It's reported that Amazon will acquire Globalstar for $9 billion. Can this reshape the landscape dominated by SpaceX's Starlink?
On April 2, multiple sources revealed that Elon Musk's SpaceX has submitted an IPO application to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission confidentially, aiming to raise $75 billion. If successful, it could set a new global record for IPO scale. Analysts estimate that SpaceX's potential valuation of approximately $1.75 trillion will be largely driven by its Starlink satellite business.
Interestingly, on the same day, there were reports that Amazon is in talks to acquire satellite communications company Globalstar to accelerate the construction of its own low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite business and compete with SpaceX's Starlink. The potential deal is estimated to be worth up to $9 billion.
On one hand, there is an industry pioneer on the verge of entering the capital market, aiming to "rule" with a trillion - dollar valuation. On the other hand, there is a latecomer still on the path of catching up, trying to accelerate through mergers and acquisitions. The appearance of these two pieces of news on the same day seems to be a signal - the LEO satellite internet is transitioning from a "technology race" to a "full - scale competition of capital and resources." If the acquisition is finalized, its impact may go beyond a $9 - billion - level deal and could reshape the global satellite internet competition landscape.
$9 Billion: Buying Not Assets, but a Time Window
For Amazon, the core significance of this acquisition lies in "seizing time."
Since 2019, SpaceX has achieved an unprecedented launch rhythm relying on its reusable rocket system. As of April 2026, Starlink has over 10,000 satellites in orbit, accounting for 66% of the world's active satellites. The number of active global users has exceeded 10 million, covering 155 countries and regions. It has a market share of over 85% in the global LEO satellite internet market, and is now supporting the overall valuation of the company.
In contrast, Amazon only entered the intensive launch phase in recent years. The current number of its satellites in orbit is only in the hundreds, far from its planned constellation of 3,200 satellites. In late January this year, Amazon applied to the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for a 24 - month exemption or extension until July 2028 to meet the deadline of deploying about 1,600 internet satellites by July 2026. At that time, the company blamed the delay on factors beyond its control, including "recent shortages in rocket supply" and production disruptions. This slow deployment progress has drawn strong criticism from the FCC chairman, who said that Amazon is "about to miss the satellite deployment milestone."
This gap is not only reflected in "quantity" but also in "time." The satellite internet is not an industry where one can catch up slowly. Its underlying logic is more similar to platform - type infrastructure: the first one to achieve global coverage has a better chance of locking in spectrum resources, orbital positions, and the earliest high - value customers. Once the network forms a scale effect, latecomers will not only have to pay a higher cost but also face multiple barriers such as user migration costs, ecological binding, and service inertia.
More practical pressure comes from the business side. Amazon has started signing service contracts externally, such as cooperating with airlines like Delta to provide in - flight Wi - Fi. This means that its network construction is no longer just an internal technical advancement but has entered the stage of "fulfilling external commitments." If the deployment progress fails to match the business rhythm, it will not only affect customer trust but also weaken its bargaining power in subsequent market competition.
Against this backdrop, the strategic significance of Amazon's acquisition of Globalstar becomes clear. Now, let's look at the target company, Globalstar - an established satellite mobile communication company headquartered in Louisiana, USA. The company has a turbulent development history: it filed for bankruptcy in 2002, resumed operations with the investment of a private equity fund in 2004, and had a turning point in 2017 when the FCC approved the use of its 2.4GHz frequency band for 5G terrestrial communications. In 2025, Globalstar achieved revenues of $273 million, a year - on - year increase of 9%, and an operating profit of $7.4 million, turning a profit from losses.
Overall, although Globalstar cannot be compared with Starlink in terms of satellite scale and market influence, its L - band and S - band spectrum authorizations, global ground gateway station network, and years of accumulated business operation experience constitute the most difficult and time - consuming infrastructure in the LEO satellite business. Acquiring these resources often requires going through complex regulatory approval cycles and long - term capital investment, which is exactly what Amazon needs most at present.
