Wang Jianlin, you're really in trouble this time.
Wang Jianlin is really in trouble this time.
Recently, an announcement of a compulsory enforcement case has once again pushed Wang Jianlin, who has been continuously slimming down to save himself, into the spotlight of public opinion.
On the evening of May 21st, Yonghui Superstores officially applied to the court for compulsory enforcement against Wang Jianlin, Sun Xishuang and related enterprises to recover a huge debt of over 3.6 billion yuan, and the case has been accepted by the court.
Different from Wanda's past corporate - level debt crises, this dispute directly targets Wang Jianlin's personal joint and several guarantee liability. His personal assets and personal reputation are directly exposed to judicial risks, and it also poses significant uncertainties for Wanda Commercial Management, which is preparing for a Hong Kong IPO.
At this critical juncture when Wanda is continuously selling assets, reducing liabilities and striving for listing, this sudden personal debt storm has become one of the most thorny crises Wang Jianlin has encountered in recent years.
01
Yonghui Superstores Seeks to Recover Over 3.6 Billion Yuan from Wang Jianlin, Sun Xishuang, etc.
This huge debt dispute of over 3.6 billion yuan originated from an equity transaction in December 2023 that attracted wide attention in the industry. It is the judicial final result after the two - year - long performance of the agreement between the two parties completely broke down.
At that time, in order to optimize its own asset structure and recover operating cash flow, Yonghui Superstores divested its non - core equity investments and reached an equity transfer agreement with Dalian Yujin Trading Co., Ltd. It transferred its 389 million shares in Dalian Wanda Commercial Management Group Co., Ltd. externally. This transaction was also one of the larger - scale equity turnovers in Wanda Commercial Management in recent years.
The counterparty of this transaction is an affiliated entity deeply bound to Wanda: Dalian Yujin is an indirectly wholly - owned subsidiary of Dalian Yifang Group, and its actual controller is Sun Xishuang. Sun Xishuang is a long - time close friend and core partner of Wang Jianlin. The two have long - term in - depth cooperation in the fields of real estate and commercial operation. This transaction is also interpreted by the market as an operation by affiliated parties to take over the equity and stabilize the equity structure of Wanda Commercial Management.
To ensure the performance of the transaction and enhance the transaction credit, the agreement clearly stipulates that Wang Jianlin, Sun Xishuang and Dalian Yifang Group shall provide full joint and several guarantee liability for all the payments, liquidated damages and derivative expenses of this transaction.
This guarantee clause is the core root of Wang Jianlin being directly listed as an enforced person, and it also allows the transaction default risk originally between enterprises to directly penetrate to the personal level of the actual controller.
After the transaction was completed, the main debtor, Dalian Yujin Trading, did not pay the equity transfer payment in installments as agreed. There were multiple payment delays, and later it even terminated the performance of the agreement and has been in long - term arrears.
After multiple consultations and written notices between the two parties, the arrears situation still did not improve, and Yonghui Superstores had no hope of getting the payment back. To resolve the huge bad debt risk and safeguard its own asset bottom line, Yonghui Superstores officially filed an arbitration with the Shanghai International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission in October 2024 to recover all the arrears and default losses.
In April 2026, the arbitration commission made a final award, fully supporting Yonghui Superstores' claims: it ruled that Dalian Yujin should pay the remaining equity transfer payment of 3.639 billion yuan, and an additional 218 million yuan in accelerated - maturity liquidated damages. With the addition of various expenses such as arbitration fees, lawyer fees and preservation fees, the total scale of the case exceeded 3.85 billion yuan.
At the same time, it was clearly stated that Wang Jianlin, Sun Xishuang and Dalian Yifang Group shall bear joint and several liability for all the debts and shall complete the payment within 20 days after the award takes effect.
After the award took effect, the responsible parties still refused to perform their obligations, and finally Yonghui Superstores initiated judicial measures.
On May 21, 2026, Yonghui Superstores officially announced that the case had been officially approved for compulsory enforcement by the court, which means that this debt tug - of - war that has lasted for more than two years has completely entered the stage of compulsory enforcement, and judicial accountability has been fully implemented.
02
How Many Aces Does Wang Jianlin Have Left?
Since the debt crisis broke out in 2021, Wang Jianlin has always adhered to the self - rescue route of "selling assets, reducing liabilities and making a light - asset transformation". For several consecutive years, he has large - scale divested heavy assets and non - core businesses, and the asset scale of the Wanda system has shrunk significantly.
