letter from an overseas journal: "We are very much looking forward to your exclusive data."
What our researchers need to do is not to stop publishing papers or stop academic exchanges, but to ask themselves one more question before pressing the "submit" button: What will happen if the content in this paper is fully downloaded by competitors?
The answer to this question is the first line of defense for China's new energy security.
This article is from the WeChat public account "Yujian Energy", author: Wang Mengjiao. Republished by 36Kr with authorization.