Apple: The "Invisible Judge" of This Deal
If the potential deal between Amazon and Globalstar is a surface - level "buyer - seller game," the one who may really determine the direction of the deal is likely a party not directly at the center of the negotiation table - Apple. In this competition, Apple is more like an "invisible judge." Its attitude not only affects whether the deal can be finalized but may also reshape the power structure of the entire satellite internet ecosystem.
The reason is that in 2024, Apple invested $1.5 billion in Globalstar and holds a 20% stake. Globalstar agreed to reserve 85% of its network capacity for Apple, mainly for the "satellite messaging" function of iPhones outside the base station coverage area. If Amazon wants to complete the acquisition, it will inevitably need to have in - depth discussions with its competitor, Apple.
From Apple's perspective, satellite communication capabilities are becoming an important complement to its hardware ecosystem. By integrating functions such as satellite SOS into its terminal devices, Apple is extending its "connectivity" from traditional cellular networks to a wider range of extreme scenarios. This not only enhances product differentiation but also subtly increases user dependence on the ecosystem. In this context, if Globalstar is acquired by Amazon and its resource allocation logic shifts from "serving a single large customer" to "building an open network," the service priority and stability that Apple values most may face uncertainty.
Therefore, the core tension of this deal is not only an extension of the competition between Amazon and SpaceX but also implies a dispute between two completely different technology paths: on one hand, there is the "closed - ecosystem integration" represented by Apple, emphasizing in - depth control of key capabilities and consistent experience; on the other hand, there is the "open - network expansion" represented by Amazon, pursuing scale coverage and multi - scenario service capabilities. Before these two logics reach a balance, Apple's attitude becomes an important weight in tipping the scales.
Before Apple's attitude becomes clear, there are still many uncertainties in this acquisition case that could shake the global satellite internet market pattern.
The LEO Race Enters the "Resource Integration Period"
From a more macro - industrial perspective, a more notable change is taking place: the LEO satellite race is transitioning from the early "technology verification period" to the "resource integration period."
In the past few years, the core narrative of the LEO race revolved around "can it be done" - whether high - frequency launches can be achieved, whether large - scale constellations can be built, and whether stable connections can be provided. During this period, the dominance was in the hands of companies with engineering and launch capabilities, and technological breakthroughs themselves were the threshold. However, as leading players gradually complete the prototype of constellations and commercial services start to be launched, the industry's focus is quietly shifting: the question is no longer "can it be done" but "who will control the key resources."
These "key resources" are highly scarce and irreplaceable. First, there are spectrum and orbital resources. Their allocation is essentially restricted by international coordination and regulation and has natural exclusivity. Second, there are ground infrastructure and network access capabilities, which determine whether the satellite network can be truly converted into usable services. Third, there are terminal entrances and user relationships. Whether it is consumer electronic devices, enterprise customers, or industry application scenarios, they are all key interfaces for monetizing connectivity. Once these resources are gradually occupied by leading companies, latecomers, even if they have technological capabilities, will find it difficult to enter the competition at the same cost.
Against this backdrop, the industry is showing an obvious integration trend: through investment, cooperation, and even mergers and acquisitions, dispersed spectrum, network, and application capabilities are quickly integrated into a system. This integration is not only an efficiency choice but also a "position - taking" behavior - occupying a favorable position before the resources are fully locked in. More fundamentally, the focus of competition in this stage has shifted from "whose technology is more advanced" to "who can build a more complete system." A single capability is no longer sufficient to support long - term competition. The real barrier lies in cross - level integration capabilities: forming a closed - loop from satellites in the sky, to the ground network, and then to the terminal devices in hand and application scenarios.
Conclusion
Currently, both Amazon and Globalstar have remained silent and refused to make an official comment on this rumor. Whether the acquisition is finalized or not, the competition for spectrum, network, and terminal entrances is in full swing. In this race, what may be truly reshaped is not only the competition pattern but also the ownership of the dominance of the next - generation connectivity infrastructure.
This article is from the WeChat official account "Internet of Things Think Tank" (ID: iot101). Author: Sophia. Republished by 36Kr with permission.