After continuous slimming down, his currently controllable and realizable core assets are concentrated in the main business of commercial management, existing properties and a small amount of cultural and tourism sectors.
The core high - quality assets are concentrated in the main business of Wanda Commercial Management, which is also the current core profit - making and listing entity of Wanda.
Data shows that despite the continuous sale of Wanda Plazas in recent years, Wanda Commercial Management still maintains a large management scale, operating and managing more than 500 commercial shopping centers across the country. It is a leading commercial property operation service provider in China in terms of scale.
Among them, the vast majority of high - quality plaza assets are included in the Hong Kong IPO entity, Zhuhai Wanda Commercial Management. They are the core assets for listing, with strong stability and stable cash flow, and are currently Wanda's most core high - quality resources.
From 2023 to the present, Wanda has sold more than 80 Wanda Plazas in total, including 48 core urban plazas packaged and transferred in 2025 and multiple projects such as Shanghai Zhuanqiao, Changde and Changzhou Xinbei that were transacted in 2026, recovering tens of billions of funds in total.
Even so, according to the calculation of Daxiang News, there are still about 140 Wanda Plazas in the Wanda system that are not included in the listing entity. These assets are Wang Jianlin's core reserve chips to resolve the short - term debt crisis.
In addition, Wanda still holds core cultural and tourism projects such as Changbaishan International Resort, Wuhan Central Cultural District and Lanzhou Wanda City. At the same time, it retains the Baby King children's industry and some sports event marketing businesses, forming a stable supplement to the operating cash flow.
In the cultural sector, the control right of Wanda Film has been transferred to Shanghai Ruyi, and only a small amount of equity is retained, no longer having control. In addition, the remaining small amount of corporate equity investments are mostly non - core assets with weak realizable ability.
03
Wanda's Listing Road May Suffer Another Heavy Blow
This compulsory enforcement case of over 3.6 billion yuan is by no means a simple financial dispute. It has a great impact on Wang Jianlin's personal reputation, Wanda Group's operation and the Hong Kong IPO process of Wanda Commercial Management.
In the past, all of Wanda's debt risks were limited to the corporate level, and Wang Jianlin has never been subject to large - scale compulsory enforcement personally. If the full joint and several guarantee liability is implemented this time, the court can legally seal up, freeze and deduct his private assets such as equity, real estate and deposits under his name to cover the principal and interest of the debt of over 3.85 billion yuan and related expenses.
At the 2015 annual meeting of Wanda Group's chairman, Wang Jianlin sang "Nothing to My Name".
If he fails to make the payment on time, he may be included in the list of dishonest persons and those subject to consumption restrictions, and his personal business reputation will be completely damaged.
For a private commercial giant that highly depends on Wang Jianlin's credit endorsement, Wang Jianlin's personal reputation may directly affect the cooperation and financing of the entire system.
Especially in recent years, Wanda Commercial Management has been trying to list in Hong Kong. The gain or loss of Wang Jianlin's personal business reputation is crucial at this juncture.
It is worth mentioning that before this crisis broke out, PAG Capital had already joined hands with leading institutions such as CITIC Capital and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority to launch a precise "operation" on Wanda Commercial Management, making every effort to clear the obstacles for the Hong Kong IPO. This is also the core ace for Wanda to turn around in recent years.
The institutional parties invested nearly 60 billion yuan as strategic investment, completely reconstructing the equity structure of Wanda Commercial Management. The shareholding of Wanda Group was significantly compressed from over 70% to 40%, and external institutions such as PAG Capital hold a total of 60%. According to a report by Yicai, regarding the listing issue, the new investment will no longer set up a gambling agreement, breaking the biggest compliance and performance barriers for the IPO.
In order to further meet the compliance requirements for listing in Hong Kong, in March this year, there was an industrial and commercial change in Wanda Commercial Management Group Co., Ltd. (the core operating company wholly - owned by Zhuhai Wanda Commercial Management). Wang Zhibin stepped down as the legal representative and manager, and Xiao Guangrui stepped down as the executive director. Chen Qi took over as the legal representative, manager and director.
This move means that Wang Zhibin and Xiao Guangrui, representatives of Wang Jianlin's old - school, have completely left, and the professional manager Chen Qi hired from the outside has officially taken over.
At the same time, the company's registered capital increased from 50 million yuan to 51 million yuan.
The adjustment of senior management and registered capital is considered by the outside world as the "compliance calibration" that must be completed before the disclosure of the prospectus for listing in Hong Kong, paving the way for the Hong Kong IPO in all aspects.
However, this wave of compulsory enforcement of over 3.6 billion yuan may have a significant impact on the results prepared by PAG Capital. Zhuhai Wanda Commercial Management is currently Wanda's main core listing platform and also its ultimate ace to resolve existing debts and open up long - term financing channels. The Hong Kong IPO review has extremely strict requirements on the compliance, judicial risks and credit status of the actual controller.
Wang Jianlin being listed as an enforced person and being deeply involved in a huge compulsory enforcement dispute is a major negative matter in the listing review. It will not only delay the listing review progress, greatly increase the review difficulty, trigger special inquiries from regulators and in - depth doubts from institutional investors, but may even lead to the suspension of the listing review.
Overall, this debt - chasing storm of over 3.6 billion yuan is one of the most severe tests on Wanda's self - rescue road in recent years.
04
The "Reluctant" Yonghui
Different from the outside world's focus on Wanda's crisis, Yonghui's pursuit of accountability this time may also be "reluctant".
Financial report data shows that Yonghui Superstores has long been trapped in a quagmire of continuous losses, and its performance has been in a downward trend for many years. Since 2021, the company's net profit attributable to the parent has been negative for five consecutive years, with a cumulative loss of over 12 billion yuan in five years. The once "No. 1 stock in the fresh food supermarket industry" has completely fallen into a performance trough.
Among them, the net loss attributable to the parent in 2023 was 1.329 billion yuan, and in 2024 it was 1.465 billion yuan, and the loss continued. In 2025, the performance further deteriorated. The annual revenue was 53.508 billion yuan, a significant year - on - year decline of 20.82%. The net loss attributable to the parent was as high as 2.552 billion yuan, setting a new high in recent years. In the fourth quarter alone, the loss was 1.84 billion yuan, and the operating pressure reached its peak.
To reverse the decline and get out of trouble, Yonghui has launched a radical strategic contraction and store reform in recent years, completely abandoning the scale - expansion route and turning to quality improvement and slimming down.
In 2025, Yonghui closed 381 inefficient stores and renovated 315 stores in total. Through large - scale store closures, supply - chain optimization and personnel streamlining, it compressed costs. However, the high - intensity reform and adjustment also caused huge transformation losses. Coupled with the external impacts such as the diversion of community group - buying and online retail and the intensified involution in the supermarket industry, the company's profitability has been continuously weakened, and it has never been able to get out of the loss dilemma.
Under continuous huge losses, the asset scale of Yonghui Superstores has continued to shrink, and its capital chain is extremely fragile. Data shows that the company's total assets shrank from the peak of 62.143 billion yuan in 2022 to 30.462 billion yuan at the end of 2025. The assets were nearly halved in three years, the asset - liability ratio continued to rise, and the company's risk - resistance ability decreased significantly.
Although the company briefly achieved a turnaround from loss to profit in the first quarter of 2026, it was only a small - scale phased repair and did not completely reverse the long - term operating decline. The company still faces multiple problems such as low revenue, weak profits and pressure on existing assets.
In this context, this potential payment of over 3.85 billion yuan has become a key chip for Yonghui to get out of trouble, with extremely high strategic value.
Conclusion:
Although Wang Jianlin still has some asset aces in hand, the damage to his personal credit, the obstruction of the listing process and the pressure on the capital chain have put Wanda's self - rescue road into an unprecedented deadlock.
Yonghui Superstores, in the desperate situation of continuous losses and shrinking assets, "reluctantly" bets on this huge payment to survive.
The two once - glorious capital trajectories are now colliding at the node of judicial compulsory enforcement.
Ultimately, whether Wanda can cut off its arm to survive and overcome the difficulties again, or whether Yonghui can use this opportunity to recover and reverse the decline is still uncertain. But it is certain that this storm not only concerns the ownership of the 3.6 - billion - yuan debt, but also will profoundly affect the future development of the two enterprises.
This article is from the WeChat public account "Phoenix Finance". Author: Company Research Institute. Republished by 36Kr with authorization.